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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: HUMORS, BRAIN CHEMISTRY, AND MATERIAL
EMOTION
In August of 2002, the National Public Radio program This American Life
dedicated an hour long show to looking at one chemical that profoundly impacts the
human body in strange, exciting, and sometimes terrifying ways: testosterone. The
program featured an interview with an anonymous man whose body, for medical reasons,
had stopped producing testosterone. He lived without the chemical for four months
before doctors caught the problem and reintroduced it to his body. It is not surprising that
he felt his body undergo many changes over these months. However, the most significant
changes that he noticed were not weight gain, hair loss or anything else he would
normally associate with his physical body. Instead, he was surprised to find that the most
essential, private, and enduring aspects of his personality were suddenly and dramatically
altered. He explains, “Everything that I identify as being me, my ambition, my interest in
things, my sense of humor, the inflection in my voice, the quality of my speech even
changed in the time that I was without a lot of the hormone.”
“What happened after the testosterone was reintroduced?” asked Ira Glass, the
show’s host. The man explains,
The introduction of testosterone returned everything. There were things
that I find offensive about my own personality that were disconnected
then. And it was nice to be without them. Envy, the desire to judge itself, I
approached people with a humility that I had never displayed before.
1

2
He became aware that the very nature of his personality not only relied specifically on a
chemical but that the healthy levels of the chemical created traits that he disliked. This
knowledge initiated a crisis of identity. He began to question the nature of the
relationship between his “self” and his body. He explains:
I grew up in a culture, like all of us, that divides the soul from the body.
And that is your singleness, that is your uniqueness, and nothing can touch
that. And then I go through this experience where I have small amounts of
a bodily chemical removed and then reintroduced, and it changes
everything I know as my self. And it violates the sanctity of that
understanding, that understanding that who you are exists independent of
any other forces in the universe. And that's humbling. And it's terrifying.
The anonymous man is describing a very complicated terror. He starts by conflating the
notion of “personality,” “soul,” “singleness,” “uniqueness,” and “self.” It is deeply
important for him to be able to believe that this ambiguous core of his being “exists
independent of any other forces.” When he realizes that a physical material, one that can
be chemically defined, studied under a microscope, and extracted from (or inserted into)
his body, has such a profound effect on his understanding of this essence of his being, it
challenges his very ability to know who he is.
Reflecting on this interview, Glass concludes:
I think when it comes to this stuff, most of us do not know what to believe.
We're caught between thinking that our hormones and body chemistry can
determine so much about our personalities and wanting to believe that
they don't.
For many, the idea that “selfhood” can be described in material terms is profoundly
unsettling. Questions about how to navigate the relationship between physiology and a
personal, private sense of self have certainly been opened by the recent turn to
neuroscience. For example, David Johnson Thornton claims that “the language of the
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brain” is so powerful a vocabulary that people have come to see themselves as
“neurochemical selves;” we now use neurochemical vocabulary to express our anxieties,
articulate our hopes and dreams, and rationalize our disappointments (150). However, I
argue that neither this concept of a material self nor the confusion about the desire to
construct an immaterial identity is “new.” Instead, the language of neuroscience, which
describes the body in psychophysiological terms, harkens back to an ancient system of
belief: Galenic humoralism.
From antiquity until the turn of the nineteenth century, temperament, mood, and
personality were believed to exist within, be managed by, and interact with material
substance. Before the medical revolution of the late seventeenth century, early modern
theories of anatomy and medicine were primarily based on the writings of Galen, who
lived in the second century but was influenced by a much older medical and
philosophical tradition. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, while Shakespeare,
Jonson and their contemporaries were writing the drama that revolutionized the early
modern stage, European culture was undergoing a similar, but opposite
phenomenological shift: it moved away from the monistic view supported by humoralism
towards what would eventually become identified with Cartesian dualism.
In this period, the playwrights raise the same central question that Glass asks: “to
what extent can anyone have an emotional “self” that is autonomous from a tangible,
mortal form?” Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth feels that her “self” is brave and ruthless, but
is ashamed of her woman’s body with its cowardly “white heart” (2.2.62). 1 Is she her

1

Unless otherwise noted, all Shakespeare quotations are cited from the second edition of
The Norton Shakespeare, adopted from the text established by The Oxford Shakespeare.
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emotional body or something else? In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, two young, fickle
lovers and the immortal fairy queen are completely overcome and emotionally
transformed under the influence of love, contained in a physical liquid potion. Is love
anything more than their bodies’ reactions to the overwhelming substance? These
questions can only be asked when one lacks the ability to rely on a dualist distinction
between mind and body, self and form, emotion and materiality. However, these
questions also depend on a desire for a sense of self that “exists independent of any other
forces.” This project will discuss what is at stake when the monist notion of emotional
experience as physiology (supported by both Galenic and neuroscientific medical
writing) interacts and conflicts with the dualistic notion of an autonomous and immaterial
emotional self.
The Post-dualist Self: A Turn to Neuroscience
Ever since the term “neuroscience” was coined in the 1960’s, this
interdisciplinary field, which brings together biology, chemistry, and psychology, has
brought a revolution in the ways that we are able to conceive of individual emotional
consciousness. Neuroscience is increasingly permeating many aspects of contemporary
culture. In 1990, the U.S. Congress designated the 90’s as the Decade of the Brain, “to
enhance public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain research.” 2 23 years
later, President Barack Obama pledged $100 million to back a project intended to unlock
the mysteries of the human brain. Increasingly, neuroscience is becoming integrated into
all aspects of inquiry about the human experience. The brain is becoming the focal point

2

See the Library of Congress’s account of “The Decade of The Brain” at
www.loc.gov/loc/brain
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of more and more medical research, as well as diagnostic and treatment tools.
According to American Enterprise Institute scholar Sally Satel and psychologist
Scott O. Lilienfeld, the idea that the study of the workings of the human brain can answer
questions about the enduring mysteries of psychology and philosophy has become
increasingly fashionable. It is now so prevalent that contemporary thinkers, in both the
sciences and the humanities, are becoming what they call “neurocentric.” “Brain scans
have been used to help politicians understand and manipulate voters, determine guilt in
court cases, and make sense of everything from musical aptitude to romantic love” (Satel
and Lilienfeld 1). They argue that this “view of the mind” risks undermining our most
deeply held ideas about selfhood, free will, and personal responsibility.
Certainly, the influx of knowledge about the physical brain is opening territory to
the neuroscientist that was once reserved for philosophers. According to Patricia Smith
Churchland, who is best known for launching the subfield of “neurophilosophy,” “The
questions, whether asked by philosophers or neuroscientists, are all part of the same
general investigation” (2). She claims, “Top-down strategies (as characteristic of
philosophy, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence research) and bottom-up
strategies (as characteristic of the neurosciences) for solving the mysteries of mind-brain
function should not be pursued in icy isolation from one another” (3). Martha Farah,
coiner of the term “neuroethics,” claims that the recent findings of neuroscience call for a
new approach to the most basic phenomenological questions and necessitates a new
approach to ethics because, “in principle, and increasingly in practice, we can understand
the human mind as part of the material world. This has profound implications for how we
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regard and treat ourselves and each other. It gives us powerful new ways to predict and
control human behavior and a jarringly material view of ourselves” (1).
According to Owen Flanagan, the former president of the Society for Philosophy
and Psychology, the predominant theoretical approach that many neuroscientists rely on
is “identity theory.” This theory assumes:
All mental states are in fact brain states. We access the surface structure of
our minds first-personally, in a phenomenological manner, in terms of
how a particular experience feels to us. But first-person access fails to get
at the neural deep structure of our mental states. Only impersonal, or third
person, techniques can do this. (Flanagan 595)
According to this viewpoint, “what there is and all there is, is physical” (Flanagan 594).
Jon Mills is one of many psychologists to express concern about the implications of
materialism. In his article, “Five Dangers of Materialism,” Mills defines materialism as
“a reaction against and rejection of Cartesian dualism that posits a non-extended
‘thinking substance’ associated with an immaterial mind” (7). He acknowledges that
there are many forms of dualism, including:
the Platonic distinction between appearance and reality; Kant’s separation
of phenomena from noumena; the ontological distinctions between being
and essence; the dialectically opposed forces and manifestations of
consciousness; and the epistemological chasms between the knowing
subject and object. (7)
He does not defend ontological dualism, but argues that materialist conceptions of mind
pose many problems. Specifically, he points to “(a) the displacement of an ontology of
consciousness, (b) a simplistic and fallacious view of causality, (c) the loss of free will,
(d) renunciation of the self, and (e) questionable judgments concerning social valuation”
(5). Critics like Mills regularly (and correctly) credit the very recent neurobiological
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boom with the increasingly materialistic worldview but, as Elena Carrera points out,
they do not account for the fact that this approach is not new:
Some of the research conducted in ‘affective neuroscience’ in the last two
decades has become closer to the Aristotelian and Galenic approaches by
questioning traditional views of cognition and affect as separable (and
often opposing) forces or processes within the mind, suggesting that they
are interrelated processes, and that their distinction is phenomenological,
not ontological. (Carrera 17)
In Shakespeare’s Brain (2001), Mary Thomas Crane refers to the work of cognitive
scientists who discuss the embodiment of thinking and feeling including Gerald
Edelman’s Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (1992), Antonio Damasio’s Descartes’ Error (1994),
and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh (1999). In her
introduction, she cites a passage from Stephen Kosslyn and Oliver Koenig’s Wet Mind:
“the mind is what the brain does” (4). She claims that this sums up the dominant
cognitive position and, in this way, “contemporary cognitive theory resembles the preCartesian, Galenic materialism that shaped early modern concepts of the body and mind”
(17). In other words, early moderns, like neurobiologists, understand feeling and thought
to occur not within a mind, but within the substance of a material body.
The Pre-dualist Self: A Return to Galen
Galenic humoralism does not provide a systematic way of understanding the way
that the body worked and experienced the world. In fact, by the early modern period,
there were many contrasting and inconsistent interpretations of Galen. William Kerwin
argues, “The discourses of humoral embodiment are so ubiquitous and so multiple as to
have no coherence unless accompanied by other narratives” (195). Similarly, Ciobanu
Estelle Antoaneta borrows Baktin’s term “heteroglossia” to describe “the co-existence of
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discourses vying for hegemonic status” in renaissance medical discourse (125). In the
twentieth century, historicists including Lily B. Campbell and John W. Draper recovered
humoralism and approached it as a key that allowed them to understand early modern
physiology. In 1946, Louise C. Turner Forest sternly criticized her contemporaries,
claiming that the concept of “Elizabethan psychology” as it was conceived by the critics
in the first half of the 20th century was “erudite nonsense,” and that her contemporaries’
understanding of a comprehensible, definable humoralism was more “the creation of our
own minds than a resurrection of sixteenth-century reality” (651-52). Instead, she argues,
The truth is that Elizabethan psychology was neither exact nor consistent,
and could not possibly have been used in the way we have been led to
believe. This is simply precluded by its very nature. Figurative in and of
itself one moment, and yet concrete the next, Elizabethan psychology is a
hodge-podge of utterly contradictory "facts," conflicting theories,
hopelessly inter-mixed, overlapping terms, and extremely variable and illkept distinctions. (656)
Marjory E. Lange heeds this advice, but presents a counterclaim:
Even though the degree of consistency and coherent order that was
expected in the centuries following the seventeenth is not an attribute of
Renaissance medical interpretation, their physio-psychology has its
regulating principals (19).
For example, in the humoral system the body is composed of four humors: black bile, the
cold, dry humor associated with melancholy; phlegm, the cold, wet humor associated
with passivity; yellow or red bile, the hot, dry humor associated with choler; and blood,
the hot, wet humor associated with sanguinity. The four humors are also associated with
the four seasons and the four elements (black bile with autumn and earth; phlegm with
winter and water; blood with spring and air; yellow/red bile with summer and fire). Not
only the human body, but everything in the natural world was composed of these same
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four substances. Therefore, eating, drinking, touching, feeling, and even reading could
impact the body’s balance. 3 The humoral body was inseparable “from the external
elements on which it depends—air, food, drink, even astrological influences. Crucial to
its understanding of physiology are notions of input and output” (Harris 14).
Early modern Galenists generally believed that the humors were produced in the
liver, but different scholars and anatomists associated different organs with different
humors. An imbalance of the humors can be caused by or cause both physical and
spiritual diseases. In his Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton cites Cornelius
Agrippa’s The Nature of Spirits and Levinus Lemnius’s The Secret Miracles of Nature,
claiming that both describe:
How the body, being material, worketh upon the immaterial soul, by
mediation of the humours and spirits, which participate of both, and illdisposed organs, Cornelis Agrippa hath discussed. For as anger, fear,
sorrow, obtrectation, emulation, saith Lemnius, cause grievous diseases in
the body, so bodily diseases affect the soul by consent… The body is the
dwelling of the soul, her house, abode, and stay; and as a torch gives better
light, a sweeter smell, according to the matter it is made of, so doth our
souls perform all her actions, better or worse, as her organs are disposed.
(374)
The language Burton uses in his explanation is a perfect example of why it is so difficult
to cohesively summarize the early modern conception of material emotion. While Burton
claims that the soul is immaterial, it is clearly impacted by “bodily diseases” including
anger and fear. These emotions are caused, in part, by the concretely material “illdisposed organs.” How does the relationship between the immaterial soul and the
3

In Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature (2004), Elizabeth Spiller situates her
argument about early modern reading practices within the context of humoralism. By
focusing on the way that the body functions in a humoral world, she concludes that
reading was understood to happen in and to the body; from the early modern perspective,
what one reads cannot only morally but physically change who one is.
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material body work? What is the physical essence of the passion? In Burton’s
monumental medical treatise, these questions remain unanswered. Although, it is
unambiguous that Burton believes that the human body is physically moved and altered
by the passions, he does not clearly establish how the movements of the body relate to the
qualities of the soul.
According to the diverse early modern interpretations of Galenic humoralism,
there is no emotional self that exists in a sovereign relationship to the forces of the body.
Instead, in Louise M. Bishop’s words, “Emotions are matter” (37).
Galenism conceives of an individual’s feeling and thinking as derived
from and reflection of the “matter”- humor in his body. Galenic theory,
then, which was available to both reading and listening publics, attributes
psychology, mentality, to the “stuff” of humors. And because these
humors are one with the cosmos, so too the individual’s humoral character
is connected “literally,” through the body as well as through emergently
material words, to the external universe.” (Bishop, 34-35)
For example, in The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1604), Thomas Wright describes
the relationship between the organs, the humors, the spirits, the character of man, and the
soul.
We may gather how that the heart is the seat of our passions, that spirits
and humours concurre with them: here we may deduce a conclusion most
certayne and profitable, that according to the disposition of the heart,
humours and body, diverse sorts of persons be subject to diverse sorts of
passions, and the same passion affecteth divers persons in divers manners:
for as we see fire applyed to drie wood, to iron, to flaxe, and gunpowder,
worketh diverse wayes; for in wood it kindleth with some difficulty, and
with some difficulty is quenched; but in flaxe soone it kindleth and
quencheth, in yron with great difficulty is it kindled, and with as great
extinguished, but in gunpowder it is kindled in a moment, and never can
be quenched till the powder be consumed. Some men you shall see, not so
soone angrie, not yet soone pleased, and such be commonly fleugmatike
persons; others you have, soone angrie, soone friended, as those of a
sanguine complexion, and therefore commonly they are called
goodfellowes: others be hardly offended, and afterward, with extreame
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difficulty reconciled, as melancholy men: others are all fiery, and in a
moment, at every trifle they are inflamed, and till their heartes be
consumed (almost) with choller, they never cease, except they be
revenged. By this we may confirme that old saying to be true… the
manners of the soule followe the temperature of the body. (D3r)
Wright first argues that the organ of the heart is where passions meet the humors of the
body. He then claims that the literal heart influences moods, characteristics, and manners.
I will discuss the centrality of the material organ of the heart in greater detail in chapter 5.
Wright uses a lengthy analogy to make this claim. Wood, iron, flax, and gunpowder each
react to flame differently. Similarly, phlegmatic, sanguine, melancholic, and choleric
people all respond differently to the same passion. For Wright, this is not a dead
metaphor. Instead, the flammability of these different substances represents a direct and
vivid expression of his own knowledge of the body. Just as wood, iron, flax, and
gunpowder burn differently because they are chemically different, the phlegmatic,
sanguine, melancholic, and choleric individuals are also physically composed of different
substance, and those substances respond differently to literal heat. Most importantly, he
concludes that this heat of the body (the way that one’s material humoral makeup
responds with the heat of the embodied passion inside the organ of the heart) influences
what the soul is. The quality of the soul and the character of the person are related to the
temperature of the body.
Furthermore, the organs (which produced these humors) were “emotionally
charged” and could affect the person without his or her intervention (Paster, The Body
Embarrassed 10). Katherine Eisaman Maus explains, “[I]n vernacular sixteenth- and
early seventeenth-century speech and writing, the whole interior of the body – heart,
liver, womb, bowels, kidneys, gall, blood, lymph – quite often involves itself in the

12
production of the mental interior, of the individual’s private experience” (195). Gail
Kern Paster explains that humoral bodies are animated by forces called “passions,” which
are “imbued with moral density and spiritual import” and act within the body “just as the
forces of wind and waves act in the natural world” (Humoring the Body, 6). When Paster
claims that early modern writers typically “understand the nature of passions as liquid,”
she is not suggesting that one should take this claim metaphorically (4). Instead, she
asserts that the human body literally moves with these passions; “the emotions actually
were liquid forces of nature” (4).
Early modern writers answer questions about what these passions are, where they
originate from, and to what extent they could be controlled with radically inconsistency.
For example, in The Mysterie of the Holy Government of Our Affections (1620), Thomas
Cooper recognizes that many of his contemporaries hold the belief that bodily humors
drive the passions. However, he claims, “The Affections proceed from the Soule, and not
the Bodie, not the Humours” (B15v-B16r). Unlike Burton, Cooper imagines a soul,
which exists as the origin of affection, to be entirely independent of the body. For
Cooper, passions are not physical products of the embodied humors. They are intangible
elements which “give fuell to our desires, & bellowes there unto” (B16r). Passions figure
forth the “desires of the mind, in the outward man” (Cooper B16r). Therefore, the source
of human desire becomes a question of spirituality, not physicality. In her seminal
volume, The Body Embarrassed (1993), and its successor, Humoring the Body (2004),
Paster exhaustively demonstrates that, for an early modern, humoral physiology was not
only a tool to describe human character, but was a ubiquitous, intensely corporeal, “livedin-the-body” reality. She argues that the relationship between the humors and their
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influence on the body is not one of cause and effect but of equation. Too much choler
does not cause anger; instead choler is anger. Mental imbalance is humoral imbalance.
Paster argues that the questions of selfhood and questions of the body are inseparable.
Paster’s book grows out of, and contributes to, the burgeoning field of “the
history of emotions.” In response to the “dramatic explosion of interest in emotions
throughout a wide variety of disciplines as well as around the world of research and
scholarship” the International Society for Research on Emotions (ISRE) was founded in
1984 (isre.org). 4 Since then, an interdisciplinary focus on emotion has become what
William Reddy, author of The Navigation of Feeling, calls “a revolution” (34). Patricia
Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, in their collection of essays, The Affective Turn, trace
the emphasis in the humanities and social sciences on the body and the emotions. They
argue that this turn comes out of science studies, critical theory, post-structural feminism,
and queer theory. William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns envision the
history of emotions not as a specialized field but, “as a means of integrating the category
of emotion into social, cultural, and political history, emulating the rise of gender as an
analytical category since its early beginnings as “women’s history” in the 1970s”
(Plamper 237).
4

The extent to which this field is thriving can be measured by the number of international
research societies that are specifically dedicated to the history of emotions. The 2007
launch of the Languages of Emotion at Freie Universität Berlin, a research center
founded to investigate “the complex relationships between emotions and language, art,
culture, and society,” marked the institutionalization of the field. The following year, The
Queen Mary Centre for the History of the Emotions at the University of London and the
Max Planck Institute for Human Development Center for the History of Emotions were
established. ISRE began publishing an interdisciplinary journal devoted to this topic,
Emotion Review, in 2009. More recently, the ARC Center of Excellence for the History
of Emotions, a collaboration across five Australia Universities, was founded in 2011,
with the specific goal of using historical knowledge from Europe, 1100-1800, to
understand the long history of emotional behaviors.
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Paster’s new historicist approach to humoral theory inspired a surge of
scholarship in what she calls “the historical particularity of early modern emotional selfexperience” (Humoring the Body 23). Her emphasis on the materially emotional body
has deeply impacted a range of early modern scholars who apply her study of embodied
experience to their work on diverse topics. For example, David Houston Wood explores
how the connections between the humoral body and conceptions of time and temporality
shape the concept of the self within early modern texts about health and emotion in Time,
Narrative, and Emotion in Early Modern England (2009). Victoria Kahn, Neil
Saccamano, and Daniela Coli theorize about the various ways early modern writers’
changing perception of the body and gradual abandonment of humoral discourse lead to a
new understanding of the self as a free, autonomous agent capable of political agency
(Politics and the Passions, 1500-1850, 2006). Other recent work explores the extent to
which the humoral body allows for human agency in altering and manipulating the very
experience of embodiment. For example, Schoenfeldt argues in Bodies and Selves in
Early Modern England (1999) that diet and nutrition enabled physiological and affective
self-fashioning. Mary Floyd Wilson's English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern
Drama (2003) suggests an ethnic and regional self-fashioning, both putting
“embodiment” into the hands of culturally informed social agents. Similarly, in the
introduction to the 2012 special issue of Shakespeare, which focuses on “Shakespeare
and the Culture of Emotion,” each essay uses Paster’s new critical emphasis on humoral
theory as a starting point but, as Richard Meek claims, “this theory is only one way of
approaching this topic, and needs to be brought into dialogue with other cultural
frameworks and theoretical insights… Shakespeare’s characters themselves contemplate

15
and comment upon their relationship with the culture of emotion that shaped them”
(279). T. Reiss and Paster are more skeptical about this concept of agency, reminding
their readers that agency was possible only to a subset of very specific and privileged
bodies or persons. 5
As these works suggest, Paster’s claim that it is anachronistic to study any aspect
of early modern identity, selfhood, emotion or embodiment without considering humoral
theory has been widely accepted. However, other scholars are critical of the implication
of what Paster describes as “historical phenomenology, a rubric that centers upon the
ensouled body and the embodied soul” (Shakespeare and Embodiment). Richard Strier
summarizes his concern:
It seems to me that the last thing that the Galenic physiological discourse is
going to yield is a “phenomenology.”… To get a phenomenology, one
needs to recreate the world of persons – the world of beliefs, hopes, fears,
loves, hates, wishes, desires, etc. When an early modern person got angry,
for instance, he or she did not say to her/himself: “Oh dear, my liver is
heating up; my choleric humour is being activated, etc.” any more than we
say (except under very special circumstances), “My blood pressure is
rising; certain chemicals are raising their level in my brain, etc.” Instead,
then, as now, people said, “That makes me mad, and I’m going to try to
retaliate, or remember,” or something along those lines. (Paster, Strier, et
all Shakespeare and Embodiment)
The next four chapters will demonstrate that these “very special circumstances” are not
so rare as Strier implies; in fact, early modern dramatic characters talk about their organs
and humors very frequently. Attempting to make sense of his overwhelming emotion

5

In Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe
(2003), Reiss argues, that personhood was commonly believed to have been grounded in
the material world. However, rather than emphasizing the materiality of the body, he
argues that society, family, corporality, rationality, and the divine created, what he calls
“circles.” These “circles” did not surround an individual who somehow fit into them, but
they were the person, who was embedded in and acted upon them.
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after being confronted by his father’s ghost, the terrified Hamlet says to himself “Hold,
hold, my heart,/ And you, my sinews, grow not instant old, But bear me stiffly up”
(Hamlet 1.5.94-96). As he tries to manage the extreme emotion, he speaks directly to the
organ that is considered the seat of his passions and to his buckling knees; he imagines
the substance of his anguish in humoral terms. When Othello first sees his beloved wife
after a long sea voyage, he describes his otherwise inexpressible joy in the language of
the humors. “I cannot speak enough of this content; It stops me here,” he says, pointing at
his heart (Othello 2.1.225). Too soon after this joyful reunion, Desdemona is confused
when her husband suddenly begins to act strangely. She wonders aloud what literal
“thing” could have “puddled his clear spirit” (3.4.165). 6 Desdemona distinguishes
between that muddying thing and Othello’s pure mind.
In these three cases, characters turn to the language of humoralism for very
specific reasons: Hamlet, to maintain agency over his fear; Othello, to explain an
experience that defies language; Desdemona, to distinguish between Othello (the man she
loves) and his ugly, dangerous mood swing. Of course, as Strier argues, characters do not
always describe their emotions in embodied terms. But why do these characters make the
shift between subjective emotional language and material discourse? The next four
chapters will address this question. In chapter two, I trace the moments that characters
turn to humoral language in Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour and argue that Jonson’s
characters use humoral terms to express concern with bodily impulses that counter their
rational desires. In the third chapter, I closely read Shakespeare’s use of humoral
6

Paster uses Desdemona’s question to exemplify the conflation of the literal and
figurative meaning of the word “puddle.” For her reading of Shakespeare’s humoral
language in this scene, see Humoring the Body, 62-65.
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language in the Henriad noting when characters attempt to define themselves and
others in distinctly material terms. In the fourth chapter, I look at moments of contrasting
emotion in King Lear. In this play, Shakespeare places particular emphasis on bodily
forces, which directly counter and occasionally overthrow reason. Finally, in chapter
five, I discuss the dramatic event that must ultimately shut down all emotional
narratives: the moment that the staged character literally dies of a broken heart.
Although Paster’s work is foundational to my focus on humoralism, I want to
challenge one of the implications of her central argument; she argues that Galenic
humoralism, the dominant mode of understanding what emotions are and how they
function in the early modern period, created a “distinct profile” and an emotional
universe “that is dissimilar from ours” (The Body Embarrassed 3). In other words, since
passions were imagined to function differently, they were felt differently. This claim
defies a trend in psychology and the field of emotions, which stems from the work of
Silvan S. Tomkins and his follower, Paul Ekman. Tomkins and Ekman assume that
affective processes occur independently of intention or meaning. This paradigm had been
dominant for over twenty years (Leys 437). In Affect Imagery Consciousness (1963),
Tomkins interprets emotions as non-intentional bodily reactions; he describes a gap or
“radical dichotomy between the ‘real’ causes of affect and the individual’s own
interpretation of these causes” (248). Ekman famously builds on this notion when
claiming that the basic set of six emotions (anger, fear, disgust, surprise, happiness, and
sadness) are genetic, not learned. 7 Ekman’s thesis is based on the assumption that facial
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expressions can be innately recognized as being associated with particular
emotions. Many social constructivists, who discuss the importance of ritual practices and
collective performance in shaping emotions as learnt processes, have criticized Ekman
(and the life scientists who he influenced) for being “universalist” and “presentist”
(Carrera10). Notably, historian Barbara Rosenwein, who introduces the concept of
“emotional communities” in her influential Emotional Communities in the Early Middle
Ages (2006), dismisses Ekman’s idea of a “real” emotion, which comes into being as
solution to a problem in an evolutionary past. For example, Rosenwein claims that even
“primal” emotions, like fear, cannot be appropriately studied outside of the context of
cultural shaping:
Even if we accept this premise [that fear is nothing more than the real
response to a threat](and I myself think it is much too simplistic), we still
are confronted by the fact that only culture can tell us what a threat is, how
we should handle and express our fear, and whether fear or some other
emotion should dominate our social lives—or dominate at certain times
but not at others. This “shaping” is what we see in “elaborate textual
artifacts,” which, after all, are the products of a culture. (Rosenwein qtd. in
Plamper 259) 8
Like Rosenwein, Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wison, emphasize the importance of
distinguishing between the early modern conceptualization of emotion and our own. In
the introduction to the recent volume that they co-edited, Reading the Early Modern
Passions, they claim, “taxonomies of emotions do not track or translate across cultures or
historical periods” (4). For Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wison, the central differentiating
feature is that of materiality. In Humoring the Body, Paster frequently suggests that
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she performs” (Plamper 258).
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Shakespeare dramatizes emotional crisis in ways that still feel familiar, current and
relevant; his characters’ reactions to circumstances feel accessible; the plays can be
staged as if they represent psychological dilemmas. However, to assume that a modern
reader can relate to or fully understand the emotion of an early modern is a fantasy. This
feeling of familiarity, as well as assumptions about our ability to relate to characters,
causes modern readers to wrongly assume that an early modern emotional experience can
be equated with a contemporary emotional experience. She asserts her belief that we
moderns are far too imbedded in Cartesian dualistic thought to be able to imagine the
early modern emotional body.
Many other scholars who have recently focused on the importance of
understanding humoralism in early modern works conclude that our approach to the
emotional body is so distant from the early moderns that it is irretrievable. Charles Taylor
explains that although much modern philosophy has challenged this kind of dualism, it
remains “a model of thought we easily fall into” (189). Schoenfeldt approvingly quotes
Anthony Fletcher who similarly claims, “Despite some trends in recent philosophy and
medicine, we are mostly still good Cartesians at heart” (10). Schoenfeldt argues:
Whereas our post-Cartesian ontology imagines psychological inwardness
and physiological materialism as necessarily separate realms of existence,
and thus renders corporeal language for emotion highly metaphorical, the
Galenic regime of the humoral self that supplies these writers with much
of their vocabulary of inwardness demanded the invasion of social and
psychological realms by biological and environmental processes. (8)
Emphasizing that our current, post-Cartesian intellectual framework cannot avoid
creating a mind/body binary, scholars argue that the binary prevents us from fully
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comprehending the ostensibly unitary perception of the early modern body and the
humoral conception of the self.
Troubling the Dualist Distinction
In the following chapters I do not want to make a universalizing claim or assert
that “taxonomies of emotions” translate across the vastly different cultures and historical
periods. Certainly, the inconsistent vocabulary provided by early modern Galenic
humoralism and the evolving language of neurobiology are poles apart. These
physiological approaches to the body are not the same; humors are not brain chemicals;
passions are not neurotransmitters. However, for both the Galenic and the neuroscientific
thinker, the internal workings of the body not only affect, but are one's emotional and
psychological state. The way that Michael Schoenfeldt describes the distinctly early
modern conceptualization of self as a fully imbricated “bodily condition, subjective state,
and psychological character” (Bodies and Selves 10) can also apply to the proponents of
the neuron doctrine, who assert that the mind is the brain, neuroscience is the science of
the brain, and therefore, neuroscience alone will explain what can be explained about the
mind (Gold and Stoljar 810). Both the pre-and-post-dualists can conclude that the change
in their emotions is contingent on a change in their physical bodies. When asking, “why
am I sad?” the Galenist can answer, “Because my liver produced too much bile,” while
the neuroscientist can answer, “Because my brain is not producing and processing
enough serotonin.”
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Neither system can consistently explain the big questions: “Why does my black
bile decrease as I write?”9; “Why does my body produce protein when my beloved enters
the room?”10 However, according to both the paradigms of humors and brain chemistry,
these complicated questions about emotion can only be explored by learning more about
the material substances produced by and experienced within the body. In a New York
Times op-ed piece responding to President Obama’s State of the Union Address (in
which he announced a plan to invest in the study of neuroscience to “map the human
brain”), David Eagleman discusses why this project is so important:
Imagine you were an alien catching sight of the Earth. Your species knows
nothing about humans, let alone how to interpret the interactions of seven
billion people in complex social networks. With no acquaintance with the
nuances of human language or behavior, it proves impossible to decipher
the secret idiom of neighborhoods and governments, the interplay of local
and global culture, or the intertwining economies of nations. It just looks
like pandemonium, a meaningless Babel. So it goes with the brain. We are
the aliens in that landscape, and the brain is an even more complicated
cipher. (1)
Even though mapping this outrageously complicated system is a tall (and very expensive)
order, Eagleman claims that it is necessary because, “Our thoughts, desires, agonies, and
ecstasies all emerge from the details of the neural landscape” (1). This is where Galenic
humoralism and neuroscience meet: the answers to the questions about the nature of man
are always found in the body.
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In Burton's preface to the reader, his character Democritus Junior explains, "I write of
melancholy by being busy to avoid melancholy."
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Nerve growth factor (NGF), a protein important for the growth, maintenance, and
survival of certain nerve cells is secreted when a person feels romantic love. See E.
Emanuele, et all, “Raised Plasma NGF Levels Associated with Early-stage Romantic
Love.”
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It is important to recognize that, even as the neuroscientists’ monistic approach to
the mind/body relationship is quickly gaining ground, Cartesian dualism obviously
remains foundational to our contemporary worldview. Even the neuroscientists who
most aggressively assert “a successful theory of the mind will be solely neuroscientific”
cannot entirely overcome dualism (Gold and Stoljar 809). As I will discuss at length in
the next chapter, leading neuroscientists’ regularly expose “a fundamental and
irresolvable problem that emerges with any attempt at neural explanations of mental
phenomena” (Mudrik and Maoz 39). However, a similar dualistic distinction between
body and mind can be found in the language of pre-Cartesian early modern writing.
Years before Descartes positions the conduit through which the soul and body interact in
the pineal gland and categorizes body and mind as distinct and separate entities, a great
deal of literature raised questions about the distinction between the mental and physical.
Despite her claims that the early modern body/soul/mind was fully imbricated, Paster
recognizes that Shakespeare and his contemporaries distinguish (in their own terms)
between body and mind. She briefly mentions that early moderns were familiar with
“dualistic habits of thought” and “preoccupied... with the relations of soul and body,
reason and passion, spirit and flesh” (Humoring the Body 245). However, she only
touches upon the existence of pre-Cartesian dualism briefly and the many critics she
inspires ignore it altogether. Instead, new historicists, who focus on humoral theory,
prioritize Paster’s insightful critique of early modern scholars who “disembody human
psychology... and entail a profound underestimation of the materialism so dominant in
early modern discourses of soul and body and a misunderstanding of the bodily ecology
of the passions” (Humoring the Body 245).
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My argument depends upon the work of the many critics who have succeeded in
shifting the focus to a humorally theorized materiality of emotion. However, I argue that
neither the theory of the material humoral body nor the theory of the material chemical
brain can provide a stable explanation for emotional experiences. Instead, both the early
modern writers and my contemporaries weave together “dualistic habits of thought” and
the monistic, materialistic language (of either Galenic humoralism or neurobiology) to
narrate their emotions, desires and self-knowledge.
This introduction has argued that since the paradigms of humors and brain
chemistry both associate emotion with material substance produced by and experienced
within the body, the two approaches allow for similar questions to be asked about the
relationship between the emotional body and the construction of identity. Both systems
allow people to conclude that the change in their emotions occurs along with a change in
their physical bodies. Rather than imply that self and body are categorically distinct and
that people are responsible for actions initiated by one but not the other, the pre-Cartesian
early modern defenders of Galen and the post-Cartesian “neurocentrics” struggle with the
connection between embodied emotion and human agency.
In the following chapters, I explore how the understanding of emotion as bodily
material (the Galenic humors, being moved by passions and animal spirits, or brain
neurons, transmitting and reabsorbing neurotransmitters) affects the extent to which we
believe we can govern our emotional responses. The first chapter will focus on the
language of embodied emotion in Ben Jonson’s, Every Man in his Humour. Again and
again, Jonson’s characters raise the question that neuroscientists are currently struggling
with: “To what extent is my nature determined by my physiology?” I argue that as
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Jonson’s characters navigate the relationships with their passions and humors, they
distinguish between their bodies and a dualist “self.”
In chapters two and three, I study Shakespeare’s approach to the “biological
predetermination” question, by closely reading the Henriad and King Lear. In chapter
two, I argue that Prince Hal, unlike many of the other characters he interacts with, is able
to build and restructure his character, moods, emotions, and desires with calculated
manipulation. My focus on Hal’s humoral self-fashioning participates in a debate
initiated by Paster and Schoenfeldt, who disagree about the extent to which the humoral
discourse empowered early moderns to "produce the parameters of individual
subjectivity” (Schoenfeldt 15). The third chapter will continue my discussion of the
relationship between agency and bodily forces by focusing specifically on moments of
high emotional conflict in King Lear. I discuss the moral and legal implications of these
passions in the context of the play. Shakespeare asks “can one can be held responsible
for his or her actions when a physiological causes their irrational behavior?” Then, I
discuss how similar questions about accountability are being raised as neurobiological
evidence is increasingly being introduced in the courtroom.
While the next three chapters explore how dramatic physical changes can impact
the emotional body and individual identity, the last discusses how drastic changes in
emotion and identity changes the physical body. I look at the most extreme cases of
staged emotional materiality: the moments that characters die of heartbreak. In order to
understand the notion of early modern heartbreak, the trope must be opened up and
viewed as a literal, rather than figurative, breaking. By tracing the way that characters
take control over their own breaking hearts through narrative in John Ford’s The Broken
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Heart and several of Shakespeare’s plays, I conclude that the story the characters tell
themselves about what the materials in their bodies are doing not only determines how
they define what their emotions are, but also changes what the material of that emotion is
able to do to the body. Finally, I discuss the fact that it is no longer considered hyperbolic
to discuss dying of a broken heart.

CHAPTER TWO
IN AND OUT OF HUMOR: PHYSIOLOGY AND IDENTITY IN JONSON’S EVERY
MAN IN HIS HUMOUR
In the same This American Life program that I discussed in the introduction, one
of the show’s producers, Alex Blumberg, gives a ‘testosterone testimonial,’ describing a
memory of hitting puberty and suddenly feeling sexual desire for the first time. He tells a
story about being 15 and stumbling across Marilyn French’s seminal feminist novel, The
Women's Room, on his parents’ bookshelf. He was struck by, and horrified with, the
descriptions of the lustful men who objectified these powerful women. He quoted a
particularly upsetting passage; French’s narrator claims,
My feelings about men are the result of my experience. I have little
sympathy for them. Like a Jew just released from Dachau, I watch the
handsome, young Nazi soldier fall writhing to the ground with a bullet in
his stomach. And I look briefly and walk on. I don't even need to shrug. I
simply don't care. (French 198)
While reading this book, he had an unwanted, new experience. He looked at a girl in his
homeroom class and was suddenly, unexpectedly, shockingly overcome with an allconsuming desire. He was disgusted with himself. He explains:
I felt like, oh my God. This is what, this is— I could see myself becoming the
people that [French] was describing, the men she was describing. And it was
really terrifying. My testosterone, and how it affects me, and how I react to it, I
think about on a daily basis, all the time. It often feels like there's something in
my body giving me instructions that I probably shouldn't follow. (Blumberg)
Although feminist literature is not so formative to most coming of age stories, many of us
26
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have experienced some moment like the one Blumberg describes. Something happens
to our bodies and we are transformed, sometimes so drastically that we do not even know
ourselves. This experience opens questions about identity: What does it mean when a
chemical change in my body makes me act in ways that I do not want to act, think
thoughts that I do not want to think, desire things that I do not want to desire? Who/what
is it that is doing the acting, thinking, desiring? How much control do I really have over
my hormonal, chemical, changing, unpredictable body?
In Ben Jonson’s humoral comedy Every Man in His Humour, Thorello, a wealthy,
young merchant takes on these questions directly. He is shocked to experience a sudden
change in his body shortly after his wedding. He and his new wife, Bianca, live with his
wife’s brother, Prospero, who brings many young gulls (wealthy simpletons) into his
home. He suddenly becomes irrationally convinced that his wife will be seduced by one
of these men. Worse than this fear is the fact that he is keenly aware how irrational he is
being. He knows that he has no cause to suspect Bianca of infidelity. However, like the
terrified teenage Blumberg, he can feel his body giving him directions that he does not
want to follow. For Thorello jealousy is not an occurrence within his mind; it is a
physical thing that he can feel move within his body. He describes it as:
A searching vapour, spreads itself
Confusedly through every sensive part
Till not a thought or motion in the mind
Be free from the black poison of suspect. (1.4.200-203) 1
As he is materially overcome with all-encompassing jealousy, he experiences the terror
of feeling an alien physical force change him from the inside. However, what upsets him
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more than this physiological experience is the awareness that the poison, not his free
will, has dominion over all of his thoughts and actions. He questions the nature of this
disturbing enslavement:
Ah, but what error is it, to know this,
And want the free election of the soul
In such extremes! Well, I will once more strive,
Even in despite of hell, myself to be,
And shake the fever off that thus shakes me. (1.4.204-208)
He laments his inability to establish a “free election of the soul” against the corrupting,
external force of jealousy’s black poison. Yet, although jealousy is preventing him from
making his own choices, he clearly has not given up his notion of an independent,
abstracted “self” that exists apart from his subjected body. He imagines the emotion of
jealousy as a vaporous material and claims, “in order to become myself again I must
materially expel jealousy from my body.”
Striving To Be Myself: Distinguishing Between Body and Self
What does it mean to make Thorello and Blumberg’s claim: “my body is
preventing me from being myself”? Peg O’Connor, a moral philosopher and regular
contributor to the New York Times philosophy series, “The Stone,” argues that this
question is becoming increasingly relevant in our current discussions about addiction. In
“The Fallacy of the ‘Hijacked Brain,’” she claims that recent scientific studies on the
biochemical responses of the brain appear to show that “the structure of the brain’s
reward system combined with certain biochemical responses and certain environments”
cause people to become addicted (1).
In such studies, and in reports of them to news media, the term “the
hijacked brain” often appears, along with other language that emphasizes
the addict’s lack of choice in the matter. Sometimes the pleasure-reward
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system has been “commandeered.” Other times it “goes rogue.” These
expressions are often accompanied by the conclusion that there are
“addicted brains.” The word “hijacked” is especially evocative; people
often have a visceral reaction to it. I imagine that this is precisely why this
term is becoming more commonly used in connection with addiction. But
it is important to be aware of the effects of such language on our
understanding. (1)
Richard A. Friedman, a professor of clinical psychiatry and the director of the
Psychopharmacology Clinic at the Weill Cornell Medical College, suggests that it is not
just material substances (alcohol or drugs) that can “hijack” the brain, or stimulate the
brain’s reward circuit in unwanted ways. Instead, emotional experiences can act like
these substances. He describes a series of human experiments that attempt to
understand when an emotional reward creates a physiological change. He concludes,
“This [reward] circuit releases dopamine when stimulated, which, if it reaches a critical
level, conveys a sense of pleasure.” When rewards are unanticipated there is a greater
activation in the brain’s circuit than when a reward is delivered in a predictable fashion.
Since unpredictable rewards cause more dopamine release than
predictable ones and more dopamine means more pleasure, one
implication of this study is that people experience more pleasure with
unpredictable rewards than with predictable ones — but they may not be
consciously aware of this fact. (1)
For example, a brain will be more stimulated by a relationship with a person who is hot
and cold —occasionally generous and generally withholding— than with a person who
is consistently loving and supportive. However, the cogent, thinking, feeling person is
not aware of the brain’s behavior. Friedman uses this lack of communication between
the brain and the owner of the brain to explain one of the most infamous literary
examples of irrational behavior: King Lear’s ill-treatment of Cordelia. Friedman
explains, “Unfortunately for Cordelia, her father knew he could count on the love of his
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devoted and constantly affectionate daughter. Compared with her scheming sisters,
Cordelia was just not all that exciting —at least to Lear’s reward circuit” (2). However,
Friedman does not go so far as to argue that this biological predetermining factor
excuses Lear’s behavior. “None of this is to say that just because our reward circuits
light up in the face of unanticipated rewards, that we are off the hook. Far from it. We
use conscious knowledge to override our unhealthy or undesirable impulses all the
time. Except for a few, limited circumstances, we are expected to be in charge of our
brains” (2).
I am not arguing that Friedman is a particularly close reader of Shakespeare. (To
imply that Lear is underwhelmed by Cordelia because he is so accustomed to her love
ignores Cordelia’s deeply complicated silence and wrongly assumes that Lear was more
surprised by Regan’s and Goneril’s declarations of love than by Cordelia’s “nothing.”)
However, Friedman’s claim about Lear’s “reward circuit” is particularly relevant to the
questions brought up by Thorello’s lament because Friedman draws a distinction
between Lear and his unconscious urges. He claims that it is Lear’s physical brain and
the material chemicals, which interact with one another inside of the organ, not Lear,
who fails to be enthused by Cordelia’s love. By claiming that “we are expected to be in
charge of our brains,” Friedman differentiates the self and the brain chemicals that
produce affect, which Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley define as “pre-individual
bodily forces, linked to autonomic responses, which augment or diminish a body’s
capacity to act or engage with others” (316).
The metaphorical language that O’connor and Friedman use to describe the
relationship between the brain and the conscious person, or the owner of the brain, is
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the subject of neuroscientists Liad Mudrik and Uri Maoz’s forthcoming “Me & My
Brain: Exposing Neuroscience’s Closet Dualism in Studies of Consciousness and
Voluntary Action.” They claim that when it comes to discussing “involuntary” feelings
and bodily responses, most leading neuroscientists anthropomorphize the brain and
differentiate the self from the body.
Sentences like "what your brain knows that you don't" (e.g., Frith, 2007,
"When the brain knows but doesn't tell"; Gazzaniga, 2000, "The brain
knows before you do"; Ornstein, 1992, "How the brain knows what you're
doing before you do"), or even descriptions of the brain as a deceiving,
manipulating entity that distorts the way we think of the world and our
selves (Aamodt & Wang, 2008, "Can you trust your brain"; Fine, 2006,
"How your brain distorts and deceives") appear front and center in some
of the most prominent neuroscientific texts. (Mudrik and Maoz 5)
Mudrik and Maoz find this personification of the brain misleading because it creates two
intentional subjects who are able to psychologically oppose one another. They refer to
“this practice of personifying the brain as an additional subject on top of the conscious
self” as the “Double-subject Fallacy” (6). In the conclusion of Humoring the Body, Gail
Kern Paster discusses the dualism in current discussions of embodied language:
Even though cognitive science and psychopharmacology are encouraging
us to relinquish our beliefs in such dualisms as mind and body, reason and
passion, our language of self-reference and of emotion is relentlessly
dualistic. We remain locked in a puzzle of lexical self-contradiction about
these fundamental issues, even if we do not experience this selfcontradiction as anything but the ordinary workings of semantic variation
and overlap, the ordinary excesses of the signifying chain. (245)
Similarly, Mudrik and Maoz claim that these phrases are examples “of the lingering
remnants of our intuitive dualistic dispositions, reminiscent of Descartes’ dichotomy
between body and soul which is now substituted by a dichotomy between my brain and
me” (6). However, they insist that this fallacy is not merely a harmless metaphor or a
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linguistic tool. Instead, dualism is actually harmful to neuroscientific progress because
it obscures a scientific discussion about the mind/brain relationship.
They assert that there is no “self” that opposes the material brain. Instead, the mind
and the brain, the mental and the physical, are one substance that can be understood in
many ways. This approach to the mind/body question is compatible with Baruch
Spinoza’s metaphysics and Bertrand Russell’s “neutral monism” (Mudrik and Maoz 38).
Russell claimed that “the whole duality of mind and matter… is a mistake” (15). The
mental and the physical are the same intrinsic property. “They differ only in respect of
arrangement and context” (Russell 15). As Russell explains, “In my mind, Caesar may
call up Charlemagne, whereas in the physical world the two were widely sundered” (15).
It is a mistake to assume that two distinct types of things (the idea of Caesar, and the man
Caesar) are composed of two distinct substances (the mental and the physical). Instead,
“there is only one kind of stuff out of which the world is made, and this stuff is called
mental in one arrangement, physical in the other” (15).
As Mudrik and Maoz use neutral monism to theorize their understanding of a postCartesian contemporary worldview, Michael Witmore similarly employs monism as a
guide for understanding the pre-Cartesian early modern worldview in his Shakespearean
Metaphysics. He uses three philosophers as guides for his readings of three of
Shakespeare’s plays: Baruch Spinoza, Alfred North Whitehead, and Henri Bergson.
2

Mudrik and Maoz analyze the possible metaphorical meaning of the phrase “the brain
decides to act before we do,” and conclude that “While the alleged non-literal meaning of
“decide” might make sense for each part of the sentence separately, their conjuncture as a
whole is clearly confused. It seems to entail that there are two different neural networks
whose activation leads to performing one and the same action, one in the brain and the
other in the subject. As much as it is clear that there are no networks of the brain as
opposed to networks of the subject, it should also be clear that there are no decisions of
the brain that are dissociated from decisions of the subject” (33).

33
Spinoza, the seventeenth century father of modern dual aspect theory, refuted
Descartes’s famous division of immaterial minds and physical bodies and originated the
notion that there exists only one substance with both mental and physical attributes.
More than 250 years after Spinoza’s death, Whitehead established the modern iteration of
“process philosophy” which challenges the notion that the mind is unrelated to the world
of nature and argues that “there is urgency in coming to see the world as a web of
interrelated processes of which we are integral parts, so that all of our choices and actions
have consequences for the world around us” (Mesle 9). Whitehead’s contemporary, Henri
Bergson, developed a concept of multiplicity, which attempts to unify heterogeneity and
continuity.
Witmore admits that this is a “historically and geographically diffuse” trio (11).
However, he argues that these thinkers are “the ideal guides” for a study of Shakespeare’s
worldview because,
Like the party of Italians who emerge from the sea in The Tempest only to
marvel at the music that wafts across its shores, Whitehead, Bergson and
Spinoza are fascinated by the ways in which truly distinctive forms of
being fail to be bonded within the edges of a physical body, taking shape
rather in an ensemble of actions, like the mobile shine of a school of fish
turning in the water. Yet these thinkers are also interested in the reality
and touch of the physical world in which we live, its pressing claims on
our being and consciousness, something Shakespeare too never loses sight
of in his theatrical practice (2).
Specifically, Witmore argues that Shakespeare shares the philosopher's investment in a
metaphysical tradition that opposes Cartesian dualism. He claims that Shakespeare is a
“dramaturgical monist,” a term he invents to suggest “a parallel between Spinoza’s
commitment to a one-substance model of being and Shakespeare’s tendency... to view the
elements of theatrical reality as interconnected features of a single whole— aspects of
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what we might call the substance of theatrical reality” (25).
Although Witmore focuses specifically on Shakespeare’s theory of the theater and
Paster focuses more generally on the early modern understanding of the mind/body
problem, his notion of “dramaturgical monism” is compatible with her notion of
“affective immanence.” Paster refers to the early modern notion of mind-body monism
when she argues that “early modern bodies have an affective immanence and ability
supported rather than contradicted by humoral theory” (22). As I discussed in the
introduction, critics including Schoenfeldt, Wood, Neely, Maus, and Floyd-Wilson agree
that early moderns had a difficult time conceiving of the immaterial and that “bodily
condition, subjective state, and psychological character [were] fully imbricated”
(Schoenfeldt 1). Mudrik and Maoz argue that the neuroscientific community claims to
understand the body as the pre-Cartesians did: as an integrated psychophysiological
substance. However, Mudrik and Maoz reveal that moving away from the dualist
framework is proving to be more difficult than the self-proclaimed materialist
neuroscientists are willing to admit.
Mudrik and Maoz find neutral monism a particularly useful framework because it
allows for an experience to be discussed as a mental event from the first-person
perspective and as a neural mechanism from the third-person perspective. “However, it
does not make any sense to confuse the two types of predicates” (38). They claim that
neuroscientists commit “Double-subject Fallacy,” not when they use multiple predicates,
but when they confuse those predicates. They use Bernard Baars’s description of the
neuropathological condition known as “blindsight” as an example:
If we hold a pair of scissors before the eyes of blindsight patients, they
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would claim not to see anything, yet they might be able to reach for the
scissors with thumb and forefinger extended to insert into the scissor
loops. Thus we can verify that some part of the visual brain knows about
the scissors, though the patient disclaims any direct perceptual knowledge.
There is a dissociation between what the brain knows and what the patient
claims to experience. (Baars quoted in Mudrik and Maoz, 9)
Mudrik and Maoz argue that it is reasonable to describe “a person both relying on her
conscious state (e.g., saying that she consciously wanted to act), and on her brain
state (e.g., saying that at that point in time, a readiness potential was already present”
(38). However, Baars ascribes one first-person predicate to the person who does not
know that there are scissors in front of her, and another, opposing first-person
predicate to her brain that does know of the scissors. Despite an explicit commitment
shared by most neuroscientists to monism, their writings reveal implicit dualism
regarding the relationship between the brain and its owner, the body and the mind,
the material and the mental.
I find Mudrik and Maoz’s “Double-subject Fallacy” compelling because it exposes
how contradictions, mixed metaphors, and imprecise language reveal the difficulties in
transitioning from a dualistic to a monist worldview. The neuroscientists use of language
exposes a complexity that is rarely discussed: even the most proclaimed materialists do
not know how to think of themselves or even communicate the notion of “self” in utterly
materialistic terms. Therefore “another entity with an unclear nature comes into play: a
mysterious "I" that can interact with its brain in various ways” (Mudrik and Maoz 6). 3

3

For more examples of the extent to which Cartesian dualism is central to contemporary
ways of ordering thought, see Paul Bloom’s Descartes’ Baby (2005). Bloom argues that
even very young children are understood to distinguish bodies from souls.
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Jonson’s “Humour”
While Jonson was writing his humoral comedies, the opposite type of shift was
occurring in early modern Europe. Although there was growing skepticism amongst
European medical communities towards Galenic humoralism by the time the Lord
Chamberlain's Men performed Every Man in His Humour in 1598, Galen's basic
assumptions persisted widely. The popular notion of human personality based on the
four humors was foundational to Jonson’s humoral comedy. As I will explain, in most
contemporary criticism, Jonson is portrayed as the quintessential early modern
materialist. However, just as the post-Cartesian neuroscientists slip into dualist language,
the pre-Cartesian, materialist Jonson also slips in and out of language, which reveals that
he is very troubled by the distinction between mind and body. His characters express
concern with bodily impulses that counter their rational desires. In navigating their
relationships with their materially changing bodies, Jonson’s characters distinguish
between their bodies and that same, dualist “entity with an unclear nature” with which the
neuroscientist struggle. Jonson’s characters are much more concerned about this
distinction than critics like Paster and Schoenfeldt suggest.
When Jonson began writing Every Man in His Humour, the humoral comedy genre
was well established on the early modern stage. The strategy of creating comic humoral
characters dates back to antiquity, and “theater historians tend to credit the invention of
humors comedy [in Renaissance England] to Chapman, whose popular play An
Humerous Days Myrth was first performed in May 1597” (Scott-Warren 75). The two
most popular theatrical companies in London, the Lord Admiral’s Men and the Lord
Chamberlain’s Men, “rivaled each other in the production of humors plays” (Scott-
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Warren 75). Many of the most prolific early modern dramatists including Shakespeare,
Marston, Fletcher, and Shirley wrote comedies in which “the action depends primarily on
humours, because it is the humours themselves, in all their various pathologies, trivial or
profound, that provoke it. Without them the action could not occur” (Ostovich 13).
Every character is a recognizable type. The characters’ revelations of their humoral
states (as well as the entire notion of humoralism) are the butt of the jokes.
Every Man In His Humour was Jonson’s earliest commercially successful play
(Bloom 16). Part of its success may have been due to his adherence to the expectations
of humoral comedy. However, Robert Miola claims that in Every Man In His Humour,
“Jonson is up to something new” (12). Miola distinguishes the “humours” that Jonson
references from those of the traditional Galenic discourse:
This kind of humours characterization differs fundamentally from the
simple presentation of sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric or melancholic from
the understanding character…. Instead, it develops from the understanding
of humour popular at the turn of the century, humour as ‘affection,
caprice, or whim’ (OED II.6a, b). (13)
Jonson is very interested in exploring the multiple, overlapping, and stylish uses of the
word “humour.” James D. Redwine convincingly demonstrates that “the place to begin an
investigation of Jonson's theory of humours is neither the work of Hippocrates nor the
work of Galen,” but the induction to Every Man Out of His Humour, Jonson’s thematic
sequel to Every Man In His Humour (316). In this induction, Jonson’s character Asper, a
playwright who is frequently read as Jonson’s self-portrait, famously defines the term
“humour” (Barton 62).
Why, humour (as’ tis, ens) we thus define it
To be a quality of air or water,
And in itself holds these two properties,
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Moisture, and fluxure. As, for demonstration: Pour
water on this floor, 'twill wet and run; Likewise, the
air, forced through a horn or trumpet, Flows
instantly away and leaves behind
A kind of dew. And hence we do conclude
That what soe're hath fluxure and humidity,
As wanting power to contain itself,
Is humour. So in every human body,
The choler, melancholy, phlegm, and blood,
By reason that they flow continually
In some one part and are not continent,
Receive the name of humours. Now, thus far
It may by metaphor apply itself
Unto the general disposition,
As when some one peculiar quality Doth
so possess a man that it doth draw All his
affects, his spirits, and his powers, In their
confluxtions all to run one way.
This may be truly said to be a humour. (Induction, 86-107)
Apser begins his complicated definition of the humors by didactically laying out the
traditional Galenic definition of the four humors. Humors are liquid or vaporous moving,
changing substances that exist in the body. As Jonson’s contemporary medical theorists
often do, Asper describes the psychological component of two (choler and melancholy)
and the material components of the other two (phlegm and blood). He goes on to further
explain the foundational Galenist belief: an imbalance of one of the four humors impacts
the affects (or passions) and spirits (or the animating forces of the body). Then, Asper
discusses a different meaning of humor. Rather than being just a bodily substance, he
describes humor as “a metaphor” for a disposition. At this point, he personifies the
humor, giving it an agency of its own; he explains that the imbalanced man’s “powers”
are “drawn” by the dominant humor.
Miola argues that Jonson’s use of this term “insistently and self-consciously
transforms humors physiology into a method of characterization and a structural
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principal, thus creating a drama not so much of interaction as of display” (13). In other
words, he suggests that when he writes a humoral comic character, Jonson is not
necessarily interested in creating a fully developed person who is animated by a humor
and interacts with other humoral people. Instead, Jonson’s characters simply are the
characterization of the humors. The emphasis of the comedy is not in their interactions
and relationship so much as it is in the exposure and display of their humors or dominant
affections, vices, or follies. Miola’s analysis summarizes the dominant critical approach
to Jonson’s humoral characters. They are traditionally read as “flat, inflexible,
predictably ridiculous... [They follow] Aristotle’s requirements [in Poetics] to
harmottonta, ‘appropriateness to expectation’; to homoion, ‘likeness to traditional
characters’; to homalon, ‘consistency in representation’” (Miola 12).
Lawrence Danson argues that Jonson’s comic characters are so fully imbricated in
their humoral states that when their humors are exposed, they become entirely empty.
Therefore, he reads the endings of most of Jonson’s comedies as tragic:
It seems to me, however, that the "darkest" Shakespearean comedy
(Troilus and Cressida problematically apart) is not as dark at the moment
of discovery as is, for instance, Bartholomew Fair at the uproarious
moment when Jonson's spokespuppet throws up his skirts to reveal
himself in the purity of his essential nothingness. Brainworm, Volpone,
Face and Subtle, Bartholomew Cokes, Epicoene: each of them, like the
puppet, is vivid as a character but weirdly insubstantial as a self. (Danson
189)
He claims that the character’s fail to have moments of “self-discovery” because they have
no selves to discover. James Hirsh similarly argues that Volpone presents no reformations
because its world is “populated by incurably knavish or naive fools” (13). Jason ScottWarren has an even darker interpretation of the dishumouring scenes, which expose,
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display, and mock the characters’ humorally imbalanced bodies. He argues that they
“can turn a play into a low form of entertainment, the equal of a freak-show, or a
bearbaiting” (79).
Danson and Hirsh’s argument that there can be no Jonson character “out-ofhumour” is a commonly held critical assumption. Miola reaches the same conclusion in
his discussion of the last scene of Every Man in His Humour:
Despite Clement’s assumption of a judicial voice and control over the
unmistakable motions of closure, the final scene does not present unambivalent
dishumouring... As in classical comedy, dishumouring in Jonson takes the form of
exposure rather than reformation. And despite the various treefalls, the displayed
humours, though stunted for the moment, are still crescive and green. Every man
in his humour still. (Miola 64)
According to Miola, these characters are their humoral states.
Most critics discuss Jonson in order to make an argument for how much more
complex the Shakespearian characters are by contrast. In Kenneth Jackson’s compelling
reading of Hamlet, Polonius becomes the stand-in for the Jonsonian character and Hamlet
becomes the stand-in for the Shakespearian character.
Shakespeare begins Act Two with a duel, as it were, between one character who
believes wholeheartedly, even presumptuously, that he can master the “truth” of
someone through careful observation of superficial mannerisms, the assumption,
again, of the Jonsonian “humor” plays, and one person who refuses to have his
truth known by these gestures and, moreover, displays a notable irritation with
such mannerisms. (Jackson 88)
Katherine Maus reaches a similar conclusion about Jonson’s characters, claiming that
their apparent “flatness” “may be due to this impossibility of his possessing hidden
depths, some implied level of experience from which the audience is excluded” (27).
Certainly, Shakespeare and Jonson are doing very different things with their
comedies. As I’ll explain in the following chapters, Shakespeare approaches questions

41
about the complicated identities of his characters much more explicitly than Jonson does.
However, I want to challenge this reading of Jonson’s humoral characters. For Jonson’s
characters, “truths” are not exposed by a “careful observation of superficial mannerisms.”
Instead, Jonson challenges the notion that it is ever possible to entirely know the full
“truth” of the character. The traditional reading of his characters as allegorical folly or as
predictable and definable metaphors for specific age-old vices ignores the deeply
problematic relationships that these characters have with their own humors. Certainly,
Thorello is overcome by jealousy, but as he clearly explains, he is anxious and frightened
because he believes that he has a self that is distinct from his humor. If he does not want
to allow his humor to define him, how can it? The comic tone, as well as the fact the
Jonson states in the prologue of his revised folio that the purpose of his play is to “sport
with human follies,” often masks the very real and terrifying
concerns that the characters express upon realizing that they cannot control their own
humoral bodies. Jonson’s interest in exploring the complicated relationship between the
mind and the body is an under-theorized aspect of his work. Exploring how Jonson’s
characters contradict themselves—and one another—as they attempt to reach conclusions
about how their notion of self can be compatible with their bodily experiences is
particularly relevant in this current cultural moment as we renegotiate our own dualist
distinctions in the wake of neuroscience.
(Im)perfect and Divine Temper: The Bodies of Jonson’s Characters
Before I return to the complicated, nuanced, and upsetting mind/body relationship
that Thorello explores, I will begin with one of Jonson’s far less troubled descriptions of
a humoral body to show that even the perfectly balanced humoral body raises questions
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about the mind/body relationship.
In Cynthia’s Revels Mercury describes Criticus, the most perfect human specimen
he knows to exist. To prove that Criticus is the ideal man, he specifically focuses on
describing the humoral makeup of his body:
A creature of a most perfect and divine temper; one, in whom the humours and
elements are peaceably met, without emulation of precedency; he is neither too
fantastically melancholy, too slowly phlegmatic, too lightly sanguine, or too
rashly choleric, but in all so composed and ordered as it is clear Nature went
about some full work; she did more than make a man when she made him.
(2.3.93-97)
Interestingly, Mercury praises Nature for balancing the humors in Crites body, not Crites
for taking any agency over his “divine temper.”

Crites is his perfect body and

providential forces have predetermined what his body is. In fact, nature balanced his
humors so well that Mercury has doubts about whether Crites is even a man. Instead, he
is positioned as some kind of Platonic ideal. His lack of humoral imbalance makes him
inappropriate for the world of Jonson’s stage where all the humoral characters struggle
with their complex, deeply imperfect humoral bodies.
In the world of Every Man in His Humour, there are no perfect, nature-sculpted
bodies. Instead, the primary drama revolves around the characters’ struggles with their
own humors and the humoral states of their loved ones. The play opens with Lorenzo
Senior lamenting about the humoral state of his son, Lorenzo Junior. Lorenzo Senior is
concerned that his son has been wasting his time with, what he considers to be, frivolous
study. Lorenzo Junior has become the melancholic scholar, locked away from the world.
While Lorenzo Junior believes that he has become, like the speaker of Milton’s “Il
Penseroso,” the true, scholarly melancholic who worships at the feet of poetry, viewing
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her “in her glorious ornaments,/ Attired in the majesty of art,/ Set high in spirit with the
precious taste/ Of sweet philosophy” (5.3.272-275), his friend, Prospero, has a different
interpretation of this melancholic solitude. He mocks Lorenzo Junior: “I doubt Apollo
hath got thee to be his ingle” (1.1.130). However, both Lorenzo Senior and Prospero
believe that there is more to Lorenzo Junior than his current dominant humoral
characteristic. Prospero knows this because his friend visits him, putting aside both his
books and his melancholic disposition. Lorenzo Senior is confident that his son can
change because he once overcame a similar humoral imbalance himself. He explains:
Myself was once a student and, indeed,
Fed with the self-same humor he is now,
Dreaming on naught but idle poetry.
But since, experience hath awaked my spirits,
And reason taught them how to comprehend
The sovereign use of study. (1.1.16-21)
As Lorenzo Senior aged, two distinct forces, experience and reason, changed the
animation (the literal movement) of “his affects, his spirits, and his powers.” Lorenzo
Senior retains a faith in his son’s ability to manage the internal workings of his humoral
body through acts of will. However, he claims that the only way to achieve this selfcontrol is through an intentional submission to reason. He later explains that his primary
concern is his son’s unwillingness to do so:
My labouring spirit, being late oppressed
With my son’s folly, can embrace no rest
Till it hath plotted by advice and skill
How to reduce him from affected will
To reason’s manage. (2.2.1-5)
Lorenzo Senior laments that his spirit is being physically restrained by his concern about
his son. Lorenzo Senior’s comment about moving his son from affected will to reason’s
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manage is a paraphrase of Sidney’s famous dictum “our erected wit maketh us know
what perfection is, and yet our infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it” (Sidney
66). Lorenzo divides his son into three distinct categories: the wit/reason that allows him
to know perfection, the affected/infected will that prevents him from achieving that
perfection and the active agent doing the knowing/failing. He imagines that his son has
an abstracted self that is distinct from the helpful forces of reason and the dangerous
forces of affection.
Lorenzo Senior goes on to pontificate upon the relationship between passion and
reason. He admires “nature’s art, who when she did inspire/ This heat of life, placed
reason as king/ Here in the head to have the marshalling/ Of our affections” (2.2.12-15).
This analogy, which positions reason as the singular monarch and the passions/affections
as distinct, numerous, quarrelsome, individual members of the commonwealth, is
frequently used in early modern passion discourse. For example, Jean-François Senault
similarly insists that people have a moral imperative to train their passions. The title page
of the Earl of Monmouth’s 1649 translation of Senault’s The Use of the Passions depicts
Reason as an austere Goddess standing in dominion over images representing enslaved
affections. Characters depicting joy, sorrow, choler, hope, boldness, fear, despair, love,
eschewing, hatred, and desire are chained at the ankle and linked together. Reason, on
her throne holds the chains in one fist, a scepter in her other. Similarly, Tommaso Buoni,
Thomas Wright, and Robert Burton all conceptualize passions, affections, desires, and
urges as biological responses that are determined by the humoral elements. However,
none of these writers (not even Burton who frequently celebrates men who allow
themselves to indulge in their impulses) allow for man to use their natural humor as an
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excuse for poor behavior. Reason, the knowing, moral, immaterial essence, should
guide the passions. In his “Cure for Melancholy” chapter, Burton states,
Against those other passions and affections, there is no better remedy than
as mariners when they go to sea, provide all things necessary to resist a
tempest:... to oppose sufferance to labour, patience to reproach, bounty to
covetousness, fortitude to pusillanimity, meakness to anger, humility to
pride; to examine ourselves for what cause we are so much disquieted…
then either to pacifie ourselves by reason, to divert by some other object,
contrary to passion or premeditiation (64).
Ultimately, man’s body makes reason difficult, but man still has the ability and the moral
imperative to use reason to control these passions.
Lorenzo uses very similar language to describe the nature of the passions. They
are,
like proud arch-traitors that rebel
Against their sovereign, practise to expel
Their liege lord, Reason, and not shame to tread
Upon his holy and anointed head. (2.2.23-26)
He then expands the analogy to include the mind, comparing it to the kingdom in which
these distinct forces battle.
But as that land or nation best doth thrive
Which to smooth-fronted peace is most proclive,
So doth that mind, whose fair affections, ranged
By Reason’s rules, stand constant and unchanged. (2.2.27-30) 4
Lorenzo asserts that when the bodily, material forces of affection are ruled by the
immaterial, disembodied reason, the mind is stable. He positions the affections as forces
that belong to the body and reason as an external, authoritative force. He asks why the
abstracted “we” obey reason if reason is too weak to control our affections/passions: “Or

4

Miola glosses this as “Just as that land thrives best which is peaceful, so does that mind
thrive best which is ordered by reason” (n. 129). However, Lorenzo’s claim is somewhat
more complicated than the paraphrase suggests.
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why are we obsequious to his law,/ If he want spirit our affects to awe?” (2.2.33-34).
Again, Lorenzo presents a triadic relationship between the reason (personified as a male
authority figure), the passions (which are of and belong to the body), and the abstracted
agent (the owner of the body) which can either obey or disobey the rules of reason.
Lorenzo Senior concludes his aside with a hypothetical question about why people
ought to follow the rules of reason since reason is not even strong enough to contain
passion. He answers it by mocking himself for the futility of even raising such a
question: “Oh, no, I argue weakly” (2.2.35). Finally, he concludes, “[reason] is strong,/
Albeit my son have done him too much wrong” (2.2.35-36). His son—not his son’s
passions or mind, but the abstracted agent who has free will—is at fault for refusing to
submit to reason’s powers.
Despite his confidence that men are free to shape and change their own dispositions,
Lorenzo Senior proves to be unsuccessful in managing his own. In the last act, Doctor
Clement challenges Lorenzo Senior to do away with the melancholic humor that has
dominated him throughout the play. Doctor Clement encourages Lorenzo Senior to let go
of his distrust and overbearing concern for his son and lays out a compelling
case about why his anxieties are unreasonable. He tells him, “Signor Lorenzo, God’s pity,
man, be merry, be merry, leave these dumps” (3.3.105). Lorenzo Senior replies,
Troth would I could, sir; but enforcèd mirth,
In my weak judgment, has no happy birth.
The mind being once prisoner unto cares,
The more it dreams on joy, the worse it fares. (3.3.107-110)
Here, Lorenzo Senior contradicts his earlier claims about the man’s freedom to choose
reason or folly. Now, he describes his mind as a prisoner and “care” as a jailer. Therefore,
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the affections of his mind (which are manifest as neurosis about his son) are not
controlled by reason.
He takes no action to attempt to remedy this imbalance. Instead, he justifies his
surly stubbornness by condemning “forced mirth.” He tells Doctor Clement,
A smiling look is to a heavy soul,
As a gilt bias to leaden bowl,
Which in itself appears most vile, being spent
To no true use, but only for ostent. (3.3.125-134) 5
He claims to despise false appearances. For Doctor Clement, moods, affections, and
humors are like so many different hats, “soon put on, and as soon put off” (2.3.135). For
Lorenzo Senior, it is useless to have a mood or affection that he does not feel. His
stubborn defense of his heavy mood interestingly contradicts his earlier lofty claims
about man’s ability to choose to follow reason despite even the strongest forces of
“affection.”
His own stubbornness does not prevent him from condemning others who are
unwilling to change their affections and moods. Throughout the play, Lorenzo Senior
proselytizes his faith that the tempers of the spirits are changed by activity. A
contemporary reader may understand him as a proponent of behavioral rather than
cognitive therapy. When Lorenzo Senior comes upon Musco disguised as a beggar
soldier he lambasts him for not living up to the full potential of his body and tells him
that his idleness will hurt the motion of his spirits:
But men of your condition feed on sloth,
As does the scarab 6
5
6

Ostentation

According to the OED, in early use, scarab can refer to a beetle of any kind including
the “scarabæid beetle, Ateuchus sacer, reverenced by the ancient Egyptians.” Therefore,
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on the dung she breeds in,
Not caring how the temper of your spirits
Is eaten with the rust of idleness. (2.2.69-72)
Lorenzo Senior believes that the beggar soldier (who is really the disguised Musco) has a
body that is capable of producing a better spirit. According to Lorenzo Senior, bodies
should match the mind:
Believe me, I am rapt with admiration
To think a man of thy exterior presence
Should, in the constitution of the mind,
Be so degenerate, infirm, and base. (2.2.56-59)
He believes that one’s internal state should be reflected in their looks; therefore, Lorenzo
Senior is upset that the body can’t always be trusted.
In this scene, it is particularly difficult to discern whether Jonson believes that an
external body can be indicative of an internal truth. First of all, Musco is disguising his
body. The audience knows that Musco is capable of much more than he is pretending to
be. Furthermore, most of the other characters’ external bodies do give others reliable
clues about their internal humoral states. For example, the choleric Giuliano, (who is
always either in the midst of an enraged fight or about to be) externally looks like what
he internally is. Matheo describes his appearance to Prospero: “An there were no more
men living upon the face of the earth, I should not fancy him, by Phoebus” (2.3.9-10).
Prospero replies, “Troth, nor I. He is of a rustical cut — I know not how” (2.3.14). Not
only is his behavior choleric, but he looks “rustical” or boorish and unsophisticated (OED
def 4a). His “rustical cut” may also refer to his “rust” colored face suggesting that an

Lorenzo Senior could refer to either the common dung beetle or a rare, beautiful insect
which also breeds in dung. This double meaning could complicate Jonson’s message
about the relationship between external appearance and inner truth. However, Jonson
edits this ambiguity out of the revised folio by replacing “scarab” with “snake.”
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excess of blood, which causes him to appear flushed, causes his humoral imbalance of
choler.
Gallbladders and Boiling Blood
Both Giuliano and the characters whom he meets consistently explain his behavior
by referencing his choleric humor, Hesperida tells him “Brother, indeed, you are too
violent,/ Too sudden in your courses” (3.4.149-150). Jonson gives the audience many
examples of Giuliano’s rash choleric outbursts. When Giuliano hears about his brother’s
increasingly wasteful lifestyle, he claims that he will cut off his own ear before giving his
brother another penny (1.4.60). When Thorello asks him to be patient, he declares “
‘Sblood, he mads me! I could eat my very flesh for anger” (1.4.62-63). When Giuliano
attempts to beat Prospero during an argument, Prospero excuses his brother’s violent
behavior by explaining, “Come let’s go. This is one of my brother’s ancient humours,
this” (3.4.167). Thorello tries to talk Giuliano down after Bobadilla insults Giuliano by
calling him a Scavenger. Thorello restrains him and prevents the fight.
But, brother, let your apprehension then
Run in an easy current, not transported
With heady rashness or devouring choler,
And rather carry a persuading spirit,
Whose powers will pierce more gently and allure
Th’imperfect thoughts you labor to reclaim
To a more sudden and resolved assent. (1.4.128-134)
Thorello recognizes the telltale signs of Giuliano’s choler and in Galenic terms discusses
the choler as a devouring thing that can transport apprehension. 7 By defining it in
material terms, Thorello offers an actual plan to try to stop it. However, Jonson has
7

Miola cites Timothy Bright’s A Treatise of Melancholy (1586) as a source for
Thorello’s description. Similar passages, describing apprehension as a devouring choler
appear in Levinus Lemnius’ The Touchstone of Complexions (1581).
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already made it clear that despite Thorello’s knowledge about the humoral body and
his logical urging of Giuliano to control his, Thorello is ultimately unable to follow his
own advice.
Giuliano, as much as anyone, is aware of his own humoral imbalance. When he
becomes infuriated with the gull Matheo and his ridiculous poetry, he communicates his
anger using Galenic language to describe the relationship between the organs of his body
and his anger “Oh, here’s no foppery! ‘Sblood, it frets me to the gall to think” (3.4.31). 8
After he storms out of the room, Prospero tosses his hands in the air, recognizing the
futility of trying to change his choleric brother. He tells his companions, “Oh, ay, it is his
condition” (3.4.32).
At the end of the play Giuliano offers Prospero the closest thing to an apology that
he is able to manage:
Well, brother Prospero, by this good light that shines here, I am loath to
kindle fresh coals, but, an you had come in my walk within these last two
hours, I had given you that you should not have clawn off again in haste.
By Jesus, I had done it; I am the arrant’st rogue that ever breathed else!
But now, beshrew my heart if I bear you any malice in the earth. (5.3.322326)
In this moment of “good light,” Giuliano’s humor is not in control of his actions. He is
able to tell Prospero that he cares for him and attempts to make peace. However, in the
same breath, he threatens his brother, stating the fact that he would have beaten him
severely if he had seen him earlier. Being conscious of his humoral imbalance does not
empower him to control it.
Like Giuliano, Lorenzo Junior’s cousin, Stephano, is naturally choleric. The

8

According to Gallen, the gallbladder was the organ that produced choler.
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audience immediately knows this because, in the first scene, Lorenzo Senior has to
restrain him from beating Prospero’s messenger as a result of a casual misunderstanding.
However, unlike Giuliano, he has no awareness of his own humoral imbalance. He never
indicates that he is conscious of or has regrets about his choler. Yet, even though he is
blissfully unaware of the humors that control him (which are so obvious to everyone
else), he is unsatisfied with his current humoral state. Rather than attempting to correct
his choleric imbalance, he laments that he lacks the fashionable imbalance of melancholy.
He believes that he can make himself “more gentlemanly” if he can become a
melancholic. 9 Much to Lorenzo Junior and Prospero’s delight, Stephano attempts to
affect this humor. The two secretly mock him as he introduces himself by claiming “I am
somewhat melancholy” and by asking for a stool (2.3.74). The folio clarifies the reason
that he asks for the stool; he asks, “have you a stool there to be melancholy upon?”
Stephano goes so far as to pull Lorenzo Junior aside and self-consciously ask, “Cousin, is
it well? Am I melancholy enough?” (2.3.99).
Lorenzo Junior and Prospero share laughs with the audience, watching Stephano
make a fool of himself. The stakes feel low since neither Lorenzo Senior nor Stephano
seem to be irreparably harmed by Lorenzo Junior and Prospero’s mockery nor by their
own lack of humoral agency. However, Thorello’s failed attempts to alter his
relationship with his humoral body are much more disturbing and reveal a deeper level of
anxiety about free will, abstracted selfhood, and biological predetermination.
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“In the Heat of Passion”: Thorello’s Dualistic Destiny
The jealous Thorello is one of the most conventional humoral characters in one of
Jonson’s most conventional humoral comedies. However, as we have already seen,
Thorello regularly rejects the notion that he is his jealousy. Instead, like the
neuroscientists whom O’connor criticizes, Thorello insists that his mind has been
hijacked; his true self is overcome by bodily disease. Jonson introduces Thorello as he
approaches Giuliano to ask him to intervene and get his half-brother, Prospero, to change
his ways. When Giuliano asks him why he does not just confront Prospero himself,
Thorello explains his theory of human behavior:
...if I should speak,
He would be ready in the heat of passion
To fill the ears of his familiars
With oft reporting to them what disgrace
And gross disparagement I had proposed him;
And then would they straight back him in opinion,
Make some loose comment upon every word,
And out of their distracted fantasies
Contrive some slander that should dwell with me. (1.4.78-86)
The notion that other men’s “distracted fantasies” could cause a scandal was a commonly
discussed early modern anxiety. Robert Burton warns that when the imaginative faculty
becomes diseased, people “are so much affected, that with the very strength of
imagination, fear, and the devil's craft, they pull those misfortunes they suspect, upon
their own heads, and that which they fear, shall come upon them” (364). However,
Thorello’s assumption about how Prospero will behave if he confronts him is doubly
ironic. First, Thorello concludes that a confronted Prospero will be “in the heat of
passion” and that this passion will cause Prospero to say cruel things about him behind
his back. However, by sharing this hypothetical with Giuliano, Thorello is doing exactly
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what he fears Prospero will do, “filling the ears of his familiars with disgrace.” Next,
Thorello prematurely accuses Prospero and the other gulls of creating a slander out of
“distracted fantasies,” or, in other words, of imagining a scandal and making up false
rumors. Of course, it is actually Thorello whose diseased imagination is giving him
images of the gulls seducing Bianca and Thorello who does the slandering.
For Thorello, every human action can be predicted and explained as a result of
physiology. In his first soliloquy, Thorello explains that his understanding of the humoral
body justifies his fear of being cuckolded. His house is full of “wonton gallants and
young revelers” and he knows that “strong motives muster and make head/ Against [his
wife’s] single peace” (1.4.154-155). The “strong motives” that he imagines are not
Bianca’s desire to hurt him or any moral failing on her part. Instead he is concerned
about a potential humoral alteration in his wife’s vulnerable body. He explains these
fears about Bianca’s changing body:
No, no, beware
When mutual pleasure sways the appetite,
And spirits of one kind and quality
Do meet to parley in the pride of blood (1.4.155-158).
Of course, his word choice references the actual act of intercourse (Miola notes the play
on the word “spirit” which can be a slang for semen). However, he is primarily concerned
with the motion of the animal spirits, which animate her body. According to Galenic
theory, when one is “moved” by passion, one does not merely feel moved. Instead, the
physical body undergoes a distinct, material change as the animal spirits, which
communicate between the embodied soul and organs, literally move at a different rate.

The motion of these spirits will literally combine in the “pride of blood.”
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He does not necessarily believe that the Bianca he married is a lustful woman.
However, just as he knows that Prospero’s “disposition” and “fair form” has been altered
by humoral alteration, and that the physical essence of choler has prevented his friend
Giuliano from making rational choices, he fears that the presence of the gulls in his home
will change his wife’s body against her will. The medical theories of his day support his
belief that heated blood stirred with lustful passion can lead Bianca into temptation.
These spirits are entities with an agency that is entirely separate from the abstracted
person he knows as his loving wife and they hold the essence of lust. When explaining
his wife’s infidelity to himself, he creates that dualist excuse which echoes through the
play (and later haunts the literature of “Double Subject Fallacy” ridden texts): “her body
made her do it.”
Interestingly, Jonson immediately provides evidence that Thorello’s theory is true:
agitated spirits do make the blood hot and blur reason. However, it is not Bianca whose
physiology is impacted by the presence of the strange men in her house. Instead, it is
Thorello who is altered by passions, which ironically arise from fantasizing about her
passions. Jonson demonstrates how absurd his assumptions are when, shortly after his
first soliloquy about his jealousy, Bianca enters the stage, lovingly calling him nicknames
and expressing concern about his health. When she touches his forehead she says, “Good
Lord, how it burns! Musse, keep you warm. Good truth, it is this new disease” (1.4.181182). Early modern medical writers frequently associate excessive heat with humoral
illness. Burton describes many of Thorello’s symptoms, including “fear and sorrow
10
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without a just cause, suspicion, jealousy, discontent, solitariness, irksomeness, continual
cogitations, restless thoughts, vain imagination,” as consequences of melancholy (128).
“If a humour which in its “natural” state tended toward the cool (phlegm or melancholy)
was suddenly acted upon or scorched by heat, producing thereby what was identified as
an “unnatural” humor, then a terrific altering in the health and character of the affected
individual was understood to result” (Wood, 207n10).
The burning heat of jealousy is a common trope of the early modern stage and is
frequently deployed by Shakespeare. In The Winter’s Tale, Leontes suddenly declares
“Too hot, too hot” seeing his wife, Hermione, exchange pleasantries with his childhood
friend, Polixenes. From that moment onwards, he acts irrationally and violently. David
Houston Wood convincingly argues that Leontes’s exclamation reveals “the overlapping
vocabularies of mental and physical disease in the humoral body” (188).
The humoral heat of jealousy is similarly central to understanding the nature of
Othello’s jealousy. Ian Donaldson argues that Shakespeare, who acted in the original
production of Every Man in his Humour, had Thorello and Bianca in mind as he wrote
Othello and Desdemona. 11 In Othello, Desdemona misreads her husband’s humoral state
when she claims that Othello’s body is humorally incompatible with the disease of
jealousy. After she has lost the precious handkerchief (the symbol of her loyalty to her
husband), she explains to Emilia that she has no fear that Othello will read into this
mistake because, “my noble Moor/ Is true of mind and made of no such baseness/ As
jealous creatures are” (3.4.24-26). Emilia is incredulous. She asks, “Is he not jealous?”
11

For more on how Shakespeare's memory of Jonson's Thorello influences his depiction
of jealousy in Othello, see Mary Floyd-Wilson’s English Ethnicity and Race in Early
Modern Drama (132-35) and Ian Donaldson’s Ben Jonson: A Life (130-132).
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(3.4.28). Desdemona replies, “Who, he? I think the sun where he was born/ Drew all
such humours from him” (3.4.29). She imagines the burning African sun, which darkened
his skin, literally drawing the heat from his humoral body. According to Desdemona, the
hot fever of jealousy has no place in his sun-weathered disposition. Of course Othello
does have a humoral body that is all too prone to jealousy. Stuart Walton argues:
More than the irrelevant tokens of Iago’s resentment, this notion of
Othello’s being too noble to have been prey to baseless jealousies is the
play’s great decoy, what Alfred Hitchcock used to refer to in his own film
plots as a ‘McGuffin,’ some apparently significant object, observation or
occurrence that turns out to be wholly misleading or irrelevant. We are
asked to believe that Othello is of such iron-willed resolution that only
some scheme of diabolical Machiavellian intricacy could trap him in its
snares, and yet at the same time we see him coming to a state of boiling
rage at the mere suggestion, unfounded as he himself sees it to be, that his
wife has been unfaithful to him. (84-185)
Not only are Desdemona and the audience falsely confident that Othello is a temperate,
balanced man, Othello himself believes this to be true.
What sets Thorello apart from Leontes and Othello is his recognition of his own
physiological change and the language he uses to explain it. Unlike Shakespeare’s
heroes/villains who accuse their wives of being the source of their jealousy, Thorello
recognizes that his painful passion is caused by a material disease, not by any of Bianca
actions. As I discussed in the opening of the chapter, Thorello feels imprisoned by his
bodily experience as the “searching vapour” of jealously “spreads itself,/ Confusedly,
through every sensive part,” directly countering the desires of his reason seeking mind
(1.4.200-201). He repetitively uses slavery imagery to describe the relationship he has
with his body.
Bane to my fortunes! What meant I to marry?
I that before was ranked in such content,
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My mind attired in smooth, silken peace,
Being free master of my own free thoughts,
And now become a slave? (3.3.14-19)
Thorello is aware that he is not a free agent. He describes his thoughts as forces that
undermine his authority. He imagines the moving forces of his suspicions moving
through the organ of his brain:
My brain, methinks, is like an hourglass,
And my imaginations, like the sands,
Run dribbling forth to fill the mouth of time,
Still charged with turning in the ventricle. (3.1.39)
Thorello is hyperconscious of the fact that his jealousy is a physical force that causes
unhealthy, potentially dangerous fantasies. He draws a clear distinction between the will
of his mind and the will of his body. He does not blame his wife for his agony; instead,
he blames his humorally imbalanced body. 12
“Drowned in a flood of joy”: Fear of Humoral Overabundance
After a confusing and upsetting interaction with Thorello, his servant, Piso, begins
to experience his own humoral turn.
Whence should this flow of passion, trow, take head? Ha?
Faith, I’ll dream no longer of this running humour,
For fear I sink. The violence of the stream
Already hath transported me so far
That I can feel no ground at all. (3.1.123-127)
Like Thorello, Piso is frightened of losing the self that he knows himself to be in this
dangerous, powerful liquid force of overwhelming humor. Piso imagines Thorello as a
man who has been swept away from the bank in a strong tide, and he dares not follow
after Thorello for fear of drowning himself. Just being near the overwhelmingly
12

Kenneth Jackson has a similar reading of Thorello’s blame. “Thorello believes his
jealousy stems from humoural madness, not the gallants’ immoral conduct” (Jackson 67).
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passionate man has “transported” Piso from a place of comfortable self-knowledge into a
confusingly altered humoral state. Thorello uses a similar drowning analogy when he
imagines his wife greeting Prospero’s friends. He describes Bianca becoming silent
because “the voice, / Drowned in a flood of joy at their arrival, / Had lost her motion,
state, and faculty” (3.3.27-29). “The voice” becomes a stand-in for his beloved wife, and
he imagines her drowning in a flood of passions, loosing “her motion, state, and faculty.”
Certainly, Jonson’s use of language that depicts the body as a river, lake, or sea and
the passions as the filling, flowing, waters supports Paster’s claim that early modern
people “grew up with a common understanding of his or her body as a semipermeable,
irrigated container in which [each of these] humors moved” (8). However, the metaphor
also exposes how anxiety producing this permeability was. These metaphors are
particularly violent ant disturbing. Thorello and Piso describe themselves in dire
situations, lost, confused, and troubled by their passions. Their fear stems from the fact
that they once had clear, definable, established senses of what kind of men they were and
what kind of women they were married to. However, the passions unsettle these notions
and leave them feeling unmoored.
As the play continues, the passion of jealousy becomes increasingly powerful,
dangerous, and material. After Prospero makes a casual remark (mocking Thorello for
his tendency towards paranoia), Thorello becomes convinced that he has been poisoned
and calls out for medicine:
I feel me ill. Give me some mithridate;
Some mithridate and oil, good sister, fetch me.
Oh, I am sick at heart! I burn, I burn.
If you will save my life, go fetch it me. (4.3.21-24)
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Of course, no one has literally poisoned him; however, by instigating his jealousy,
Prospero has physically altered Thorello, increasing the heat of his body. Thorello’s
emotional pain is so intense that he cannot distinguish it from physical pain. However,
Prospero observing Thorello’s strange response is certainly able to distinguish mental
disease from physical disease. He diagnoses Thorello, saying, “Oh strange humour! My
very breath hath poisoned him” (4.3.24). Prospero knows that mithridate is not the cure
that Thorello needs and attempts to assuage the influx of passions by appealing to
Thorello’s reason: “For shame, be wiser. Of my soul, there’s no such matter” (4.3.3132). Prospero is the first outsider to finally directly address the root of Thorello’s secret
suffering, “His jealousy is the poison he hath taken” (4.3.36).
Even after witnessing Thorello becoming “poisoned” by a mere suggestion,
Prospero and Lorenzo Junior cruelly devise a plot that will intentionally make Bianca
jealous of Thorello. They set this scheme in motion to get Hesperida out of Thorello’s
house so that Lorenzo Junior will be able to woo her. He cannot court her inside of the
house because, according to Prospero, “the house is so stirred up with jealousy that there
is no room for love to stand upright in” (4.3.53-54). The passion becomes a material
entity that takes up physical space and impacts even those who have no reason to be
affected by it.
“Dishumorings”: The Humorous Conclusion
In the final scene, all of the main characters appear together in front of Judge
Clement who finally exposes each of their predominant humors. Miola defines this as a
“dishumouring.” “As in classical comedy, dishumouring in Jonson takes the form of
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exposure rather than reformation” (64). Doctor Clement, the character who is
responsible for the “dishumouring” begins the process by asking all of the characters to
“put down” their disturbing humors. He says, “First, you Senior Lorenzo, your cares [To
Thorello and Bianca] you and you, your jealousy; [To Giuliano] you, your anger; [To
Prospero] and you, your wit, sir” (5.3.372-374). When he asks, “Do you all approve my
motion?” Prospero answers, “We do. I’ll be mouth for all” (5.3.377). All of the characters
clearly want to be able to exist beyond their humoral faults, and they believe that they
can. But, of course, as Lawrence Danson points out, the “dishumouring” project fails.
Thorello remains jealous even after everything is revealed to him. Lorenzo Senior
remains melancholic and anxious, Giuliano and Stephano remain choleric and volatile.
However, the fact that they longing to rid themselves of their humors, as well as the
language that they use to distinguish “themselves” from their humoral bodies,
demonstrates that they are more than mere bodily fluctuation. Just as Polonius is a fool
to think that he can diagnose and know all that Hamlet is just by observing his superficial
displays of humoral characteristics, the ending of the play demonstrates that Doctor
Clement is foolish for believing that he can know all that there is to know about these
psychologically complex characters by merely indexing their humoral characteristics.
Coda: “The Book of Humours”
In the folio of Jonson’s Cynthia’s Revels, a crew of courtly ladies imagines their
ideal selves in distinctly humoral terms. Phantaste makes a game out of asking “Put
case, that we four now had the grant from Juno, to wish ourselves into what happy estate
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we could, what would you wish to be?” (4.1.107-108). Moria exclaims that she would
like to be the person who knows all the gossip; Philautia, whose name means self-love,
already is who she wants to be, although she does desire more power. Phantaste has
higher aspirations. She wants to be the perfect woman who will be committed to no one
and torment the multitudes of men who fall for her:
. . . and in that person I would prove all manner of suitors, of all humours, and of
all complexions, and never have any two of a sort. I would see how love, by the
power of his object, could work inwardly alike in a choleric man, and a sanguine,
in a melancholic and a phlegmatic, in a fool and a wise-man. . . and how he could
vary outward . . . And, then, I to have a book made of all this, which I would call
the ‘Book of Humours’, and every night read a little piece ere I slept, and laugh at
it. (4.1.198–214)
What she really wants to be is an anatomist. She wants to know how love could “work
inwardly” in each man’s body. She will gather empirical evidence about how different
humoral bodies respond to love. “Offering a fantasy of knowledge as potent as any
indulged by Marlowe’s Faustus, Phantaste’s “booke of humours” would record the results
of a potentially endless series of experiments in the unity and diversity of human nature”
(Scott-Warren 77). Her imagined "Book of Humours," not only gives her the kind of
pleasure that the audiences of Jonson’s humoral comedies gain from watching laudable
figures expose their follies, but also could provide a real type of power. To know the
humoral body is to know how one will react to anything. Therefore, her imagined self
will be able to control and manipulate anyone. She becomes the playwright. She
becomes the one who can characterize all of those around her, know, and predict exactly
how each person will respond.
At one level, this is what Jonson, as the playwright, tries to do. He creates
characters who represent myriad humoral traits and places them in different situations to
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see how they will react. However, Jonson’s characters seem to rebel against these clean,
neat characterizations. The irrationally melancholic Lorenzo Senior attempts to reason
his way into joy, the choleric Stephano pretends that he is melancholic so frequently that
he almost manages to convince himself that he has a changed temperament, and the poor,
tortured Thorello cries out, “I am more than just my jealousy.” Jonson challenges the
notion that mankind is classifiable; we need more than a “Book of Humours” to
understand the complexities of human character.
Many neuroscientists are treating the new “Mapping the Brain” project as Phantaste
treats the “Book of Humours.” They share the assumption that knowing the material
makeup of the physiological emotional body will allow them to understand all human
behavior. In his recent New York Times opinion piece, “The Amygdala Made Me Do It,”
James Atlas suggests that recent science has led psychologists and philosophers alike to
recognize that “the brain is an organ, too” (1). Furthermore, it is an organ that can be
mapped. In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama announced a plan to
invest in the study of neuroscience with the ambitious goal of mapping the 85 to 100
billion neurons in the human brain “just as scientists mapped the human genome.”
This new approach to understanding human behavior through brain research has led
to a rise in the popularity of what Atlas cleverly calls the “can’t help yourself book.”
Several bestsellers, including Charles Duhigg’s The Power of Habit: Why We Do What
We Do in Life and Business (2012), Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)
and Leonard Mlodinow’s Subliminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior
(2012), demonstrate the rising concerns about whether or not we are ever fully able to
change the way that our bodies physically interact with the world or control the ways that
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we experience it. The books suggest, “the choices we make in day-to-day life are
prompted by impulses lodged deep within the nervous system” (Atlas 1). They ask: can
you help being what you are? Then, these authors present case studies and EEG scans
results that suggest, “No. You cannot.” However, at the end of each book, the authors
backpedal and include statements like, “You may be predisposed to making bad choices
but that doesn’t mean that you’ll always make them or that your bad behavior is
excused.” Despite the movement towards a monistic, embodied understanding of self,
there is a persistent cultural insistence that that there is ultimately some abstracted “I” —a
driver behind the wheel— even though, sometimes, the car will not let me drive it where
I want it to go.

CHAPTER THREE
HUMOROUS HAL: MATERIAL MANIPULATION AND EMOTIONAL SELFFASHIONING IN THE HENRIAD
In the last chapter, I focused on Jonson’s characters that use the language of
humoralism to take on Socrates’ famous admonition, “nosce teipsum.” The fact that so
many characters in Every Man in His Humour can be consistently defined by their
dominant humoural characteristics supports the core assumption of the neural doctrine:
physiology is fate; man’s nature is the balance of the material body, nothing more.
However, I argued that the fact that these characters are able to recognize their humoural
imbalances, express concern that their embodied passions and humors are other than their
“real selves,” and attempt to maintain agency over their bodies (albeit unsuccessfully),
reveals Jonson’s investment in an emerging dualism which involves the coexistence of an
aspect of character cannot be explained by the humoural discourse.
Thorello, who “strives, even in despite of hell, myself to be,” struggles to
establish an identity that exists in relation to but separate from his humoural body
(1.4.207). He imagines his body as diseased, his humors as vile waters, and his passions
as poison. Thorello’s body becomes what Julia Kristeva defines as the abject: “that from
which the subject must detach itself in order to form a separate identity” (86).
Shakespeare’s Corporal Nim (of Henry V and Merry Wives of Windsor) has a very
different relationship with his humors. Nim discusses his humoural body as frequently as
64
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any character in Jonson’s humoral comedies and uses the term “humor” more than
any other character in Shakespeare's canon. Like Thorello, every time that Nim
makes a decision, he suggests that he has no choice in the matter: when threatening to
stab Pistol, he explains, “I would prick your guts a little, in good terms, as I may, and
that's the humour of it” (Henry V 2.1.51-52); when departing for war with Pistol and
Bardolph, he refuses to kiss Mistress Quickly saying, “I cannot kiss, that is the
humour of it” (Henry V 2.3.52); when rejecting the call to go “unto the breach”
during the war, he claims, “The knocks are too hot, and for mine own part I have not
a case of lives. The humour of it is too hot, that is the plainsong of it” (Henry V 3.2.35). However, unlike Thorello, Nim never suggests that he has any investment in or
awareness of a sense of self that exists apart from his humoral body. Paster reads
Nim’s humor as “that force within him which simply and unanswerably moves him to
feel and do” (“The Humour of It” 52). Nim discusses his hum our as a sign of selfacceptance; humor is the source of his “resistance to alteration” (52). She claims, The
socially recognized autonomy of the humors served not only to excuse his
boorishness but also to justify his unwillingness to regulate, articulate, or reflect upon
his words and actions -- or indeed upon the curious nature of his world. The running
of his bad humors against others, in that sense, are his actions, the stream of
impulsive behaviors and disconnected speech that through their repetition constitute
psychologically continuous self. (“The Humour of It” 53)
Certainly, Nim justifies his self-serving actions (to himself and others) by claiming
“my humours made me do it.” But, how plausible would this excuse be to an early
modern audience? Are “psychologically continuous selves” constructed by the motion of
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humors in the material body as Nim asserts?
Throughout Shakespeare’s Henriad, Hal raises this question. Unlike Nim, who
insists that “the humour of it” accounts for his life choices, Hal’s ambiguous bodily state
does not give him a “psychologically continuous self,” nor are his humors self-justifying.
Instead, for Hal, navigating a relationship with his body’s agency is upsetting and
complicated. Rather than using his body to define himself, Hal fashions his identity by
manipulating and defying the ways that others read and classify his humoral state. By
exposing the radically unpredictable nature of Hal, Shakespeare challenges notions of
diagnosable humoral personality. In this chapter, I argue that Shakespeare opposes Nim’s
insistence that he can fully define himself and justify his actions by referring to his bodily
humor. Instead, Shakespeare plays with the conventional tropes of humorally defined
personality only to ultimately reveal their limitations.
Humoral Characterization in the Henriad
Many critics have noted Shakespeare’s specific interest in the significance of
embodied humors and passions in the four plays of the Henriad. 1 In 1963, U. C.
Knoepflmacher refuted Caroline Spurgeon’s widely accepted claim that both parts of
1

I am discussing the tetralogy, comprising Richard II; Henry IV, Part 1; Henry IV, Part
2; and Henry V. There is an ongoing critical debate about the extent to which the
characters in each of the four plays should be read as consistent representations. Robert
Adger Law describes the plays as distinct but linked "like separate coaches on a railway
train” (187). I find Mary Crane’s critique of Law particularly useful in framing my
discussion of the four plays: “The metaphor may work if we picture the coaches as very
different in shape and size” (299 n.86). Crane convincingly argues that:
It is not necessary to prove that Shakespeare intentionally created tetralogies for
performance or publication; if a general sense of history as a larger process lay
behind these individual plays, then their continuity can be explained as a result of
this unifying concept. Each play could stand alone. The stylistic differences
among them need not be smoothed over, nor need the connections be made
seamless.Yet we are also right to see these individual plays as parts of a larger
whole, a whole that seems to have been unique in the drama of Shakespeare's day.
(299)
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King Henry IV were devoid of continuous symbolic imagery by arguing,
“Shakespeare’s subtle metaphoric use of the Elizabethan theory of humors provides the
basis for a symbolic nucleus which binds the play’s abundant references to blood,
sickness, and the four elements” (497). According to Knoepflmacher, Hotspur is
sanguine, Henry IV is choleric, Falstaff is phlegmatic, and Hal is able to integrate the best
aspects of each humor. Robert Reid expands on Knoepflmacher’s claims by arguing,
“The Henriad defines the period of Shakespeare's most salient humouralism” (474). 2
Reid maintains that Shakespeare uses these characters to exemplify each humoral trait
like the emblems and rubrics in Henry Peacham’s well-known Minerva Britanna and the
epigrams in John Harington’s translation of The School of Salerne, which neatly define
and illustrate the four humoral types. However, unlike Knoepflmacher, Reid makes a
case for reading Hal as sanguine, Henry IV as melancholic, and Hotspur as choleric.
They only agree on Falstaff’s phlegmatic nature.
Falstaff, whose abundant phlegmatism makes him so deeply beloved by his fellow
drunks and audiences alike, is immediately recognizable by his enormous, rotund,
flatulent body, which is consistently described by its humoral moisture. The consuming,
drunk, leaky, and tremendous body of Falstaff is impossible to separate from his identity.

2

According to Reid, the eight plays that Shakespeare wrote between 1597-1600 “form
the heyday of explicit Shakespearean humoralism” (474). Reid supports this claim by
explaining that in the fourteen plays Shakespeare wrote prior to 1597, “humor” appears
three times per play; in the fifteen after 1600, it appears only once per play. However, in
1 King Henry IV through Twelfth Night, the word appears an average of ten times per
play. I agree with his specific claim that these plays are Shakespeare’s “most humoral.”
However, Reid’s use of the concordance is unconvincing . For example, Nym is
responsible for all 6 uses of the word “humour” in Henry V. The word also only appears
only twice in 2 King Henry IV (in which Nym does not appear). Furthermore, Reid never
discusses The Merry Wives of Windsor, written in 1602 (post “humoral heyday”), in
which the word “humour” appears 15 times, 11 of which are in Nym’s dialogue.
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The plays focus “obsessively” on Falstaff’s fatness (Moulton 236). Reid points out
how perfectly Salerno’s epigram of “The Phlegmatic Man” characterizes Fastaff:
The Flegmatiqu are most of no great growth,
Inclining to be rather fat and square:
Given much unto their ease, to rest and sloth,
Content in knowledge to take little share,
To put themselves to any paine most loth.
So dead their spiritis, so dull their sences are:
Still either sitting, like to folke that dreame,
Or else still spitting, to avoid the flegme:
One qualitie doth yet these harmes repaire,
That for the most part Flegmatique are faire. (482)
Although Falstaff is certainly not “faire” like Salerno’s phlegmatic man, he embodies all
the other characteristics: fatness, slothfulness, bodily leakiness. Hal echoes Salerno’s
language of humoral classification in his description of Falstaff: “Thou art so fat-witted,
with drinking of old sack and unbuttoning thee after supper and sleeping upon benches
after noon, that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know”
(1 Henry IV 1.2.2-5). There is no doubt that the doctrine of the four humors specifically
influenced Shakespeare’s Henriad or that Falstaff’s fat, wet, and slow body frequently
corresponds with specific depictions of the “phelegmatic man” which appear in works
like The School of Salerne and Minerva Britanna. Similarly, Hotspur’s choleric rages
(which I will discuss in more detail) are consistently defined in humoral terms. However,
I want to challenge the commonly held critical assumption that the Henriad’s characters
“exemplify” the Galenic temperaments. Shakespeare allows these over-abundantly
humoral characters to interact with a character whose physiology proves to be difficult to
predict: Hal, the humorous prince.
Although many characters try to pinpoint the humor of Hal, and Hal attempts to use
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humoral language to define himself, he ultimately remains unclassifiable. Hal is
always as he describes himself in I Henry IV: “I am now of all humours that have showed
themselves humours since the old days of goodman Adam to the pupil age of this present
twelve o'clock at midnight” (1 Henry IV 2.5.86-88). The way that Hal uses the discourse
of humoralism to narrate his intentionally constructed identity is entirely different from
the way he uses it to classify others. Believing that he is of all humors, he rejects the
notion that he can ever be humorally defined. Instead, he claims to have the power to
shape the substance of his self. The extent to which he succeeds in this endeavor is
questionable, but his confidence in humoral self-fashioning is not.
Fashioning the Humoral Self
According to Matthew Greenfield, the moderator of the online forum, “Shakespeare
and Embodiment: An E-Conversation,” the question (which is so central to Hal) about the
extent to which early modern writers believed in the possibility of self-control and
temperance is one of the primary debates among scholars who work on early modern
bodies. Notably, two of the most influential scholars on humoralism, Paster and
Schoenfeldt, disagree on this issue (Greenfield 2). In The Body Embarrassed Paster
discusses the ways in which the early moderns were defined by the liquids of their
humoral bodies. She describes the power of the actor’s humoral agency, claiming,
“Above all, the actor can offer the image of an affective and physical control so masterful
as to quell, if only for a time, the inner turbulence of his own humourality” (20).
However, she implies that this affective and physical control is only available for the
duration of the performance. In the real world, the humors determined everything about a
person’s life experience; “The men and women of early modern Europe understood their
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mortality, described their sensations and bodily events, and often experienced physical
and psychological benefit in humoral terms” (The Body Embarrassed 7). She argues that
humoral theory was “instrumental in the production and maintenance of gender and class
difference” (The Body Embarrassed 7).
Paster develops the notion of “an ecology of the passions peculiar to the
psychological materialism of early modern thought” (The Body Embarrassed 42). This
ecology of passions accounts for the influence of the embodied passions on the external
environment and of the environment on the passions. In other words, “the body can
momentarily relinquish agency to the air that surrounds and flows into it” (The Body
Embarrassed 41). It is always either the body or the air that has agency. There is no
abstracted self who has an ability to shape this body or control the way that it interacts
with its environment. Instead, Paster describes the passions and humors as independent
external forces which act within the body “just as the forces of wind and waves act in the
natural world” (Humoring the Body 6). Paster is not suggesting that one should take this
claim metaphorically. Instead, she suggests that the human body literally moves with the
passions, like the “loving palm trees” growing together as a result of passions that Robert
Burton describes in his Anatomy of Melancholy. She claims that Burton does not discuss
the trees as an analogy. Instead, the passions literally push the trees together; man
becomes subject to his body. This is far more consistent with Nim’s version of
humoralism than it is with Hal’s. A man’s character and nature is a body that can be
categorized and defined.
However, reading humors as “fixed and irreducible” does not consider the fact that
“more often in humoural discourse… humors are represented as a part of the natural body
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that can and must be manipulated through various dietary regimens for the
achievement of physical health and emotional stability” (Schoenfeldt, 25). Schoenfeldt
understands the early modern conception of agency very differently. In Bodies and Selves
in Early Modern England, Schoenfeldt refutes Paster’s interpretation of the
uncontrollable force of passion. Schoenfeldt argues that Paster’s reading of the body as a
“semipermeable, irrigated container in which humors moved sluggishly” ignores the
“individual subject’s willing and unembarrassed adoption of therapies of self-regulation”
(15). He claims that the self-regulation of the humoral body allowed early modern
subjects to “produce the parameters of individual subjectivity" (15). For him, the early
modern body is a site of self-fashioning.
Schoenfeldt convincingly argues that Galenic humoralism can be seen as a form
of self-empowerment in the struggle for self-control. He understands the humoral
discourse as one that empowered early moderns to “produce the parameters of individual
subjectivity” or fashion their identities through the careful management of their humoral
bodies (15). Analyzing the humoral fluctuations in terms of self-control and selfimprovement, he concludes, “The Galenic body achieves health … by carefully
monitoring and manipulating the inevitable and literal influences of the outside world,
primarily through therapies of ingestion and excretion” (22). Therefore, regulation of the
material body constitutes individual power. But Paster takes issue with Schoenfeldt’s
reading, claiming, “[He] simply ignores the realities of social and gender hierarchy
everywhere in the period” (“The Humour of It” 65). By implying that all individuals are
equal under the laws of early modern Galenic humoralism, Schoenfeldt “mistakenly
presumes an unmarked ‘individual’ prior to biological—that is to say hierarchical—
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classification” (21 Humoring the Body).
Schoenfeldt’s reading of the humoral body leaves an important question
unanswered: If the body can be fashioned, what is doing the fashioning? The humors that
Nim describes tell us more about what Nim desires to do than about what he is capable of
doing. Though Nim refers to the humor of his body as a matter of fact and claims that the
humors are what make him try to stab Pistol, avoid the embrace of Mistress Quickly, and
stay off the battlefield, neither the audience nor the other characters are encouraged to
believe that he is actually unable to act differently.
Neither Paster’s nor Schoenfeldt’s explanation of humoral management accounts
for the complicated way that Hal constructs himself: he is not the passive body, moved by
winds of passion as Paster describes, nor does he manage his humoral changes by altering
his physical body. Instead, he intentionally manipulates how others perceive his humoral
body. This manipulation can be read as an act of what Steven Greenblatt defines as “selffashioning.” Greenblatt asserts “In sixteenth-century England there were both selves and
a sense that they could be fashioned” (1). He defines the fashioning as “the shaping of a
distinctive personality, a characteristic address to the world, a consistent mode of
perceiving and behaving” (2). Greenblatt is invested in the question: are we the principal
makers of our own identity, or are we shaped by the cultural institutions which surround
us? I rephrase Greenblatt’s question to focus on the physiological aspect of identity and
ask: are we the principal makers of our own identity, or are we shaped by the material
realities of our bodies?
Comparing Humors: The Deceptive Humoral Flux of Hotspur
The unknowable nature of Hal’s humor is frequently brought up by characters
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who are baffled by his behavior. Doll Tearsheet asks Falstaff, “Sirrah, what humour’s
the Prince of?” expressing her confusion about this unsettling future king who she can
bizarrely count among her acquaintances (2 Henry IV 2.4.210). Hal’s father cannot
define the humor of his son any better than Doll. Henry IV describes the unpredictable
nature of Hal: “He is flint/ As humorous as winter, and as sudden/ As flaws congealed in
the spring of day” (2 Henry IV 4.3.34-36). When Hal tells his father, “I shall hereafter,
my thrice gracious lord,/ Be more myself,” Henry IV does not know what Hal imagines
this “self” to be (1 Henry IV 3.2.92-93). Even the man who believes he knows Hal best,
his old friend, drinking companion, and second father-figure, Falstaff, is shocked to find
that even he cannot predict Hal’s humor. After telling Falstaff, “Presume not that I am the
thing I was,” Hal brutally banishes him from his company (2 King Henry IV 5.5.54).
What “thing” was Hal? What “thing” is he now? What is his humor made of? The plays
leave these questions unanswerable.
While the Hal of all humors rejects the notion of diagnosable humoral personality,
Harry Percy, (better known by his nickname, Hotspur) further reveals Shakespeare’s
interest in challenging humoral classification. Unlike Hal, whose body inconsistently
changes, Hotspur’s body is dominated by a single humor: choler. His very name invokes
the hot, dry humor. Lady Percy tells her husband, “A weasel hath not such a deal of
spleen/ As you are tossed with” (1 Henry IV 2.4.71-72). 3 Hotspur’s body is so deeply
dominated by the restless, moving choler that he cannot even control his active body long
3

Paster describes how these animal metaphors illustrate the "interpretive literalism" of
early modern bodily and emotional self-experience (“Melancholy Cats, Lugged Bears,
and Cosmology” 113). Literalism means that Hotspur’s choler must be understood as a
material condition of the body.
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enough to rest his head in his wife’s lap for the length of a song.
To a certain extent, Hotspur’s choleric nature makes him admirable. After his death,
his wife lovingly remembers that other “noble youths” attempted to fashion their humoral
bodies after his natural state. She claims:
In speech, in gait,
In diet, in affections of delight,
In military rules, humors of blood,
He was the mark and glass, copy and book,
That fashioned others. (2 Henry IV 2.3.28-32)
However, his choler is also deeply problematic. The initial conflict of 1 King Henry IV is
initiated by Hotspur’s overactive humors. When Henry IV demands to know why
Hotspur refuses to give over his war prisoners, Hotspur, like Nim, asks to be excused for
his poor decision by explaining that his humors made him act as he did. He describes his
body as “dry with rage and extreme toil” (1 Henry IV 1.3.30). His passions were still
high from the act of shedding blood and he felt this dry heat in his already excessively
choleric body. He claims that these humors dictated the way that he communicated with
the King’s effeminate messenger. Hotspur describes the messenger’s neatness, his sweet
perfume, and his use of “holiday and lady terms” (1 King Henry IV 1.3.45). Clearly, he
found this messenger abhorrent and was infuriated to be asked to take orders from a man
who was so humorally incompatible with a warrior like himself. However, he explains to
the king that he now recognizes that his response was irrational. He explains,
Out of my grief and my impatience,
Answered neglectingly, I know not what—
He should, or should not—for he made me mad
To see him shine so brisk and smell so sweet,
And talk so like a waiting gentlewoman
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Of guns, and drums, and wounds, God save the mark! (1 King Henry IV
1.3.50-55)
Although he realizes that he did answer the king’s messenger “neglectingly,” he does not
take responsibility for his disrespect. Instead, his choler increases even as he recalls the
scene. Hotspur reasserts that he was “made” to answer as he did by his impatience
(another personality trait directly associated with choler).
Similarly, after his first failed confrontation with Henry IV, Hotspur demands
immediate gratification, even though he simultaneously recognizes the need to be patient;
he tells Northumberland, “For I will ease my heart,/ although it be with hazard of my
head” (1 Henry IV 1.3.125-126). Hotspur distinguishes between his heart, which contains
the overactive passions of his humorous body, and his head, the seat of reason. In the
battleground of Hotspur’s body, passion, driven by his dominant humor, always wins.
Northumberland stops Hotspur before he can take any action, accusing him of
being “drunk with choler” (1 Henry IV 1.3.127). According to Northumberland, Hotspur
must learn to mitigate the passions, which are instigated by the overabundant heat of his
blood. Northumberland does not read Hotspur’s audacity as courage but as weakness.
He tells Hotspur,
Why, what a wasp-stung and impatient fool
Art thou to break into this woman's mood,
Tying thine ear to no tongue but thine own! (1 Henry IV 1.3.234-36)
Northumberland uses the misogynistic commonplace to shame Hotspur, telling him that
he has a gossip’s mood; his bodily complexion makes him unable to listen to the opinions
of others. Hotspur admits that he is guilty of this inability to curb his rage and goes on to
explain what it feels like to embody this wasp-stung impatience: “Why, look you, I am
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whipped and scourged with rods,/ Nettled and stung with pismires, when I hear/ Of this
vile politician Bolingbroke” (1 Henry IV 1.3.237-39). Hotspur’s choleric rage manifests
itself as unbearable physical pain. Revenge becomes a primal, bodily urge.
In his youth, Henry IV shared Hotspur’s humoral classification. Richard II
describes both the young Henry (then known as Henry Bolingbrook) and his rival,
Thomas Mowbray: “High-stomach'd are they both, and full of ire;/ In rage deaf as the
sea, hasty as fire” (Richard II 1.1.18-19 ). Mowbray explains his anger at Bolingbroke
by describing the literal heat of his blood: “The blood is hot that must be cooled for this./
Yet can I not of such tame patience boast/ As to be hushed and naught at all to say”
(Richard II 1.1.51-53). He knows that only a choleric man would be so angry about
Bolingbroke’s petty words, but admits that he is physiologically prone to impatience.
Richard treats both young men’s choler like a disease that can be treated. He calls them
“Wrath-kindled gentlemen” and asks that they “purge this choler without letting blood”
(Richard II 1.1.152-153). He likens forgiving and forgetting to bloodletting, and
compares himself, the calmer of their tempers, to a medical doctor:
This we prescribe, though no physician;
Deep malice makes too deep incision;
Forget, forgive; conclude, and be agreed;
Our doctors say this is no time to bleed.
Good uncle, let this end where it begun.
We'll calm the Duke of Norfolk, you your son. (Richard II 1.1.154-159)
However, Shakespeare quickly demonstrates that calming is certainly not the equivalent
of bleeding. Neither young man is humorally altered by Richard’s attempts to calm them.
As Hotspur does in 1 Henry IV, Mowbray responds by describing the embodied nature of
his choleric anger:
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I am disgraced, impeached, and baffled here,
Pierced to the soul with slander's venomed spear,
The which no balm can cure but his heart blood
Which breathed this poison. (Richard II 1.1.170-173)
Like Thorello, who feels poisoned by Prospero’s rumors, Mowbray draws no distinction
between the emotional pain of humiliation and the material pain poison inflicts on the
body.
Henry IV is aware of the qualities that he had once shared with the young Hotspur.
However, his son, Hal, reminds him more of the melancholic Richard, who he deposed.
In an accusatory tone, he explains to Hal,
For all the world
As thou art to this hour was Richard then
When I from France set foot at Ravenspurgh,
And even as I was then is Percy now. (1 Henry IV 3.2.93-96)
However, Henry IV’s blood does not maintain the heat that filled his body when he was a
defiant youth. Age cools his humoral heat, and he is well aware of his transformation. In
1 Henry IV, he begins his chastisement of Henry Percy by criticizing his own humoral
body and accusing Hotspur of taking advantage of his newly melancholic state:
My blood hath been too cold and temperate,
Unapt to stir at these indignities,
And you have found me, for accordingly
You tread upon my patience. (1 Henry IV 1.3.1-4)
He goes on to explain that he recognizes his “condition” has been “smooth as oil, soft as
young down,” and therefore, he has “lost that title of respect” (1 Henry IV 3.1.7-8).
However, distinguishing between his “mighty and feared self” and his “soft condition,”
he then makes that Thorello-like claim: “I will from henceforth rather be myself.”
What does this claim to “be myself” mean? Hal and Henry IV both refer to an
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abstracted self that exists beyond the present condition of the physical body; both
understand this selfhood as a regulating force that interacts with the humors and passions
but is distinct from them. I will later discuss Hal’s complicated humoral self-fashioning,
but first, I ask, does the consistently choleric Hotspur share this abstracted selfhood?
Does he believe himself to be an agent that can withstand the pain of this anger and act
with patience or does his choler have total control over his body? Is he his choler?
Hotspur consistently describes his own choler as too powerful to be contained in his
body. Hal also recognizes that Hotspur’s body is too small a container for his exuberant
passion. After killing Hotspur, he memorializes him, remembering that “When that this
body did contain a spirit,/ A kingdom for it was too small a bound” (1 Henry IV 5.4.8889). However, Worcester, who frequently takes on the role of Hotspur’s adviser, is less
certain about the extent to which Hotspur’s choler can be managed. After Hotspur’s
choleric outburst in 1.3, which culminates in him promising to dedicate his life to
avenging Henry IV’s insult and threatening to poison Hal’s ale, Worcester recognizes
that any attempt to calm Hotspur’s choler is futile. Yet, Worcester does not go so far as
to suggest that Hotspur is his choler; he takes his leave, saying, “Farewell, kinsman. I'll
talk to you/ When you are better tempered to attend,” suggesting that his choleric
temperament may be altered at a different time (1 Henry IV 1.3.233).
Later in the play, Worcester begins to sound more like Nim as he questions whether
Hotspur is able to be anything other than his choleric humor. When he learns of Henry
IV’s peace treaty before the Battle of Shrewsbury, he decides not to tell his nephew about
it. He justifies his decision to Vernon by explaining that he suspects the king may pardon
Hotspur but punish the rest of the Percy clan because:
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My nephew's trespass may be well forgot;
It hath the excuse of youth and heat of blood,
And an adopted name of privilege—
A hare-brained Hotspur, governed by a spleen.
All his offenses live upon my head,
And on his father’s. (1 Henry IV 5.2.16-21)
Since young Harry Percy has a body so prone to choler that he warrants the nickname
“Hotspur,” Worcester believes that the king will not hold him accountable for his
behavior. 4
The question of Hotspur’s culpability is complicated. On one hand, Worcester
imagines Hotspur’s violence being acquitted because he is “governed by spleen” as Nim
is governed by his humor. It is not Hotspur’s choice to be rebellious; it is his young,
humorally imbalanced body’s. However, if Hotspur is his spleenful body, then what is
there to pardon? Instead, Worcester believes in a second subject, an immaterial,
redeemable Hotspur. According to Worcester, Henry IV will distinguish between a
young, guilty overactive spleen and Hotspur, condemning one and forgiving the other.
However, Worcester is certain that he and his brother will not be so easily forgiven. The
young body is naturally hot, which makes ambitious passions more difficult to control,
while the old body is naturally cold and less likely to be unruly.
The question of Hotspur’s culpability is particularly relevant now as the
introduction of neuroscience into the current courtroom brings complicated questions
about bodies and agency to the legal system. Courts must answer the same question that
Shakespeare has Worchester ask: to what extent can young, undeveloped, materially
unstable bodies be held accountable for their actions? This question has been central to
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The fact that Henry IV pardoned the young conspirator Aumerle at the end of Richard II
lends credibility to Worscester’s certainty.
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several deeply controversial court cases including the 2005 Roper v. Simmons case.
Christopher Simmons was found guilty of murdering a woman while he was still
underage and was sentenced to death. In the appeal, the court considered a brief filed by
the American Medical Association which cites structural and anatomical studies of the
brain. The brief indicates that the adolescent brain is materially different from the mature
brain. The prefrontal cortex, (which is considered to play a critical role in the “higher
order” functions of the brain, “that is, abstraction and reasoning; understanding others’
reactions; planning; organizing; controlling impulses; emotional regulation;
understanding, processing, and communicating information; establishing, changing, and
maintaining a mental set; handling sequential behavior; using knowledge to regulate
behavior; and exhibiting empathy regarding how behavior affects others”) is not
completely developed during adolescence and does not mature until early adulthood
(Fabian 740). The brief was deeply influential in the court’s decision to rule that it is
unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed while under the age
of 18.
As T. Buller claims in the introduction to the Journal of Medical Ethics’ special
edition on neuroethics, the implications of emerging ‘‘neurotechnologies’’ for morality
and the law have been highly contested in both the academic and the popular presses. He
concludes:
If rationality is a necessary condition of responsibility, and neuroscience
identifies how these capacities are linked to brain function, then it is
difficult to resist the notion that the level of neurological function is
relevant to determining our moral obligations toward others (persons or
animals) or to the assignment of responsibility. (Buller, 63)
Can Hotspur be held accountable for his choler when it is well known that his overactive
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spleen governs his reason? Should the 17 year old Christopher Simmons be acquitted if
his prefrontal cortex is not yet mature? These questions require us to clearly identify
what it is that we imagine doing the acting. The claim that the underdeveloped brain or
the spleen makes rational action impossible requires a belief in an agent that would be
rational if not for the defect.
Shakespeare presents this problematic assumption, but refuses to either justify it or
condemn it. For example, when Hotspur crosses Glyndwr, he uses the “Nim defense,”
claiming that his body is what it is and does what it does. He justifies his harmful hot
temper saying, “I cannot choose. Sometimes he angers me” (3.1.144). Worcester, like
Northumberland, scolds Hotspur for his impatience. He accuses him of being “too wilfulblame” (1 Henry IV 3.1.173). He argues that Hotspur most certainly can choose how he
acts and tells Hotspur that he ought to be able to change the way that his choler impacts
his decisions:
You must needs learn, lord, to amend this fault.
Though sometimes it show greatness, courage, blood-And that's the dearest grace it renders you-Yet oftentimes it doth present harsh rage,
Defect of manners, want of government,
Pride, haughtiness, opinion and disdain,
The least of which haunting a nobleman
Loseth men’s hearts, and leaves behind a stain
Upon the beauty of all parts besides,
Beguiling them of commendation. (1 Henry IV 3.1.176-85)
The “fault” of his choler makes him brave but also haunts him and corrupts his other
attributes. Hotspur claims that he is “schooled” by this speech and entirely rejects the “I
cannot choose” claim that he has just made. Instead, he (the abstracted self) takes agency
over his body, and therefore over his actions, by promising to “amend this fault”
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(3.1.186).
Hal’s Humoral Assumptions
In the opening of I Henry IV, Hal presents himself as a character who is much more
likely than Hotspur to take responsibility for his decisions because he is able to draw a
clearer distinction between his abstracted self and the material forces of passion and
humors. He rejects the notion that his young body has any agency over him. Instead, not
only is he able to manage his own humors, but he can also manipulate how others
perceive his humoral state. In his first soliloquy, Hal describes his process of selfconstruction, claiming, “I know you all, and will a while uphold/ The unyoked humour of
your idleness” (I Henry IV 1.3.173-174). This assertion relies on two assumptions: (1) all
of Hal’s Eastcheap companions are dominated by the same idle humor, and that knowing
the quality of that idle humor will allow him to entirely “know” all of these people; (2) he
is in control of “upholding this humour;” it is his choice to partake in the idle, phlegmatic
humor of Falstaff whenever he chooses. He reasserts his confidence in these assumptions
with his next analogy:
Yet herein will I imitate the sun,
Who doth permit the base contagious clouds
To smother up his beauty from the world,
That, when he please again to be himself,
Being wanted, he may be more wonder'd at,
By breaking through the foul and ugly mists
Of vapours that did seem to strangle him. (I Henry IV 1.3.175-181)
In order to convince his royal family and the larger English public that his body is
strangled by “the foul and ugly mists of vapours,” he (the sun) must surround himself
with people who are materially inferior to him (base contagious clouds). In order for his
plan to work, Hal needs everyone else to assume that the company he keeps will change
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his humors. However, Hal is convinced that he is in no real danger of catching their
“contagion.” He simply uses his Boar’s Head companions to mask his true self,
confident that he will be able to “please again to be himself” whenever he wants to; he
will be unaltered by his barroom adventures. Hal insists that he can perform an alternate
humoral identity without actually embodying it. However, Shakespeare demonstrates that
both of these assumptions are ill conceived.
First, Shakespeare challenges Hal’s belief that he is naturally humorally different
from all of his companions (who share the same “unyoked humour of idleness”). In the
opening scenes of 2 Henry IV Hal has a very personal conversation about his father’s
illness with one of his dearest companions, Poins. As he discusses the pain of his grief,
Hal pauses to condescendingly qualify his declaration of friendship by claiming that
Poins is “as to one it pleases me, for fault of a better, to call my friend” (2 Henry IV
2.2.17). Furthermore, Hal asserts that he has a primarily pragmatic interest in Poins’s
advice; he knows that Poins is a dependable gage of public opinion and tells him, “Never
a man's thought in world keeps the roadway better than thine” (2 Henry IV 2.2.45).
However, despite Hal’s multiple claims to the contrary, Poins has obviously become
more than just a base cloud that covers his sunny rays. The close friendship that the two
young men share is recognized by the rest of the population of the Boar’s Head. Doll
asks Falstaff, “Why does the prince love [Poins] so?” (2 Henry IV 2.4.217). Falstaff feels
threatened by the intimacy of their relationship and writes to Hal, “Be not too familiar
with Poins” (2 Henry IV 2.2.118).
Hal obviously does not follow this advice. He admits to Poins that he has become
as “engraffed” to him as he had been to Falstaff (2 Henry IV 2.2.50). Recognizing how
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close he is to Poins makes Hal rethink his construction of himself as humorally
superior to his friends. In fact, he mocks himself for knowing Poins as well as he does.
“What a disgrace is it to me to remember/ thy name, or to know thy face tomorrow,” he
says to Poins, claiming that he believes himself to be degraded by their ongoing
friendship (2 Henry IV 2.2.13). However, rather than shunning his friend, Hal goes on to
recite a literal laundry list demonstrating that he knows how many shirts and pairs of silk
stockings Poins owns. Poins reciprocates an intimate knowledge of Hal, telling him “I am
your shadow,” suggesting that he literally follows the motions of Hal’s body (2 Henry IV
2.2.137).
Falstaff is quick to point out that Hal and Poins have a great deal in common. He
explains that Hal and Poins eat the same foods (conger and fennel), play the same
drinking games, and share “such other gambol faculties a' has, that show a weak mind
and an able body” (2 Henry IV 2.4.224). Falstaff also describes the similarities between
their bodies. He claims, “The weight of a hair will turn the scales between their
avoirdupois” (2 Henry IV 2.4.225). Even “their legs are both of a bigness” (2 Henry IV
2.4.117). Furthermore, like Hal, Poins is born to a landed family. Obviously, Poins’s
class status is incomparable to the crown prince’s, but still sets him apart from the other
Boar’s Head regulars. Poins complains that Hal refuses to see him as an equal. He claims,
“By this light, I am well spoke on. I can hear it with my own ears./ The worst that they
can say of me is that I am a second brother” (2 Henry IV 2.2.51). Poins’s claim to
relatively high birth further complicates the dividing line that Hal draws between himself
and his companions. Hal recognizes that his status as prince is as tenuous as Poins’s
birth order is unfortunate, since his father usurped the previous king rather than inheriting
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the crown. Hal will be the first of his father’s descendants to ascend to the throne, and
he shares his father’s concern that his blood might not be royal. What really distinguishes
Hal from Poins?
In his pamphlet, Problemes of Beauty, Love, and all Humane Affections, originally
published in 1605, Italian anthologist Tommaso Buoni phrases this question differently.
His section “On Beauty” contains the subsection titled: “Why do Princes and women of
honorable birth prove for the most part fairer both in body and mind, then women of
baser condition?” Buoni’s answer has little to do with lineage and everything to do with
what they eat and drink:
Their delicate, and exquisite diet, both in their meates, & drinks, make
their bloud more pure, their vitall spirits more lively, their complection
more Beautifull, and their nature more noble, so that passing their time
without interruption of any troublesome or disorderly molestations, they
become by their high thoughts and honorable imaginations, both
Beautifull and gentle in aspect above other women of inferior condition.
(E3v-E4)
Buoni recognizes the connection between one’s diet and lifestyle and the functioning of
their organs, which produce the humors that cause passion. Those who have better
economic and social statuses are able to improve their affections and humoral natures
through their material conditions. However, much to his father’s disappointment, Hal has
given up on the material conditions associated with his “honorable birth.” Hal eats and
drinks with characters like Falstaff, has been treating his body like a commoner’s, and
putting his organs through the same trials as the other Boar’s Head regulars. Having
shunned the “delicate and exquisite diet,” what makes his thoughts “high” or his
imaginations “honorable”? How can he be sure that he is the sun and the others are
clouds? The humoral distinction between Hal and his “vile company” becomes blurred to
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the point of being meaningless.
Shakespeare also raises doubt about Hal’s second assumption (that he will not be
humorally altered by the company that he keeps). As Hal intends, his father is convinced
otherwise. Henry IV believes that Hal has done permanent damage to his body by
keeping “so common-hackneyed in the eyes of men,/ So stale and cheap to vulgar
company” (I Henry IV 3.2.40-41). Henry IV has had direct experience with men of good
humor being corrupted by bad company. As a young man, he had characterized his
cousin Richard II as a “a happy gentleman in blood and lineaments” until “unhappied and
disfigured” by the flatterers in his court (Richard II 3.1.8-9). According to Henry IV, Hal
has undergone a similar literal disfigurement; he describes how “riot and dishonour stain
the brow/Of my young Harry” (I Henry IV 1.1.84-85). The extent to which Henry IV
believes that Hal’s body has been harmed by his riotous ways is exposed when he
accuses Hal of being a traitor. He describes this fear in distinctly humoral terms:
Thou that art like enough, through vassal fear,
Base inclination and the start of spleen
To fight against me under Percy's pay,
To dog his heels and curtsy at his frowns,
To show how much thou art degenerate. (I Henry IV 3.2.124-128)
According to Henry IV, even if his spleenful son has not yet betrayed him, he knows that
Hal’s humoral nature is that of a traitor.
Warwick has a very different way of reading the humorous Hal and debates with
the King about whether Hal is permanently stained or temporarily masked. Warwick has
discovered or intuited the plot that Hal secretly reveals to the audience in his soliloquy.
Warwick tells the king:
My gracious lord, you look beyond him quite:
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The prince but studies his companions
Like a strange tongue, wherein, to gain the language,
'Tis needful that the most immodest word
Be looked upon and learnt, which once attained,
Your highness knows, comes to no further use
But to be known and hated; so, like gross terms,
The Prince will in the perfectness of time
Cast off his followers; and their memory
Shall as a pattern or a measure live,
By which his grace must mete the lives of others,
Turning past evils to advantages. (2 Henry IV 4.3.67-78)
Like Hal, Warwick rejects the notion that the dominant qualities of Hal’s current
companions are able to humorally influence Hal. He imagines Hal’s followers like the
words of a foreign and base language that Hal studies only to disregard. When it comes
time, Warwick and Hal are convinced that Hal can cast off their humors and reveal his
true nature.
Shakespeare brings this assumption about Hal’s incorruptibility into question by
demonstrating the extent to which the characteristics of Falstaff’s rotund body are
contagious. For example, Hal describes a page boy who was an untainted “Christian”
child before beginning his employment with Falstaff. Just a short while later, Hal
exclaims, “And look if the fat villain have not transformed him ape” (2 Henry IV 2.2.58).
5

Hal describes more than just a change in the boy’s apparel; something fundamental in
the boy’s humoral body has begun to mirror Falstaff’s. The boy mocks Bardolph in the
same manner that Falstaff does (by joking about his red face). Only Poins, who also
recognizes the change in the child, seems to be disturbed by the way that the boy’s

5

The Norton glosses Hal’s exclamation about the boy as “Falstaff has perhaps dressed
the Page in an outlandish livery or uniform.” However, I argue that Poins’s concern about
the child and the boy’s similarities to Falstaff indicate that Hal also refers to the page
boy’s transformed humoral state.
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acquaintance with Falstaff has altered him. He describes the boy as “this good blossom”
and wishes that he “could be kept from cankers!” (2 Henry IV 2.2.78). As Lorenzo
senior wants to protect his son from Prospero, and Henry IV wants to protect Hal from
the whole Eastcheap population, Poins wants to protect the boy from Falstaff’s
transformative and corrupting powers.
This notion that a humorally balanced person, like the pre-Falstaff page boy, could
be materially corrupted by bad company and slothful habits is consistent with the
dominant early modern medical theories. Although the humoral body determines much of
one’s complexion, the “second nature” within humoral theory was one’s “qualities”
which were articulated as one’s moral disposition, or habits (Shenk 127). “The
tendencies of the bodily complexion could be ruled and managed, suppressed and
aroused, and generally disposed by the habits” (Shenk 128). Bad company and slothful
habits can corrupt even the most perfectly humorally balanced body. According to
Thomas Elyot, if a person does not focus on an active, temperate life, then “by sluggardy
and idleness the said activite is appalled and the wyttes consumed: wherby men be made
unapte for the life which is actife or politike” (Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise
Man 163).
Falstaff directly counters this idea that temperance leads to an active life.
Instead, he explains to the Lord Chief Justice that King Henry, who suddenly becomes
afflicted with a “whoreson apoplexy” is sick because of his lack of drinking (2 Henry IV
1.2.97-98). He claims that the sudden malady “hath its original from much grief, from
study, and perturbation of the brain,” (2 Henry IV 1.2.105-106). He justifies this claim by
citing the expert on all bodily functions: “I have read the cause of his effects in Galen” (2
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Henry IV 1.2.105-106). Falstaff suggests that Hal’s brother, John, is afflicted with the
same humoral disease that temporarily affects the king, and he suggests that John suffers
because of his “sober-blooded” body (2 Henry IV 4.2.79). Falstaff proselytizes the
humoral dangers of sobriety:
There's never none of these demure boys to any proof; for thin drink doth
so over-cool their blood, making many fish meals, that they fall into a kind
of male green-sickness; and then, when they marry, they get wenches.
They are generally fools and cowards— which some of us should be too
but for inflammation. (2 Henry IV, 4.2.81)
He associates sober men with the humoral disease of green-sickness, or chlorosis,
suffered by virginal women (OED). According to Falstaff, many men would be weak,
foolish, and cowardly if not for the saving powers of liquor. He describes how “A good
sherry-sack hath a two-fold operation in it” (2 Henry IV, 4.2.81). The first is purely
humoral:
It ascends me into the brain; dries me there the foolish and dull and crudy
vapours which environ it; makes it apprehensive, quick, forgetive, full of
nimble, fiery, and delectable shapes; which delivered o'er to the voice, the
tongue, which is the birth, becomes excellent wit (2 Henry IV, 4.2.87-92)
He describes the sack as if it is a psycho-pharmaceutical drug. The beverage counteracts
the undesirable material workings of the brain. The other “operation” of the sack also
refers to the way in which it is able to change the working of the material body:
Your excellent sherry is the warming of the blood; which cold and settled,
left the liver white and pale, which is the badge of pusillanimity and
cowardice. But the sherry warms and makes it course from the inwards to
the parts extremes; it illumineth the face, which, as a beacon, gives
warning to all rest of this little kingdom, man, to arm; and then the vital
commoners and inland petty spirits muster me all to their captain, the
heart, who, great and puff'd up with this doth any deed of courage. And
this valour comes of sherry. (2 Henry IV, 4.2.93-101)
According to Falstaff, courage not only comes from the “excellent sherry,” it is the
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sherry. He claims, that skill in the weapon is nothing without a strong drink, because
“Skill in a weapon is nothing without sack, for that sets it a-work; and learning is a mere
hoard of gold kept by a devil till sack commences it and sets it in act and use” (2 Henry
IV, 4.2.101-103). It is not the courageous man who is doing the acting; the agent is the
drink as it becomes manifested in the man’s humoral body.
Falstaff asserts that his influence on Hal (which has primarily been to encourage
Hal to drink) results in Hal’s altered (and superior) body. Without the all-important
sherry, Hal is humorally cowardly as a result of “the cold blood he did/ naturally inherit
of his father” (2 Henry IV, 4.2.105). However, under the influence of Falstaff, he has
“like lean, sterile, bare land, manured, husbanded, and tilled, with excellent endeavour of
drinking good, and good store of fertile sherry, that he is become very hot and valiant” (2
Henry IV, 4.2.108). Falstaff takes pride in his ability to shape Hal’s body, and boasts that
he has taught Hal and his companions to “forswear thin potations and to addict
themselves to sack” (2 Henry IV, 4.2.111).
In the very next scene, Henry IV uses the same analogy as Falstaff when he
compares Hal’s body to farmable land. However, Henry IV uses the analogy to make the
opposite claim. Rather than imagining Hal’s body as “lean, sterile, and bare land” which
must be manured and tilled with drinking, he describes Hal’s body as dangerously fertile
soil and claims, “Most subject is the fattest soil to weeds;/ And he, the noble image of my
youth,/ Is overspread with them” (2 Henry IV, 4.3.54-55). This disagreement about the
use of the metaphor of land demonstrates the fundamental disagreement about what Hal’s
humoral body is and how it ought to be shaped. However, it also reveals that Henry IV
and Falstaff share an assumption: like untilled soil at the beginning of the planting
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season, Hal’s body is pregnant with potential and can be farmed to produce anything
that they want it to yield. Falstaff imagines himself as the farmer, watering the cold and
dry earth with sack, heating Hal’s elements. On the other hand, Henry IV (like Poins
who wishes to protect the “good blossom” of the young servant boy from the “cankers”
of Falstaff and his friends) describes himself as the gardener, struggling to pluck
corrupting weeds from the overgrown, abundantly fertile earth.
Towards the end of his life, Henry IV realizes that he has failed to shape Hal into a
leader. Like the jurors who ruled that Christopher Simmons was unable to regulate his
emotions because of his underdeveloped brain, Henry IV is convinced that Hal is unable
to control his passions because of the physiological makeup of his humoral body.
Therefore, he explains to Hal’s brother, Thomas, that it is his responsibility to manage
Hal. Henry IV tries to convince Thomas that Hal does have many good qualities. For
example, “he is gracious, if he be observed:/ He hath a tear for pity and a hand/ Open as
day for melting charity” (2 Henry IV, 4.3.30-35). However, the humorousness of his body
negates the reliability of these admirable qualities:
Yet notwithstanding, being incensed, he's flint,
As humorous as winter and as sudden
As flaws congealed in the spring of day.
His temper, therefore, must be well observed. (2 Henry IV, 4.3.36-38)
Here, humorousness comes to stand in for unpredictability. Henry IV commands Thomas
to “Chide him for faults, and do it reverently,/ When thou perceive his blood inclined to
mirth” (2 Henry IV, 4.3.39-40). Thomas must come to know his brother’s body, and be
able to predict when Hal’s blood is heated. However, Henry IV understands that this
chiding will only have limited impact. When Hal is “moody,” Henry IV encourages
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Thomas to “give him line and scope,/ Till that his passions, like a whale on ground,/
Confound themselves with working” (2 Henry IV, 4.3.40-41). Rather than mitigate Hal’s
most extreme passions, Thomas must enable Hal’s moody fits, but carefully observe
them. Henry IV imagines Hal’s passion as a leviathan, a force that cannot be directly
confronted, which, left to its own resources, will use up all of Hal’s bodily humors and
tire itself out.
Henry IV’s belief that Hal is entirely unable to control his passions is particularly
disturbing because, in the early modern period, rational self-control was considered the
most important quality of leadership. Susan James makes the connection between “advice
books” of the seventeenth century and the “broader preoccupation in early modern
European culture with the relations between knowledge and control, whether of self or
others” (2). Often addressed to noblemen, the books instruct the reader on ways to
“control his own passions so that he does not . . . forfeit his subjects’ loyalty by doing
something unjust while he is in a rage” and to “be able to read and manipulate the
passions of those around him, to detect and play on the ambition, envy, fear, or esteem of
courtiers, counselors, and citizens” (James 3). For example, Thomas Elyot recommends
that fathers must be diligent in keeping their sons “in continual exercise” so that they can
be prepared for a political life. In The Passions of the Minde in Generall Wright similarly
argues that “the doctrine of the passions is really concerned with methods of control over
self, others, and ultimately, the state” (Paster “Humoring the Body,” 6).
Hal at Happy Hour
In his soliloquy in 1 Henry IV, Hal asserts that he has a clearly defined royal
selfhood, which he imagines as the sun. He imagines himself so fully in control of his
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humoral body that he is able to put on a successful performance, convincing his family,
friends, and future subjects that he is made of the same humoral stuff as his Eastcheap
cohort. However, by the time he returns in 2 Henry IV, Hal has begun to question
whether his performance has stopped being a performance. Is the notion that he has of
himself as the royal sun, falsely hidden behind common clouds actually compatible with
his humoral body?
Hal enters the stage for the first time in 2 Henry IV in the middle of a casual
debate with Poins about whether or not to stop in a bar for a drink. To have a beer or not
to have a beer? That is the question. Out of context, this is not a terribly significant
moment. However, for an audience familiar with the earlier plays of the Henriad, Hal’s
pontificating about drinking comes as a shock. The last time Hal appeared on the stage,
he was the man Vernon described as an ideal modest prince:
He made a blushing cital of himself
And chid his truant youth with such grace
As if he mastered there a double spirit
Of teaching and of learning instantly. (1 Henry IV 5.2.60-63)
The Hal who impresses Vernon certainly seems to be entirely divorced from the young
man who his father describes as his “unthrifty son” (Richard II 5.2.1). He is no longer the
Hal who frequented taverns with Poins and played tricks on Falstaff. On the plain of
Shrewsbury, Hal’s body is fundamentally altered. Vernon describes an abstracted Hal
who has had an altercation with his body’s old truant desires and taken agency over
them. 6
The extent to which Hal has remade himself as a modest, self-aware leader can be
6

OED defines chid as “To complain aloud against (so later, to chide against); to quarrel
or dispute angrily with; to have altercation with”
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seen when Hal enters the last scene of 1 Henry IV fresh from the battlefield with
Hotspur’s blood hot on his hands. He calmly doles out war prisoners and prepares to
return to fight the Welsh alongside his father. Hal, his family, and the audience all have
every reason to believe Vernon’s assumption: “England never did owe so sweet a hope,/
So much misconstructed in his wantonness” (1 Henry IV 5.2.67-68).
What has happened to Hal between the last scene of 1 King Henry IV and the first
scene of 2 King Henry IV? How can the audience reconcile this princely Hal of
Shrewsbury with the wild Hal who returns to the wantonness of Eastcheap? Who is Hal,
really? Is he the imbalanced body that his father describes “As humorous as winter, and
as sudden/ As flaws congealed in the spring of day,” or is he England’s sweet hope?
This is the question Hal seriously contemplates while deciding whether or not to
indulge in happy hour with his drinking buddies. In his opening line, he describes the
weakened state of his body, telling Poins that he is “exceeding weary” (2 Henry IV 2.2.1).
In this period, weariness frequently connotes an admirable “seriousness of purpose”
(Trevor 48). However, Poins reads Hal’s weariness as a sign of physical weakness rather
than spiritual seriousness. Sleep and waking, along with exercise and rest, are among the
Galenic “non-naturals” that one can regulate to control health and temperance (FloydWilson, “English Mettle” 133). Hal’s discussion of exhaustion is an admission of an
imbalance. Poins asks Hal, “Is’t come to that? I had thought weariness durst not have
attached one of so high blood” (2 Henry IV 2.2.2). Poins believes that Hal’s royal body
should be humorally incompatible with the exhaustion. Hal agrees with Poins but admits,
“Faith, it does me; though it discolors the complexion of my greatness to acknowledge it”
(2 Henry IV 2.2.5). Here, Hal discusses the fragility of his new identity. He has already
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established greatness in his complexion, defined by the OED as “the combination of
the four humours of the body.” However, the very acknowledgement of his own
exhaustion discolors the complexion, changing the ideal balance of his princely body.
Hal’s next question reveals his own doubts about whether he really has been able to
“chid his truant youth”: “Doth it not show vilely in me to desire small beer?” (2 Henry IV
2.2.1-6). He has not yet consumed a beer or made any other decision to materially alter
his body with any change in diet. Yet, he expresses concern about the fact that he has
this desire at all. What does it mean that his prince’s body wants something as vile as a
beer? Like the teenage Blumberg (who resents the sudden influx of testosterone in his
body) and the newly wedded Thorello (who is physically overcome with jealousy despite
his attempts to fight it off), Hal’s recognition of his un-princely craving exposes the
divorce between who he believes himself to be and what his body actually is. He has this
clear idea of what constitutes his princely self, but the nagging needs of his material body
make him question that identity.
Poins answers Hal’s question with an unabashed “yes.” He says, “Why, a prince
should not be so loosely studied as to remember so weak a composition” (2 Henry IV
2.2.7). The weak composition that Poins refers to has a double meaning. First, he refers
to the “small beer” which is a “beer of a weak, poor, or inferior quality” (OED). In The
Castell of Helthe, Thomas Elyot recommends giving small beer to children. According to
Peter Hobley Davison, it is not undignified for Hal to desire a beer, but it is undignified
to desire something of such a low quality. “[Hal’s] tone could be mildly ironic, but the
dominant mood is one of self-disgust” (Davidson 534). However, Poins simultaneously
refers to the composition of Hal’s weak, imbalanced humoral body which desires the
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beer. Poins clearly states that this is not an appropriate desire for a prince to have.
Poins echoes Henry IV’s concern about the confusing discrepancy between Hal’s
royal blood (which he inherits from his father) and Hal’s base desires. Hal’s father asks:
Could such inordinate and low desires,
Such poor, such bare, such lewd, such mean attempts,
Such barren pleasures, rude society,
As thou art match'd withal and grafted to,
Accompany the greatness of thy blood
And hold their level with thy princely heart? (1 Henry IV 3.2.12-17)
Hal also recognizes that his desires are not compatible with the humoral body he believes
himself to have. He responds to Poins’s comment by explaining how this desire
complicates the way he has intentionally fashioned himself:
Belike then my appetite was not princely got; for, by my troth, I do now
remember the poor creature, small beer. But, indeed, these humble considerations
make me out of love with my greatness. (2 Henry IV 2.2.12-14)
By claiming that this craving makes him “out of love with his greatness,” he suggests that
his greatness is not an essential part of him. Instead, he constructs his greatness as he
constructs the “unyoked humour” of his friends; as he is able to put on and take off
idleness, he is able to put on and take off greatness. Throughout the play, he has claimed
that he is able to perform his humoral makeup in any way that he chooses and that he is
in control of the performance. However, the craving for beer is not a performance.
Instead, he is shocked to find that he is unable to perform in a way that is contrary to his
bodily desires. He describes his appetite as something that is out of his control. Like
Hotspur, whose rationality is prevented by his spleen, and Christopher Simmons, whose
morality is limited by his adolescent prefrontal cortex, Hal recognizes that he is limited
by and subjected to his body. Since his physical urge does not belong in the body of a
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prince, is he really a prince?
Hal’s relapse exposes his chameleon nature and the inconstancies of his humoral
body. The audience knows that the phlegmatic Falstaff will drink the beer every time he
is able to and that choleric Hotspur will never be so idle as to drink a beer with the likes
of Poins. However, neither his friends, the audience, nor Hal can confidently predict
whether or not Hal will have a beer until he actually does. Shakespeare refuses to answer
Doll Tearsheet’s question, “what humour is the prince of?” Hal recognizes that others’
inability to know what form his “humour” will take makes them uneasy, and he is able to
use this unpredictability to his advantage when he finally becomes king.
Hal’s Constructed Kingly Body
After Hal’s father dies, Canterbury describes Hal as a humorally changed man.
He describes the moment of Henry IV’s death as one of Hal’s material transformation:
At that very moment
Consideration, like an angel, came
And whipp'd the offending Adam out of him,
Leaving his body as a paradise,
To envelop and contain celestial spirits. (Henry V 1.1.29-33)
According to Canterbury, Hal’s body had always had the potential to be a humoral
paradise for good spirits. However, before his father’s death it had been possessed by
corrupting vapors. Rather than crediting Hal for taking part in his own reformation,
Canterbury’s account gives “consideration,” the external spiritual force, agency over
Hal’s body. Even when he becomes king, Hal still does not want to be perceived as a
container of “celestial spirits” ruled by “consideration.” He recognizes that he can gain
true power over his subjects and opponents, not by becoming the perfectly humorally
balanced man like Jonson’s Crites, but by masking and manipulating the ways that others
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perceive his humoral state. He does not give anyone the advantage of being able to
reliably diagnose his personality and therefore predict what his actions will be. For
example, after receiving the insulting gift of tennis balls from the Dauphin’s messenger,
he explodes with a passionate tirade, not acting as a man who has (or is) a body filled
with celestial spirit, but as a man who must constantly repress his urges. He first asserts,
“We are no tyrant, but a Christian king,” but clarifies this claim by describing the extent
to which he has control over his passions: “Our passion is as subject/ As are our wretches
fettered in our prisons” (Henry V 1.1.241-243). Rather than claiming, “I do not have
intense, furious, dangerous passions,” he says, “I am as full of passions as a prison is of
criminals, but I am able to control them.” He is not “consideration” embodied; he is a
kettle about to boil over.
Before his death, Henry IV prematurely mourns for his nation which he is certain
will be destroyed by the unpredictable Hal. He laments:
For when his headstrong riot hath no curb,
When rage and hot blood are his counsellors,
When means and lavish manners meet together,
O, with what wings shall his affections fly
Towards fronting peril and opposed decay! (2 King Henry IV 4.3.62-66)
This account of Hal’s humoral state is radically different from Canterbury’s. According
to his father, rage is more likely to have agency over Hal’s body than consideration.
However, Hal soon proves that positioning himself as an unpredictable, humorally
unstable man with passions (which can, at any moment, become a monstrous whale)
makes his threats more meaningful and his power more absolute. At the gates of
Harfleur, he threatens the town governor with nightmarish brutality, claiming that he will
allow his “soldiers, rough and hard of heart” to rape and pillage the town, “mowing like
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grass/ Your fresh fair virgins and your flow’ring infants” (Henry V 3.3.88-93). He
rhetorically asks, “What rein can hold licentious wickedness/ When down the hill he
holds his fierce career?” (3.3.99-100). He suggests that the Governor must act quickly
before Hal loses control of both the wickedness of the war heated bodies of his men, and
the passions of his own body. He urges,
Take pity of your town and of your people
Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command,
Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of grace
O’erblows the filthy and contagious clouds
Of heady murder, spoil, and villainy. (3.3.105-109)
If the Governor truly believes that Hal is “no tyrant, but a Christian king,” he will not take
these horrific threats so seriously. Instead, the Governor cannot be sure whether or not Hal
will allow his soldiers to rape virgins and throw the heads of infants upon pikes like
Herod’s army. Hal may be a manipulative performer who is ultimately in full control of
his humoral state. Or Hal may truly be susceptible to the always changing passions that
can change their course as fast as the winds of grace. In fact, no one, not even Hal, can
reliably predict how he will act. This deeply unsettling uncertainty is what encourages the
Governor to surrender without a fight.
Throughout the rest of the play, he continues to make unpredictable and frequently
contradictory decisions. For example, he pardons the drunk man who threatens to kill him
but allows his old Boar’s Head companion, Bardolph, to be hung for stealing a “pax”
from a church. He insists that the French be treated with justice, claiming, “When lenity
and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner” (Henry V
3.6.102), but orders every soldier to kill his French prisoners. These decisions do not
seem to come from the same man. What makes the shock value so successful is that so
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many characters are confident that they really know Hal. Most famously, Falstaff is
completely convinced that he knows Hal even after Hal accuses him of being “the feeder
of my riots” and banishes him “on pain of death.” Falstaff tries to comprehend this
sudden change in his friend and explains, to Master Shallow, “this that you/heard was but
a colour” (2 Henry IV 5.5.85). He assumes that Hal is only performing, as he has seen
Hal do so many times before. He assumes that Hal will return to being the friend he
knows once he is away from his royal family. However, Falstaff is wrong about his
ability to predict Hal and dies questioning how well he ever knew the prince that he
thought was his friend.
Shakespeare opens the question about how well Falstaff knows Hal as early as the
second act of I Henry IV. After playing a trick on Falstaff, Poins, and Hal reveal that they
had been the robbers. Trying to save face, Falstaff falsely claims: “By the Lord, I knew
ye as well as he that made ye.” This is a complicated claim, because it is both a lie and a
truth. Of course, Falstaff did not recognize Hal during his robbery and he lies to
undermine his own humiliation. However, Falstaff’s claim (that he knows Hal “as well as
he that made ye”) reveals what Falstaff believes to be a truth: he knows Hal. He feels real
affection for the young man and describes Hal in very endearing terms. For example, he
tells Hal “thou hast the most unsavoury similes and art indeed/ the most comparative,
rascalliest, sweet young prince” (1 Henry IV 1.2.71-72). Heart-wrenchingly, he calls Hal
“my sweet boy” and “my heart” moments before Hal responds with his fateful “I know
thee not, old man” (2 Henry IV 5.5.41-45). Only after the close of the play does Falstaff
fully realize that he was never able to predict Hal any better than he was able to recognize
Hal’s face in the pitch-blackness after the mock robbery. Falstaff is always looking at a
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figure in the dark, allowing the faculties of his own retroactive, phlegmatic, and sackaltered imagination to fill in the blanks.
While in the process of mourning for Falstaff as he dies after being sent away by
Hal, Nim makes an odd remark: “The king is a good king: but it must be as it may;/ he
passes some humors and careers.” Nim, who uses his humors to justify even his most
mundane actions, does not pretend to be able to understand the humors of the prince. As
Nim explains, Hal has his moods and his ways. They are what they are; any attempt to
predict them or define them will always prove futile. While Hotspur’s choler and
Falstaff’s phlegm gives each a sense of identity and consistency, the only reliable aspect
of Hal’s humor is that it is always a source of anxiety for Hal, the characters who interact
with him, and any audience who attempts to humorally classify him.

CHAPTER FOUR
“TWIXT TWO EXTREMES OF PASSIONS”: EMOTIONAL AGENCY IN KING
LEAR
In 2011, the pharmaceutical company Bristol-Myers Squibb released a
commercial for Abilify, a prescription drug. Abilify is Aripiprazole, a chemical that
binds to and activates dopamine and serotonin receptors (Lawler, Prioleau and Lewis,
612). It is prescribed to people who suffer from Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and
helps the neurotransmitters process dopamine and serotonin, the brain chemicals that
contribute to the ability to feel joy.
The commercial opens on a cartoon image of a smiling woman standing in the
street, her hands on her hips. A voiceover states “Here is me.” Immediately, the cartoon
woman looks upwards. An anxious look comes over her face as a blue umbrella falls
from the sky into her hand. The voiceover continues “And here is my depression.” As
the voiceover explains, “before taking Abilify, I was taking an antidepressant alone,” the
cartoon umbrella becomes anthropomorphized. Angry eyes appear above the
downturned arc of the umbrella, indicating a frowning face (Figure 1). Under the
umbrella, it begins to rain on the cartoon woman. She holds the blinking, angry
umbrella away from her body as the voiceover explains, “Most days I was able to get
out from under it and carry on.” Then, the umbrella, with a force of its own, begins to
violently drag her arm. She clings to the umbrella, as if blown by an invisible wind, as
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the narration continues, “But other days I still struggled with my depression. I was
handling it, but sometimes it still dragged me down” (Figure 2). Meanwhile, the
depression umbrella transforms into a depression hole in the ground. The cartoon
woman falls into the hole, looking frightened. She then stands in the hole (which still
has uncanny, blinking, animated eyes) while the voiceover says, “I’d been feeling stuck
for a long time.” A cartoon doctor in a white coat walks towards the woman and helps
her step out of the hole as the narration continues, “So, I talked to my doctor and she
added Abilify to my antidepressant and said it could help with my depression.”
Simultaneously, the depression hole transforms back into a depression umbrella, but
now it is collapsed and stands on the ferrule. Its eyes are on the handle. The cartoon
woman looks down at it condescendingly. It is still present but is no longer a vicious
force. Instead it is a passive, almost affectionate looking animated object (Figure 3).
For the remainder of the commercial, the cartoon doctor explains the many side effects
of Abilify while the woman and her depression umbrella sit side by side taking notes
(the pencil magically hovering above the umbrella’s handle). In the final scene, the
doctor voice continues to narrate as the woman, her husband and her daughter all
cheerfully pick apples in a sunny field while the depression umbrella leans against a
tree (Figure 4). Even in happy moments of blissful apple-picking, the depression
umbrella is constantly present, ready to regain power.
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Figure 1. Still of anthropomorphized umbrella from Abilify

Figure 2. Still of struggle with depression from Abilify

Figure 3. Still of pacified depression umbrella from Abilify
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Figure 4. Still of final scene from still from Abilify
Obviously, the most bizarre and memorable aspect of this commercial is the
“depression umbrella” character. Bristol-Myers Squibb introduced two other similar
characters in a series of ads: a depression balloon (which can morph into a ball and
chain), and a depression bathrobe (which wraps around the cartoon woman as she
wakes up in the morning and follows her, floating like a bed-sheet ghost). Clearly, these
are metaphors for depression; however, in order for the story to make sense, the
cartoon woman must also be a metaphor. She comes to represent the cogent, reasoning
woman who is influenced by, but exists outside of, the depression. Sadness, tension,
suicidal thought, pessimism and all of the other affective experiences associated with
depression are depicted as an object which is visually distinct from the rational,
controlled self. For a person suffering from depression, this visual metaphor can be
empowering. It enables one to say, “The way my brain chemistry functions does not
necessarily dictate who I am. I am not my depression.” However, the commercial
simultaneously creates the troubling image of depression as a force with its own agency
and agenda. The umbrella is able to physically move and alter the cartoon woman;
emotion is able to overcome the woman’s rationality. After she physically changes the
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way that her body produces brain chemicals by taking the Abilify, the relationship
the cartoon woman has with the depression umbrella changes; the reasoning woman is
able to regain agency. Yet, as the presence of the umbrella in the final scene picnic
scene demonstrates, reason and depression are only able to exist within the context of
their relationship. They constantly engage in a struggle, one attempting to assert
physical force over the other.
The fact that a major pharmaceutical to company built a national advertising
campaign upon these metaphors, reveals a turn in the way that we articulate the
relationship between emotion and identity. The commercial claims that when the
depressed body is unmedicated, the umbrella has control; when Abilify changes the
ways that the neurotransmitters process dopamine and serotonin, the reasoning woman
is in control. In order to make this claim, the advertisers must assume that their
audience accepts that the material makeup of the body determines whether reason or
passion can have agency. The self is not the depression caused by an influx of brain
chemicals nor the rational cognition which goes to battle with this depression. Instead,
the self is both the woman and the umbrella; identity is defined by the relationship
between reason, or intentional cognition, and passion, or “the pre-individual bodily
forces, linked to autonomic responses” (Clough and Halley 316).
In one of the most memorably disturbing scenes of King Lear, Shakespeare’s
villainous Cornwall uses a comparable pair of metaphors to make a claim about the
agency of his passion. Moments before gouging out Gloucester’s eyes, he pauses to
rationally explain the relationship between his reason and his wrath. In describing this
relationship, he explains, “our power/ Shall do a curtsy to our wrath, which men/ May

107
blame, but not control” (14.23-25). His “power,” his ability to reason, takes on human
characteristics. It becomes a submissive being that is forced to bend to wrath, like the
Abilify cartoon woman being dragged by the unmanageable, angry depression umbrella.
His personified wrath, like the depression umbrella, can now be imagined in material
terms. In other words, Cornwall claims, “Here is me, and here is my wrath.” They are
distinct entities and one is able to exercise agency over the other. I will return to discuss
how Shakespeare complicates and undermines Cornwall’s claim about the agency of
passion. However, Cornwall’s description of reason curtseying to wrath indicates that
Shakespeare and his original audience were familiar with the narrative
that the Abilify commercial uses: reason and passion are material essences battling
for agency inside of a malleable body.
In the world of King Lear (characterized by eclipses and violent storms), a
multitude of individual passions act as driving forces within the characters’ humoral
bodies. Each passion has a real, terrifying ability to determine how the body will
behave. However, the passions do not only go to war with reason or higher faculties in
the body battleground. Instead they contradict one another, physically pulling the body
in multiple and confused directions. In this chapter I will continue my discussion of the
relationship between identity and the material body by focusing specifically on
moments of high emotional conflict in King Lear. Concern with the agency of the
passions is most evident in the moments when characters are simultaneously altered by
more than one humoral change. I will argue that Shakespeare places particular emphasis
on the moments when characters’ bodies betray them and they go to battle with
passions that they do not want to feel. He uses these emotionally complicated moments
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to engage with the early modern discourse about the passions and question the
notion of human agency.
Throughout King Lear, the ability to manage, or override, the passions of the
humoral body and the undesirable impulses produced by the body, determines the
extent to which one is able to maintain both sanity and humanity. The danger of the
passions and the desperate need to manage them is a central theme of many of the most
canonical readings of the play. This critical focus emerged from the Romantics’ interest
in the individual’s experience and expression of emotion. “In early-nineteenth-century,
British criticism of tragedy seriously competed with the epic for the first place among
the poetic genres, and Lear’s high position among tragedies seems to have been
undisputed... The admirers of Lear agreed that passion has a unique importance in
tragedy” (Albrecht, 611). Charles Lamb’s reading of Lear exemplifies this belief. He
claims “the greatness of Lear is not in corporal dimensions, but in intellectual; the
explosions of his passions are terrible as a volcano: they are storms turning up and
disclosing to the bottom that rich sea, his mind, with all its vast riches” (359). William
Hazlitt expands this argument:
The passion which [Shakespeare] has taken as his subject is that which
strikes its root deepest into the human heart; of which the bond is the
hardest to be unloosed; and the canceling and tearing to pieces of which
gives the greatest revulsion to the frame. This depth of nature, this force
of passion, this tug and war of the elements of our being, ... this is what
Shakespeare has given. (118)
W. H. Clemen valorizes passion, claiming that what distinguishes Lear from the evil
characters (Edmund, Gonoril, Regan and Cornwall) is his ability to “feel.” The villains
are “calculating, cool, unimaginative people” who speak “rationally” while Lear

109
undergoes intense “inner drama” and conflict. Therefore, his struggle with his
passion is the very act that keeps Lear moral and human.
J.B. Bamborough, who was among the first scholars to examine the relationship
between Shakespeare’s drama and physiology by focusing on Galenic humoralism and
“setting out the psychological theory that was current when Shakespeare wrote” (11),
agrees with the romantics that passions are central to King Lear. However, the passions
that Bamborough defines in the terms of the Renaissance discourse of the body are not
the intrinsically immaterial and awe inspiring emotions that the romantics exalt.
Instead, he claims that they are corporeal forces. In fact, he argues, “Many Elizabethans
had difficulty even thinking of an immaterial substance” (30). He introduces his reading
of King Lear with this historical definition of passions and discuses their potential
danger. He claims that Lear is the archetypical Shakespearian tragic hero who follows
the same path as all of Shakespeare’s tragic characters except Hamlet and Julius Caesar
(11). The tragic hero is always engaged in the battle between reason and passion: “Evil
enters the mind of the hero in the shape of a passion; the passion grows until it
overcomes the Reason; in consequence the hero sins, or at least behaves irrationally;
finally retribution overtakes his sin. It is a perfect formula for tragedy” (148).
Harold C. Goddard poetically expands upon these earlier arguments about the
centrality of passions in the play:
The predestined end of unmastered passion is the suicide of the species.
That is the gospel according to King Lear. The play is in no small
measure an actual representation of that process. The murder-suicide of
Regan-Gonoril is an example. But it is more than a picture of chaos and
impending doom, What is the remedy for chaos? it asks. What can avert
the doom? The characters who have mastered their passions give us a
glimpse of the answer to those questions... He who masters his passions
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is king over them. Here the psychological theme of the play has its
political implications. The metaphor of the emotions as a mob bound to
dethrone its ruler if he loses control over them goes nobody knows how
far back toward the beginnings of human thought. This comparison of
the kingdom within to the kingdom without, of the microcosm to the
macrocosm, is one of the immemorial and universal figures of speech.
Plato founded his Republic on it. Jesus erected his Kingdom of Heaven
on an extension and sublimation of it. Shakespeare evinced the keenest
interest in it from the beginning. (13)
For Goddard, this powerful image of the emotions as a mob imagines passion not as a
unitary force, but as a myriad of separate forces ready to strike. In one of his most cited
critical claims, Goddard expands upon this metaphor: “The greatest poetry has always
depicted the world as a little citadel of nobility threatened by an immense barbarism, a
flickering candle surrounded by infinite night” (335). He goes on to explain that it is
not necessarily the villains who are the barbarians and the heroes who are the
threatened noble citadels. Instead, this epic battle of light and darkness can be staged
inside the hero’s body. The passions become the barbaric, natural, dark, uncultivated
and dangerous forces, and the ability to reason becomes the flickering illumination.
Shakespeare fills King Lear with descriptions of passions as rebellious forces and
expresses concern about what happens when passions win the battle and overcome the
citadel of temperance, taking full control over the actions of the body.
Of all the scenes in Shakespeare’s canon, the discussion about the ability to
control contrasting passions is most didactically laid out in scene 17 of the 1608 Quarto
text of The History of King Lear 1. The scene opens with the disguised Kent asking a

1

Scene 17 is the only full scene that appears only in the Q1 text. It is edited out, in its
entirety, from the Folio. Later in this chapter, I will discus the critical debate surrounding
the controversial claim that the scene (or any other) was “edited out.” I will also discus
the implication of this edit on my reading of the play.
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gentleman from the French court to describe Cordelia’s reaction to his letters about
the horrific treatment of her father and the torture of Gloucester at the hands of her
sisters. He wants to know, “Did your letters pierce the queen to any demonstration of
grief?” (17:10). 2
The gentleman replies to Kent’s question with a detailed first-hand account of
watching Cordelia respond to the letters. He reports:
Ay, sir. she took them, read them in my presence,
And now and then an ample tear trilled down
Her delicate cheek. It seemed she was a queen
Over her passion who, most rebel-like,
Sought to be king o'er her. (17.12-16)
Safe in France with her loving husband, Cordelia has been removed from the violence
and despair which the other characters directly witnessed since her sudden forced exile.
The letters abruptly and brutally shatter her reality. The gentleman is able to watch her
physical body change as the letter’s meaning ignites the passions in her body. Notably,
Kent does not question the Gentleman’s ability to credibly describe Cordelia’s state of
passion, especially since Cordelia is famously unable and unwilling to describe her own
passion. After all, her inability to communicate her interiority set the tragic plot in
motion: “Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave/ My heart into my mouth” (1.80). Regan
and Gonoril have no such difficulty. Both sisters use distinctly humoral terms,
describing the inner working of their bodies, as evidence of their proclaimed love.
Gonoril describes “A love that makes breath poor and speech unable,” expressing the
2

Unless otherwise noted, all quotations will be taken from the quarto text, The History of
King Lear, which includes two scenes that will be central to my argument and are not in
the folio. I will refer to the play as King Lear when making claims that could be true of
either the Q or F texts. I cite the second edition of The Norton Shakespeare, adopted from
the text established by The Oxford Shakespeare.
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physical restraints that such overabundant love places on her body (1.53). Regan
follows declaring, “Sir, I am made/ Of the self-same mettle that my sister is” (1.60-61).
She claims her love to be humorally equal and the materials of her affective body to be
identical to her sister’s. Of course, it soon becomes evident that their own descriptions
of their humoral bodies are false. 3
As I will discus later in the chapter, throughout the play Shakespeare encourages
the audience to be skeptical when characters make self-proclamations about the power
of their own passions. However, the Gentleman bases his claims about Cordelia’s
interiority on something more concrete than words: her tears. By examining her
external face, the gentleman is able to read what is happening to her interior body. 4
The gentleman's report about Cordelia’s passions becomes more credible than her own
description of her love. He introduces the audience to a less coldly inexpressive and
more conflicted, complicated, and passionate woman.
Although the Gentleman is apparently in the position to closely examine her
face, which should give him reliable information, he struggles while reporting about
Cordelia’s reaction because, as he explains, it defies his expectations. When Kent asks
him “O, then it moved her” (17.17), he begins his answer with, “Not to a rage”

3

Ironically, both sisters prove to be overabundantly passionate and humorally overheated
by love. However, their love is not the filial devotion that they claim but sexual desire
for Edmund. When the dagger that Gonoril plunged into her heart is brought out onto the
stage, it literally steams with the heat of her unbalanced body: “It’s hot, it smokes”
(24.218).
4

Michael Holahan notes that this scene is structured much like the reporting scenes in the
late romances include Pericles, 1.4; Cymbeline, 1.1, 2.4, and 5.3; and The Winter’s Tale,
1.1 and 5.2. (Holahan, 414, n. 24).
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(17.18). This suggests that both he and Kent expected Cordelia to express an
obvious rage upon learning such atrocious news. Certainly, Kent has seen enough
examples of others being moved to a rage; Kent criticized Lear for becoming
irrationally enraged by Cordelia’s refusal to amend her love speech. Michael Holahan
draws a direct connection between Lear’s surprising rage and Cordelia’s surprising lack
of rage:
Here the power of her subjectivity is so well controlled that, in governing
itself, it can lay claim to govern others, this unnamed gentleman or a
would-be king of passion. The masculine title of “king” suggests that the
implicit model may be Lear's earlier usurping rage. A gentle microcosm
suddenly takes shape in Cordelia's rich sorrow, as if Act 3's storm should
be replayed now in precious miniature. (415)
The Gentleman goes on to describe his difficulty reading Cordelia’s face. He begins by
telling Kent that Cordelia was crying; however, he immediately notes that the meaning
of her tears needs further clarification. He cannot confidently define the reaction that he
witnesses so he uses an elaborate metaphor to describe not how her face was, but how it
“seemed” (17.14). 6
Using the language of warfare, the Gentleman creates a complicated narrative
about the internal, private, invisible, happenings within Cordelia’s body: “It seemed she
was a queen/ Over her passion who, most rebel-like,/ Sought to be king o'er her.”
Notably, he defines the invisible force that changes her as “her passion,” indicating that
5

The Oxford Shakespeare editors punctuate this passage with a period after her.
However, the way that the Gentleman responds with a clear answer about how she was
moved suggests that Kent had asked it as a question. Kent inquires, “Did it stir her
passions? Is her body noticeably humorally different as a result of this letter?” He is
assuming that her tears are a sign of either melancholy or choler, two humoral states that
can be clearly defined and have overcome other characters throughout the play.
6

My emphasis.

114
this passion belongs to Cordelia. However, Cordelia’s passion acts with an agency that
is not only distinctly its own, but directly counters Cordelia’s natural state. Her passion
becomes a dangerous rebel who seeks “to be king o’er her.” This is a complex claim
which raises important questions about Cordelia’s identity: What can it mean for
Cordelia’s own passions to go to war with Cordelia? What/who is the “Cordelia” that
her own passions attempt to master? What aspect of this Cordelia is able to be “queen
over” these violent passions?
We can better understand how Shakespeare opens up these questions about
identity with descriptions of contrasting passions by comparing the Gentleman’s report
to a similar report from Antony and Cleopatra. Like scene 17 of The History of King
Lear, the central drama in 1.5 of Antony and Cleopatra involves a messenger reporting
a first hand account of another character’s affective response to a letter. In this scene,
Cleopatra’s servant Alexas reports about the face of her lover, Antony. Unlike Kent,
who specifically asks the gentleman if the letter led to a “demonstration of grief,”
Cleopatra is less confident about what type of affection to expect; she asks Alexas
“What, was he sad or merry?” (1.5.50). Alexas’ reply, like the Gentleman’s, surprises
all expectations: he was neither. Comparing Antony to the spring, Alexas explains,
“Like to the time o’th’ year between the extremes/ Of hot and cold, he was nor sad nor
merry” (1.5.54-55). Cleopatra is delighted by this answer, exclaiming “O well divided
disposition!” (1.5.56). She explains how he was able to strategically and intentionally
manage his passions for political purposes:
He was not sad, for he would shine on those
That make their looks by his; he was not merry,
Which seemed to tell them his remembrance lay
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In Egypt with his joy; but between both:
O heavenly mingle! Be'st thou sad or merry,
The violence of either thee becomes;
So does it no man else. (1.5.54-60)
Notably, she describes how he is able to rationally control the passions, not how the
passions influence his reason: He was able to prevent any passion from overcoming his
reason because he knew that his passions could influence the passions of others. This
implies that, like Cordelia, Antony’s reason remains sovereign. However, Cleopatra
then immediately notes that “the violence” of either sadness or joy can suit him. Jan H.
Blit points out that Cleopatra is not championing Antony’s temperance. Instead, Blit
argues, Cleopatra describes a clashing of extremes:
This is the only time Cleopatra praises Anthony (or anyone else) for
moderation. Antony will later say that although she can guess what it
should be, Cleopatra does not know what moderation is (3.13.126-27).
Here, proving him right, she gets it wrong. Where Alexas, sounding like
an old-fashioned Roman, explicitly spoke of Anthony’s avoiding
extremes, Cleopatra, although initially claiming that he was “between
both,” quickly shifts and takes him to mean that Antony combined rather
than avoided both (“mingle”). “Between both” comes to mean not free
from, but simultaneously subject to, both. Antony’s disposition is “welldivided” only because it is torn by the power of conflicting extremes...
What Cleopatra praises as Antony’s moderation is the violence of
clashing excesses in disguise. (47)
In humoral terms, this paradoxical mixture of opposites, or “mingle,” is not a peaceful
management of passions; it is a violent warfare.
Shakespeare’s language of the rebellious, autonomous passions in these two
scenes closely mirrors imagery commonly used in the early modern treatises and
pamphlets on the passions. In his 1603 treatise, Virtues Common-wealth, Henry Crosse
describes the passions as “many enemies” which, without temperance, “would creepe
in, and infect our best parts, and utterly ruinate and cast downe the bulwarke of reason,
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and walls of understanding” (C3v). He consistently describes passions as multiple
forces that go to battle with reason. Even when he describes the dangers of a single
type of passion, such as lust, he is not concerned with a single lust, but many lusts. He
claims, “our lusts would overthrowe our understanding, and the body rebell against all
good order, and the habit of reason wholly suppressed” (C3v). In The Passions of the
Minde in General Wright similarly describes passions as insurgent subjects, the soul as
the commonwealth that they disturb, and reason as the monarch:
By two wayes the subjects of every Common-weale, usually disturbe the
State, and breede civill broyles therin: The first is, when they rise up and
rebel against their King: the second is when they brawle, one with
another, and so cause riots and tumults: the former is called Rebellion,
the later sedition. After the same manner, Passions either rebel against
Reason their Lord and King, or oppose themselves one against another,
that I call contradiction this contrarietie. The former he well
understood, that said, Spiritus concupiscit aduersus carnem, & caro
aduersus Spiritum: The Spirit affects against the Flesh, & the Flesh
against the Spirit. This internal Combat and spirituall Contradiction,
every spirituall man daily perceiveth, for inordinate passions, will he, nill
he, cease not almost hourely to rise up against Reason, and so molest
him, troubling the rest and quietness of his Soul. (F2v)
In Wright’s depiction of the constant internal warfare between passions and reason, the
passions are essences that are both part of the soul and a danger to it. In Bodies and
Selves in Early Modern England Schoenfeldt describes these hostile passions as
“physiological double agents” which “threaten the fragile constructions of the self, both
by direct assault and by a kind of sabotage” (49). He claims that this battle between the
passions and the constructed self is “a warfare... that is constructive rather than
destructive of the self, both because of the radical inwardness such introspection
demands and because the battle prevents the self from being overrun by a series of
undifferentiated passions” (50). Schoenfeldt cites Wright’s analogy to support his
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reading of book 2 of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, which allegorizes the virtue of
temperance. In this episode of the epic, violent passions must challenge reason in order
for the virtue of temperance to be active. Ultimately, Schoenfeldt argues that “what
individuates humans is not their desires but their successes at battling this internal
usurpation by desire... [In Spenser’s universe] self-control is the vehicle for self-rule
and finally for freedom” (49-50). Schoenfeldt’s interpretation of Wright is extremely
effective in the context of his thesis about Spenser’s battle at the castle of Alma.
However, the battle Cordelia undergoes, as it is described by the Gentleman, is not
necessarily “constructive of the self” nor does it become “a vehicle for freedom.”
Instead, the very notion of “self” is challenged by the battle. Cordelia’s “self” is not
defined by either her reason or her passion. Instead, the ways in which both interact and
manifest themselves in her body defines her identity. As the reason and passion become
increasingly hostile, her body is physically pulled in many directions and her sense of
self is equally malleable and unstable. As the gentleman describes, Cordelia’s reason
remains intact at the end of this particular battle, but, as we will see over the course of
the play, many other characters lose similar battles with the direst of consequences.
According to Wright, rebelling passions take two separate forms: “rebellion”
and “sedition.” After the Gentleman explains how the passions rebel, seeking “to be
king o’er her,” he then goes on to describe the passions’ sedition:
Patience and sorrow strove
Who should express her goodliest. You have seen
Sunshine and rain at once; her smiles and tears
Were like. (17.17-20)
She does not experience a unified rebellion, but instead multiple and conflicting
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passions. In Wright’s terms, this sedition causes passions to “brawle, one with
another” and “cause riots and tumults.” Cordelia’s indecipherable emotional response
to the letters is certainly not what Kent expected. The information about the horrific
events which were destroying her family and her homeland ought to visibly move her.
One would expect an intense choler to overwhelm her body like a tempest. Her tears
may be appropriate. However, what do her “smiles” represent? Her father has been
sent out naked in a fierce storm. Her sisters have turned murderous. A blinded
Gloucester wanders around the countryside searching for a king who is mad. In this
seemingly apocalyptic moment, why do her passions “rain” and not storm? One may
have seen sunshine and rain at once, but never simultaneous sunshine and cyclone.
What role can sunshine possibly play in such a dark reality? How can patience stand a
chance against sorrow of this magnitude?
Elsewhere in the play, Shakespeare depicts grief as a powerful, monolithic
passion. What the gentleman describes is a much more complicated experience.
Patience and sorrow both act with an individual agency that is independent of
Cordelia’s body. Wright describes the effects that this simultaneous experience of
multiple passions can have on the body when the passions do not only collectively go to
war against the monarch of reason, but separately go to war against one another,
striving to dominate her humoral state, or “express her goodliest”:
The Egyptians fought against the Egyptians, the East wind riseth often
against the West, the South against the North, the Winde against the
Tyde, and one Passion fighteth with another. The cholericke Cavalliere
would with death revenge an injurie, but feare of killing or hanging
opposeth it self against this Passion. Gluttony would have dainties, but
Covetousness prescribeth parsimonie. Lecherie would raigne and
dominier, but dreadfulnesse of infamie, and fear of diseases draw in the
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raynes of this inordinate Affection. By which opposition we may easily
perceive how unquiet is the heart of a passionate man, tossed like the Sea
with contrary winds, even at the same time and moment. (F4r)
Cordelia is temporarily halted in a state of indecision and lacks control. The gentleman
goes on to use a second description to try to describe her conflicted passionate state in
“a better way” (17.20).
Those happy smilets
That played on her ripe lip seemed not to know
What guests were in her eyes, which parted thence
As pearls from diamonds dropped. (17.20-23) 7
The Gentleman does not describe what he assumes Cordelia is feeling. Instead, he
describes what her passions are doing. According to the Gentleman’s description,
Cordelia doesn’t smile. Instead, the passion (represented by the smile) “played” her lip.
Cordelia doesn’t cry. The tears are guests in her eyes. The individual parts of her body
are working with individual passions in conflicting ways. As her features are physically
altered by concurrent but distinct passions and her body becomes an instrument to be
played by the passions, the system of communication within her body breaks down.
This language of many passions battling to determine which “best becomes her”
echoes the language Shakespeare uses in his earlier poem, Venus and Adonis. When
7

The Oxford Shakespeare editors punctuate these lines differently: “her smiles and tears/
Were like, a better way. Those happy smilets/ That played on her ripe lip seemed not to
know/ What guests were in her eyes.” I take the punctuation quoted above from Leslie
Brisman, who convincingly argues for a reading first proposed by Henry Norman
Hudson. Since Q1 gives only a comma after "way" and Q2 has the whole line
unpunctuated, some form of editorial punctuation is required. Brisman notes that editors
normally associate the phrase “a better way” with the clause before but this reading adds
nothing to the sense of the simile. “The Gentleman is trying to describe Cordelia's
reaction to news of her father, and it is especially appropriate that difficulty in expression
be associated with the character who stands for the inability to translate emotion into
words -or, to put it "a better way", the character who stands for the inexpressibility of
human feeling and the fact that language necessarily belies the heart” (205).
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Venus beholds the dead body of her beloved Adonis, she is overcome with intense
grief. To explain the nature of her grief, Shakespeare uses the same analogy of the
irrational coexistence of sunshine and rain to describe the actions of the many distinct
passions that contribute to it.
But like a stormy day, now wind, now rain,
Sighs dry her cheeks, tears make them wet again.
Variable passions throng her constant woe,
As striving who should best become her grief.
All entertained, each passion labours so,
That every present sorrow seemeth chief,
But none is best. Then join they all together,
Like many clouds consulting for foul weather. (968-972)
Grief is not a single experience that Venus must endure. Instead, grief becomes a
conglomerate of many separate, warring passions that simultaneously have their own
contrasting agencies over her body. Each individual passion labors with its own force so
that “every present sorrow seemeth chief” to the suffering Venus. Like the clouds of a
storm, the passions congregate, but each batters her with its own force. As her passions
become the storm clouds, her body becomes the land that the storm thrashes. Her
Goddess form becomes humoral and materially human as it is overwhelmed by
passions which are manifest in bodily responses.
The image of sunshine peaking through storm clouds was frequently used to
describe the experience of grieving women in early modern writing, and is a notable
trope in Sidney’s Arcadia, which is commonly considered a source text of King Lear.
Kenneth Muir notes that that Shakespeare borrows the language of Sidney’s description
of the mourning Philoclea in book three for his description of Cordelia in scene 17. In
Arcadia Cecropia walks in on Philoclea crying in her chamber:
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She saw Philoclea sitting low upon a cushion in such a given-over
manner, that one would have thought silence, solitariness, and
melancholy were come there under the ensign of mishap, to conquer
delight, and drive him from his natural seat of beauty: her tears came
dropping down like rain in sunshine, and she not taking heed to wipe the
tears, they hung upon her cheeks and lips as upon cherries which the
dropping tree bedeweth. (329)
Like the Gentleman, who describes the passions invoked by Kent’s letter as dangerous
agents who engage in a “rebel like” attempt to rule Cordelia’s body, the narrator of
Arcadia describes “silence, solitariness, and melancholy” as warlike forces who battle to
displace “delight.” Even delight, who had reigned in “his natural seat of beauty” is
described as an individual force that is personified and gendered as male, which
emphasizes the distinction of “delight” from the woman, Philoclea, who “he” embodies.
However, Shakespeare uses this same analogy of “sunshine and rain at once” to
describe a different aspect of the warring passions than Sidney. In Sidney’s Arcadia,
Philoclea’s tears “came dropping down like rain in sunshine.” The sunshine is the
beauty of her face; the tears are the rain drops that shine in that sunshine, making her
face all the more lovely in her all encompassing despair. In Shakespeare’s passage,
sunshine is not Cordelia’s beauty, but patience’s smile. Philoclea mourns in a “givenover manner.” Silence, solitariness, and melancholy have conquered delight and stolen
delight’s “natural seat of beauty” as an invader could drive a king from his throne.
Undefined, contrasting passions similarly attempt to dethrone Cordelia, but they fail;
she is never entirely overcome. Unlike Philoclea, who “not taking heed to wipe the
tears, they hung upon her cheeks and lips as upon cherries” (Sidney, 329), the
Gentleman describes Cordelia as she is involved in the battle with her tears.
There she shook
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The holy water from her heavenly eyes
And clamour mastered, then away she started
To deal with grief alone. (17.30-33)
Unlike Cleopatra, who praises Antony for his ability to “mingle” the violent warring
passions (1.5.63), the Gentleman commends Cordelia’s temperance. Although she
cries, Cordelia does not appear to be otherwise altered by her invading passions; she
maintains her composure. According to the Gentleman, what is remarkable and
beautiful about Cordelia is not only her lovely face but the lack of violence and
extremity in her response. Like Cleopatra, who claims that sorrow and joy “becomes”
Antony, the Gentleman claims, “Sorrow would be a rarity most beloved/ If all could so
become it” (17.23-24). Cordelia “becomes” the passion so perfectly because, not only
does she manage to retain her status as a “queen” of passion, she “masters clamour” and
“deals with grief.” Cordelia’s reason retains agency over her body’s reaction to the
passions.
Katharine Goodland discusses how radically different the composed Cordelia is
from the more common depictions of mourning women in early canonical English
drama. She cites Webster’s Cornelia and Shakespeare’s Ophelia, claiming that these
characters, like the mourning Virgin Mary of the N-Town English Passion plays, have
excessive grief; women were frequently depicted as hysterical, overwhelmed, mad and
dangerous in early modern drama. They mourn openly and at length while Cordelia
grieves in private. According to Goodland, these staged forms of grief “denote
differences in value that register the shift from ritualized, public, communal mourning
to naturalized, private, individualized grief” (214). The grief, which Goodland argues
emerges in Shakespeare’s works, is not only private and individual, but is also deeply
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embodied. This clear difference between excessive female mourning and Cordelia’s
management of the passions demonstrates Shakespeare’s interest in the question shared
by early modern medical writers and contemporary neuroscientists: to what extent can
cognition or reason control the multiple, contrasting, embodied, material affective
forces?
Before discussing the ways in which Shakespeare works through this question in
other moments of the play, it is important to note that scene 17 does not appear in the
folio text, The Tragedy of King Lear. The differences between the Q and F versions are
significant. Q 1 contains 285 lines not in in F 1 ; F 1 contains around 100 lines not in Q 1.
Additionally, more than a thousand individual words and speech assignments vary in
the two texts, and about half the verse lines in F 1 are either printed as prose or
differently divided in Q 1 (Bradley, 24). The early editors of Shakespeare’s work,
including Rowe and Pope, operated under the assumption that both Q and F are
mangled versions of a pure original. 8
Editors would attempt to reclaim Shakespeare’s intended Lear by conflating the
two texts, “weaving together the lines that appear in only one or the other version and
correcting Q with reference to F or (in a much smaller number of instances) F with
reference to Q” (Greenblatt, The Norton Shakespeare 2333).
The development of the New Bibliography led to a new approach to the texts of
Lear. Formative works of textual criticism, including Jerome McGann’s A Critique of
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Much of this belief in the existence of a single authoritative manuscript originates
from Ben Jonson’s famous claim that Shakespeare never revised his own work: “The
players have often mentioned it as an honour to Shakespeare, that in his writing,
whatsoever he penned, he never blotted out line” (Jonson, 539).
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Modern Textual Criticism (1983) and D. F. McKenzie’s Bibliography and the
Sociology of Texts (1986) indicated a turn to a social theory of textual criticism. McGann
opens his Critique with a discussion of the texts of Lear. He describes the critical
methods of editors of “eclectic” texts:
According to this line of argument, when scholars set about editing works
of the past- and in particular when they are dealing with works for which
we do not have an author’s manuscript- they must develop methods for
reconstituting the lost original document. (4)
McGann claims that this method fails if the two original printed texts of King Lear “are
not two relatively corrupted texts of a pure (but now lost) original, but two relatively
reliable texts of two different versions of the plays (as we now think)” (4). He goes on to
argue that this rethinking of the texts of Lear creates a turning point in textual practices
because, “since Shakespearean and Elizabethan studies constitutes the central field in
which our theories of textual criticism seek their ground, a crisis in that field involves a
general crisis of the discipline” (5). The same year that McGann published his Critique,
Gary Taylor and Michael Warren published a collection of essays specifically discussing
the relationship between the two texts of Lear, The Division of the Kingdoms. Steven
Urkowitz describes the history of the conflated text and argues that “what has been a
well-meaning quest after a quite-possibly-nonexistent lost original may have
promulgated a two-hundred year usurpation of our greatest ply by an adulterated text”
(41). Urkowitz makes a case for the necessity of modern editions of both texts; three
years later, the new Oxford Complete Works edited by Taylor and Stanley Wells
published two separate versions of Lear, one based on Q 1 , the other on F 1 .
The contributors to The Division of the Kingdoms are primarily interested in
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questioning the relationship between the Q and F texts. Roger Warren describes the
assumption that they generally share, “the Folio cuts, additions, and rewordings
represent Shakespeare’s own second thoughts as a result of difficulties at rehearsal and,
perhaps, dissatisfaction with the performance” (47). Gary Taylor complicates this claim,
arguing that Shakespeare revised the folio for multiple purposes. He attempts to
distinguish between deliberate authoritative revisions and changes made to the text as a
result of censorship. The claim that Shakespeare intentionally revised F continues to be
intensely debated. Richard Knowles critiques the “frequent exaggeration found in these
essays,” claiming that there is not enough evidence to support the theory that Shakespeare
is the reviser of the Folio (The Division of the Kingdoms, 116). Shakespeare’s is likely
not the only agency in the changes. For Knowles, "The question is not whether there was
revision—of course there was—but who did it, and when, and why" ("Two Lears?" 58).
Furthermore, the question about whether a reader should consider these texts as
two distinct plays remains up for debate. For example, in his Shakespeare and Revision
(1988), Stanley Wells claims that the two texts of Lear represent the play “at a different
stage of its evolution,” but still insists that the two versions “create, in effect, two
separate plays” (15). R.A. Foakes contests his claim and asserts: “At the same time, the
reworking of King Lear is not so thorough as to mean that we have to think of two
plays” (111). In the textual notes to The Norton Shakespeare’s facing page version of
King Lear, Greenblatt offers a middle ground:
Each version has its own integrity; each contains passages intrinsically its own.
In addition, the Quarto may give us a precious glimpse, as the Oxford editor
notes, of the play “as Shakespeare first conceived it, probably before it was
performed,” while the Folio represents a revision made probably two or three
years after the play was performed. The Folio, then, with its substantial cuts and
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its small additions, its streamlining and its subtle shifts in emphasis, is the
more theatrical text. (2333)
Michael Best agrees that each version has its own integrity but challenges the
assumption about F’s superior stage-worthiness. He argues:
Productions of the play vary enormously in the kinds of cuts and
modifications that directors have historically made; one
actor's/director's/critic's high point is another's candidate for the axe. The
empirical test of production over many years argues rather against the
clear superiority of the Folio text in the theater, since only those directors
who have deliberately decided to produce a Folio version have followed
its cuts. (4)
Scene 17 exemplifies this debate about whether F is “more theatrical.” The reporting
scene is not essential to the plot and it can pull the audience away from the building
anxiety and drama of the impending war. However, some critics are deeply disturbed
by productions that cut this scene and skeptical of any claims about Shakespeare’s
intent to edit it out. Muir insists that the omission of this scene is “disastrous... Cordelia
has so little to say in the whole play that she needs all the help she can get” (xiv).
I agree with Muir that Cordelia becomes a less compelling character without the
report about her conflicted response to Kent’s letter. However, I will not go so far as to
claim that cutting scene 17 irreparably damages the play. Nor do I find that that F
undermines Shakespeare’s central concern with the agency of contrasting passions and
the physical management of them, because, at many moments in the play, Shakespeare
places characters in situations in which they are paradoxically moved by passions that
inhospitably contrast each other as they are physically experienced in the humoral body.
One of the most notable differences between Q and F is the death of Lear. Regardless
who revised F or why the revisions were made, the result of the changes to the final
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scene of The Tragedy of King Lear specifically emphasizes the embodied struggle
with the passions described in scene 17.
In both the Q and F, Lear’s final entrance is devastating. The ruined old
monarch stumbles onto the stage carrying the dead body of his beloved daughter.
“Howl, howl, howl, howl,” he yells out; words are no longer able to communicate his
grief. This prompts Kent to wonder, “Is this the promised end?” (24.252-258). Q and F
have few variants until Lear’s last lines. In Q, Lear bends down over Cordelia’s mouth,
looking for some sign of life. As he leans down towards her lips, he hears nothing. He
finally knows that she is dead. His language breaks down into guttural sounds: “O O O
O!” (24.256). Immediately, he faints and moment later is revived, recognizes the
finality of her death and dies, after delivering one final command to his humoral body,
“Break, heart, I prithee, break” (24.305). His body, which has refused so many of his
demands, finally obeys. In F, when Lear looks for Cordelia’s breath, he is overcome
with a sudden flash of hope. His final lines before his death are, “Look on her. Look,
her lips. Look there, look there” (5.3.09). As he leans down towards her, Lear fleeting
believes that Cordelia still breathes. It is not overwhelming agony that kills him.
Instead, he becomes overcome by the dangerous clashing of contradicting passion; Lear
dies in a state of alternating despair and hope for the life of his beloved daughter. I will
revisit this scene to discuss the physiology of early modern heartbreak in the next
chapter, but it suffices to say that the conflict of passions is central to Lear’s death
scene.
Lear’s death by conflicting emotion in F directly parallels the death of Gloucester
who dies as a result of a similar burst of joy amid despair. After long days of patiently
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caring for his ailing, blinded father, Edgar finally gives up his Poor Tom disguise
and reveals himself. The result is devastating. He sorrowfully reports,
but his flawed heart—
Alack, too weak the conflict to support—
‘Twixt two extremes of passions, joy and grief,
Burst smilingly. (24.192)
Gloucester simultaneously experiences two powerful passions: the horrific grief which
results from the knowledge that he had wrongly accused his son of attempted patricide
and the overpowering joy of realizing that his son is not only alive and well but has
been with him all along. The humoral contradiction is too strong for Gloucester’s heart
to process and it literally bursts. In the amended final scene of F, the parallel deaths of
Gloucester and Lear ultimately dramatize the decisive result of contrasting emotions.
Long before the conflicting passions cause Lear’s death, his inability to control
them certainly leads to his madness. The early modern physiological explanations of
madness are as complex, conflicted and extensive as the discourse surrounding humoral
theory and the passions. An exploration of the medical history of madness is beyond the
purview of this project. 9 However, I want to argue that reading Lear’s madness through
the lens of humoral theory turns the focus on his integrated mind and body, which
becomes a battleground over which the passions and reason struggle for control. Lear
describes his many individual battles with rebelling passions in distinctly humoral
terms. When Lear comes upon Kent (disguised as Caius) in the stocks, he is
immediately infuriated by the insubordination of Gonoril and Cornwall. In describing
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For an extensive discussion of the heterogeneity of the discourse surrounding madness
in early modern England, see Carol Neely’s Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in
Shakespeare and Early Modern Culture.
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his anguish, he does not distinguish between his mental and physical pain. Instead, he
narrates the way in which the passion changes his body. He cries, “O, how this mother
swells up towards my heart!/ Histerica passio, down, thou climbing sorrow;/ Thy
element’s below” (7.221-223). Histerica passio refers to a “suffering in the womb”
or stomach (Greenblatt, 2233 n6). The stomach was considered the “seat of passion” in
early modern medicine. “[According to Levinus Lemnius,] if the humours in the
stomach did not function properly, then not only were harmful vapors produced that
could ascend to the head and disturbe and hurt the brayne & minde,’ but ‘unpure’ spirits
resulted, also altering the state of both body and mind for the worse, often provoking
brawling and dissension” (Purnis 806). Here, Lear can feel his body being taken over
and tries to stop the vapors from rising from his stomach, the lower faculty, to his heart.
“Down, thou climbing sorrow,” he demands, as one might speak to a disobedient dog.
However, his attempts are clearly futile. This is made evident later in the scene when
Lear, still angry about the treatment of Kent, again gives his passions a direct
command: “O me, my heart, my rising heart! but, down!” (2.2.285). 10
Clearly, the passions have, as he feared, already risen from his stomach to his
heart. At this point, the fool mocks Lear for his futile attempts to command his humoral
body:
Cry to it, nuncle, as the cockney did to the eels when she put 'em i' the
paste alive; she rapped 'em o' the coxcombs with a stick, and cried
'Down, wantons, down!' 'Twas her brother that, in pure kindness to his
horse, buttered his hay. (7.279)
Crying “down” to one’s passions is as foolish as beating at live eels while trying to
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bake them into a pie. With this image, the fool offers a materialist objection to the
popular claim that man has a God-given ability to use reason to expel contaminating
humors. Lisa Perfetti argues that this issue was a dominant theme in Christian sermons.
She claims that these sermons assert that “although the bodily passions [come] from
outer forces, they were not […] fixed, predetermined, or beyond control” (6). The fool
uses visceral imagery in his rejection of human agency; this visual of eels fighting for
their life depicts the wriggling, crawling, terrifying otherness of passions. Like the
passions, the eels are certainly “outer forces” but they are not, in any way, able to be
controlled.
What makes this image of the cockney woman beating at the eels so disturbing is
the fact that there are so many eels. To do battle with the passions is to not fight a single
serpent, but many desperate eels. Edgar, disguised as Poor Tom, claims to have a
profound fear of the power of the multiple forces that simultaneously exist within his
body.
Tom hath been scared out of his good wits. Bless
thee, good man's son, from the foul fiend!
Five fiends have been in poor Tom at once; of lust, as
Obidicut; Hobbididence, prince of dumbness; Mahu, of
stealing; Modo, of murder; Flibbertigibbet, of
mopping and mowing, who since possesses chambermaids
and waiting-women. So, bless thee, master! (15.54-60)
Of course, Poor Tom is describing demonic forces, not passions. However, ways in
which these demons work as they possess him, mirror the embodied passions. For
example, Poor Tom implies that Flibbertigibbet takes over the waiting women, and
therefore, it is the agency of Flibbertigibbet, not the agency of the woman he possesses,
that performs the act of gossip. It is important to note that Shakespeare puts these words
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into the mouth of a man pretending to be mad. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that Edgar, even as Poor Tom, has ever acted out lust, dumbness, thievery, murder or
gossip. However, Gloucester has no doubts about the authenticity of Poor Tom’s
claims. The concept of the body being taken over by an outside force may be strange
and unearthly, but not impossible.
As I have discussed in the introduction, this possibility of the body becoming
enthralled to forces beyond the control of reason is central to both the early modern
uneasiness regarding passions as well as the contemporary neuroethical debate about
biological determinism. Furthermore, the extent to which the early moderns believed
that the humoral body could be controlled was not only a subject of debate among early
modern philosophers, medical writers and political writers, but has also been a point of
contention among historians and literary critics whose scholarship focuses on these
early modern discourses. Shakespeare’s depiction of the autonomous forces that Lear
struggles with and Poor Tom claims to succumb to seems to suggest that he sides with
the materialists like Juan Luis Vives, who emphasizes passion’s ability to overwhelm
the reason and forcibly take control over the body:
Emotions can be as light as the onset of a rising wave. Others are stronger,
while others are powerful enough to shake up the soul and dethrone it from the
seat of rational judgment by rendering it truly disturbed and impotent,
deprived of self-control, subject to strange powers and totally blind, unable to
see anything. (4) 11
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Throughout his 1990 translation of Vive’s work, Carlos G. Noreña frequently uses the
word “emotions.” The contemporary meaning of the word: “agitation or disturbance of
mind, feeling, passion” did not enter the English language until 1660 (OED). For more on
anachronistic uses of the word “emotion” in contemporary works about medieval and
early modern writing, see Louise M. Bishop, Words, Stones, & Herbs: The Healing Word
in Medieval and Early Modern England, 37.
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However, Shakespeare brings this theory about the uncontrollability of the passions into
question when the most morally despicable of the play’s villains, Cornwall, makes the
claim that he has no ability to control his material passion and uses this argument to
justify his decision to torture Gloucester. Cornwall specifically argues that his passion
has become sovereign over his reason:
Though well we may not pass upon his life
Without the form of justice, yet our power
Shall do a curtsy to our wrath, which men
May blame, but not control. (14.22-25)
Cornwall realizes that he lacks the political power to pass a death sentence on
Gloucester. This suggests that he fears the consequences of the action he had already
decided to perform in the previous scene, when he told Edmund, “I will have my
revenge ere I depart the house” (12.1).
He demonstrates that he is rationally aware that harming Gloucester “without
the form of justice” is illegal. However, in the same breath he argues that he is
physically incapable of reason. Cornwall argues that his response to Gloucester is not
simply situational. Instead, Cornwall claims that his body is changed by the wrath and
suggests that the physical element of his behavior is a more convincing excuse than an
explanation of the circumstances. Like mad Poor Tom, who describes being possessed
by Modo, Cornwall suggests that his agency is entirely suppressed by the power of
wrath. Therefore, he claims that the force of passion, not his autonomous reason, is
responsible for raising his hand to pull out the eyes of Gloucester. By emphasizing his
knowledge of the illegality of the action while, in the same breath, excusing himself
from blame, Cornwall distinguishes his reason (the cognition that allows him to be a
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rational Duke), from his passion (the irrational tyrant).
Interestingly, by explaining the process of his rage overcoming his reason,
Cornwall undermines the validity of his own claim. It is entirely illogical to rationally
discus the process of having the inability to reason. In this strange, self-contradictory
moment, Cornwall uses the vocabulary of Galenic humoralists, like Wright and Vives,
who describe passions as bodily forces which can directly counter and occasionally
overthrow reason. The use of this language exposes Shakespeare’s skepticism about
these theories and reveals his participation in a shifting discourse about the mind/body
problem.
Recent court cases have been built around the same claim that Cornwall makes:
one is not legally held responsible for his or her actions when there is a biological,
material cause of the behavior. For example, in 2005, when the Supreme Court ruled
that the death penalty for juveniles was unconstitutional, its decision took into
consideration neuropsychological research which suggests that the brain’s frontal lobes,
which are crucial for self-control, are not yet mature in adolescents. John Monterosso,
Edward B. Royzman, and Barry Schwartz argue that this finding shaped the court’s
attitudes about whether young people are fully responsible for their actions. Although
they support the court’s decision, they are concerned with the logic behind the defense.
The use of neuroscience in the courtroom suggests that violent teenagers with the
underdeveloped brains are not responsible for their behavior because their brains “made
them do it.” Similar reasoning is often applied to behavior arising from chemical
imbalances in the brain. These scholars performed a study by asking a group to
complete questionnaires about the culpability of a violent criminal. They gave their
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respondents information about the criminal which included both a history of
psychologically horrific events that the individual had experienced (e.g., suffering
abuse as a child) and an explanation of biological characteristics or anomalies in the
individual’s brain (e.g., an imbalance in neurotransmitters). Their results showed that a
physiological factor, including a brain abnormality that was weakly associated with
violence, led people to exonerate the protagonist significantly more often than a
psychological factor. They conclude:
Put together, these three propositions — (a) mind (soul) and body are two
separate entities capable of independently affecting human behavior; (b)
behavior is voluntary and “owned” by the self only insofar as it flows from the
mind or the soul; and (c) alternative, independently plausible and
noncontradictory accounts of human action can undercut each other — may
elucidate why, in our vignettes, when a physiological explanation was given,
participants tended to view the body as the cause of the behavior and
motivations as less relevant, with the result that the behavior was perceived as
less voluntary. (155)
In their accompanying article for The Sunday Review, they label this pattern of
responses “naïve dualism.” They express concern that “if we view every new scientific
finding about brain involvement in human behavior as a sign that the behavior was not
under the individual’s control, the very notion of responsibility will be threatened” (1).
Like humoral physiology, recent findings of neuropsychology complicate the notion of
human agency and bring culpability into question.
Shakespeare takes on this issue of personal responsibility by positioning
Cornwall’s excuse as entirely unacceptable. However, before I go on to trace the ways
in which Cornwall is condemned for his unforgivable decision to pluck out
Gloucester’s eyes, it is important to note that Shakespeare is not consistent in the way
he approaches this excuse about the agency of passions. The villainous Cornwall is not
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the only character to claim that wrath, not reason, is the agent of the violent action.
Kent, one of the play’s most virtuous characters, uses the same argument to justify his
choice to beat Oswald. In scene seven, when Cornwall comes upon Kent and Oswald
fighting, Kent is in a rage. He threatens to beat Oswald to death, telling Cornwall “I
will tread this/unbolted villain into mortar, and daub the wall of a jakes with him”
(7.59-60). Cornwall acts as if he is scandalized by this display of violence and asks,
“have you no reverence?” (7.63). Kent replies, “Yes, sir, but anger hath a privilege”
(7.64). Reverence, temperance, patience: all are overthrown by Kent’s wrath. Like
Cornwall, Kent personifies anger and depicts it as an outside force which his reason
cannot control. Furthermore, Kent, like Cornwall, is remorseless about his action. Of
course, the consequences of Cornwall’s rage (which results in the blinding of the old,
noble Gloucester) and Kent’s (which ends with the comical beating of the smarmy
Oswald) cannot be equated. However, they use the same rationalization for their acts of
violence.
Although Cornwall’s claim about his inability to prevent his passion from being
sovereign is an attempt to use the predominant theory of passion to pardon his immoral
behavior, Shakespeare presents Kent’s identical claim as a sincere explanation of his
internal battle with his passions. It is important to note that the wrath that Cornwall
personifies in his self-aware description does not turn him into a choleric monster;
choler had always been his dominant humor. Similarly, the anger that overcomes Kent
does not force him to do anything out of character; he remains the loyal balanced
servant. In fact, as he explains to Cornwall, he beats Oswald specifically because of his
commitment to being a good servant. When Cornwall asks Kent, “Why art thou angry?”
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(7.65) questioning the source of the very passion that Kent claims he cannot control,
Kent replies by specifically explaining that he hates Oswald for being an insufferable
flatterer who instigates his master’s passions, unlike a loyal servant who will stand up
to his master:
Such smiling rogues as these,
Like rats, oft bite those holy cords in twain
Which are too entrenched to unloose, smooth every passion
That in the natures of their lords rebel,
Bring oil to fire, snow to their colder moods;
Renege, affirm, and turn their halcyon beaks
With every gale and vary of their masters,
Knowing naught, like dogs, but following. (7.67-74)
Kent believes that it is the good servant’s responsibility to aid his master in the battle
against rebellious passions and prevent passions from overthrowing his master’s reason.
In the opening act, Kent had preformed the duties he describes by attempting to
mitigate Lear’s rage, and even though he had been banished for his intervention, he
knows he acted loyally. Flatterers and followers like Oswald, only increase the power
of these dangerous shifts in the master’s body temperature, passion, and mood. By
claiming that the servant can help a master battle the passions and that the flatterer
increases the passions, Kent suggests that passions, even powerful “gales,” can and
should be controlled. Ironically, this claim contradicts the justification for his anger
which he had just described. Kent’s argument can be paraphrased as “I cannot control
my own passion because I am so passionate about Oswald’s inability to help his master
control his passion.”
Kent’s passion is not the barbaric force described by Vives or Wright. Rather
than leading to sin, the agency of his anger affirms his core values. Directly after
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Cornwall shockingly plucks out Gloucester’s first eye and blames his uncontrollable
wrath for the action, his unnamed manservant experiences a similar passion. The
Servant perfectly plays the role of the good servant that Kent describes. Unlike Oswald,
the flatterer who brings oil to fire, the Servant attempts to help Cornwall control his
passion. He is clearly unconvinced by Cornwall’s claim that he cannot control his
wrath and orders him to use reason to take control over his body. He demands, “Hold
your hand, my lord” (14.69). Although the Servant recognizes that Cornwall will read
his interjection as a subversion, he explains that he is acting loyally: “I have served you
ever since I was a child,/ But better service have I never done you/ Than now to bid you
hold” (14.70-73). In his discussion of the ethical implications of this moment, James
Knapp argues, “Judging from the dialogue, the Servant’s decision appears to be a result
of moral reasoning, carefully articulated” (9). The Servant is defender of the fortress of
Cornwall’s reason; Cornwall is mobbed with violent passion. However, when Cornwall
refuses to be swayed by the Servant’s reasoned interjection, the Servant challenges him
to “take the chance of anger” (14.76). In other words, the Servant argues that his anger,
not his reason, is the agent of his violent act. Interestingly, he becomes governed by
anger while refuting Cornwall’s claim about being subject to wrath. Knapp notes, “both
men invoke passionate emotion (wrath and anger) rather than reasoned judgment as the
source of their action” (11), and I add that both men argue that wrath and anger are not
only the sources of their violent action, but the agents of it.
Knapp goes on to point out the paradoxical relationship between Cornwall and
the Servant’s reasoned discourse about the passions and their claims to be entirely
overcome by violent passions. He asks, “If Cornwall’s wrath is so uncontrollable as to
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force his (just) power to “do a curtsy to” it, would he really take the time to
articulate this? Similarly, would a servant so overcome by a scene of injustice that he is
willing to risk his life to stop it articulate his motivation at the moment of crisis?” (11).
However, throughout The History of King Lear, characters are consistently stopping
mid- expression of passion to explain the ways in which their bodies are processing the
changes. Shakespeare is interested in moving this deeply internal struggle for agency
out of the body and onto the observable stage. In order to achieve this, characters must
use language to describe the internal and invisible battles which take place within their
bodies and narrate their struggles to understand them and control them.
Furthermore, characters consistently attempt to understand the actions of others
by making claims about their internal bodies. For example, Cornwall’s self-declared
tendency towards unmanageable embodied anger is given further credibility by other
character’s descriptions of him. In scene 7, when Lear is furious after Gloucester tells
him that Cornwall and Regan refuse to speak to him, Gloucester tries to explain to Lear
the futility of his attempt to change Cornwall’s mind by describing Cornwall’s humoral
imbalance:
My dear lord,
You know the fiery quality of the Duke,
How unremovable and fixed he is
In his own course.” (7.251-254)
Gloucester is not necessarily excusing Cornwall’s stubborn refusal to see Lear, but he
does explain that this stubbornness is directly linked to the temperature of his body
(which Cornwall can not control). Timothy Bright draws this connection between a hot
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body temperature and irrational behavior in A Treatise of Melancholie:

12

Melancholie signifieth in all, either a certayne fearfull disposition of the mind
altered from reason, or else an humour of the body, commonly taken to be the
only cause of reason by feare in such sort depraved. This humour is of two
sorts: naturall, or unnatural: naturall is either the grosser part of the bloud
ordained for nourishment, which either by abundance or immoderate hotnesse,
passing measure, surchargeth the bodie, and yeeldeth up to the braine certaine
vapors, whereby the understanding is obscured; all organicall actions are therof
mixed with melancholie madnesse. (Quoted in Radden, 121)
Jennifer Radden summarizes Bright’s complicated classifications of melancholy. “He
divides melancholia the disease... from melancholy the humor, and he distinguishes
among instances of the melancholy humor being those that are natural and unnatural.
As a result of bodily heating of various kinds, the natural melancholy humor could
become unnatural, and thus lead to melancholia, the disease” (120). In this system of
physiology, there is no distinction between a physical and mental disability;
melancholia, the disease of the mind, is as material as a disease of any bodily organ.
Gloucester clearly describes the hot, violent, impatient Cornwall as choleric, not
melancholic. However, like Bright, Gloucester suggests that the overabundance of
Cornwall’s humor has led to disease. He suggests that this physical ailment explains
(even if it does not pardon) his inappropriate conduct.
At first, hearing Gloucester’s rationalization of Cornwall’s unacceptable
behavior, Lear is incredulous and dismissive of the warning that he should not bother to
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Several early 20th c. scholars have argued that Shakespeare read and was deeply
influenced by Timothy Bright’s A Treatise of Melancholie including J. Dover Wilson,
What Happens in Hamlet and Mary O’Sullivan, Hamlet and Dr. Timothy Bright. Mary
Crane cites these critics in her Shakespeare’s Brain. She argues, “Bright includes
lengthy, often contradictory descriptions of the internal workings of body, soul, and
mind... It was this sense of interior process and preoccupation with the spatiality and
direction of agency that strongly influenced Shakespeare” (120).
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change the mind of such a literally hot-headed man. He says, “Fiery? the fiery
duke? Tell the hot duke that —” and then pauses (7.261). At this point, Shakespeare
sets the audience up to expect Lear “to be moved to a rage,” but instead, Lear stops
himself, mid rant, to contemplate Gloucester’s claim about Cornwall.
No, but not yet. Maybe he is not well.
Infirmity doth still neglect all office
Whereto our health is bound. We are not ourselves
When nature, being oppressed, commands the mind
To suffer with the body. I'll forbear; (7.262-266)
If Cornwall’s body is truly oppressed with disease, his body temperature may really be
the cause of his bad behavior. Lear suggest that the bodily forces can determine how
and why men act as they do. “Infirmity,” the material force of overabundant humors,
has the ability to make the mind and the body suffer together. Here, Lear lays out a
complicated relationship between the self, the mind and the body. He draws a dualist
distinction between the mind and body, equating the mind with reason and the body
with passion. He suggests that in a healthy body reason does “not suffer with” passion,
but is superior to it and has agency over it.

Disease breaks down that distinction.

Disease integrates reason and passion through mutual suffering and oppresses “nature,”
or the normative relationship between the two opposed forces.
Remarkably, this rationale allows Lear to temporarily accept Gloucester’s
justification of Cornwall’s stubbornness. Scrutinizing the body/nature relationship
allows him to account for otherwise incomprehensible and unforgivable behavior. In
light of this realization, Lear becomes self critical and blames himself for not
recognizing the telltale signs of Cornwall’s illness earlier:
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I’ll forbear,
And am fallen out with my more headier will,
To take the indisposed and sickly fit
For the sound man. (7.266-269)
Here, he again uses humoral language which further complicates the relationship
between the mind, body, and self. He (the balanced, healthily rational Lear) has become
disconnected from his own “headier will” (his ability to reason) which has caused him
to mistake a “sickly fit” (Cornwall’s diseased body) for the “sound man” (a rational
Cornwall). However, immediately after Lear analyzes his own failures of reason, he
looks back at Kent in the stocks and his anger is brought back to the forefront, making
him question his previous claim:
Death on my state,
Wherefore should he sit here? This act persuades me
That this remotion of the Duke and her
Is practice only. (7.269-272)
As a result of this sudden surge of passion, Lear’s perspective about the authenticity of
Cornwall’s passion-induced disease instantly changes. No longer does he believe that
Cornwall suffers from a bodily illness which prevents him from reason. Now, Lear
concludes that Cornwall’s stubbornness is intentional and that he is feigning the illness
in order to fool him; Cornwall may be in control of his actions but pretending not to be.
What is so fascinating about the moment that follows is that the audience is able to see
Lear perform the effects of the “sickly fit” he has just described, defended, questioned
and then rejected. Unlike Cornwall, who reasons about his inability to reason moments
before blinding Gloucester, Lear performs the effects of passion on his body. A rage
rises from his body into his mind and hinders his ability to reason. Gone is the rational
Lear who was able to temporarily coolly contemplate Cornwall’s health and reason.
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Instead, he is overcome; his language stops making sense and his actions become
increasingly bizarre as he threatens to “beat the drum” at Cornwall and Regan’s door
“Till it cry sleep to death” (7.275-276).
However, just because Shakespeare uses the language of contemporary
physiology to position the passions as forces that cannot necessarily be controlled, does
not mean that he positions Cornwall as an innocent victim of passion or acquits him for
his immoral behavior. While Cornwall’s reason is quick to curtsy to wrath, other
characters go to battle with their bodies, attempting to maintain agency over the
passions. Just as Lear becomes aware of the bodily passions overcoming his reason in
scene 7, he calls to out to his rising heart, attempting to stop the swell of passion from
it, prompting the fool to mock him with the metaphor of the eels. Again and again, Lear
fails to prevent the passions from overcoming his fragile body. However, he continues
to battle with passions for agency over his body. For example, at the end of scene 7,
after his daughters refuse to allow his men into Regan’s house, he begins to weep. He
can feel his humoral state changing, his body temperature dropping. He attempts to
avoid despair by harnessing the multiple contrasting passions into violent, choleric
vengeance:
You see me here, you gods, a poor old fellow,
As full of grief as age, wretched in both.
If it be you that stirs these daughters’ hearts
Against their father, fool me not so much
To bear it tamely. Touch me with noble anger.
O, let not women’s weapons, water-drops,
Stain my man’s cheeks! No, you unnatural hags,
I will have such revenges on you both
That all the world shall—I will do such things—
What they are yet I know not; but they shall be
The terrors of the earth. You think I’ll weep.
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No, I’ll not weep. (7.425-436)
He asks the gods for help to stop the melancholy from overcoming him. His natural
choleric state is threatened by this grief and he attempts to transform it into anger. Yet,
his grief and anger contradict one another and work against each other. His melancholy
makes him want to acquiesce to tears, become submissive and allow his daughter’s to
control him. His choler incites him to a rage which leads him to refuse to go into the
house on his daughter’s terms. Lear recognizes that attempting to fight against the
passions as they recompose his body’s humors is a dangerous task. He claims “I have
full cause of weeping but this heart/ Shall break into a hundred thousand flaws/ Or ere
I’ll weep. –O fool, I shall go mad” (7.437-9). The most common reading of Lear’s fear
of “heartbreak” understands it as an analogy for psychological anguish. In my next
chapter, I will return to this moment to argue for a literal reading. Lear, whose humoral
body is besieged by two contrasting emotions, fears that the organ of heart will
physically burst as a result of holding too many liquid humors. His heart remains intact
for the moment, but his fear of heartbreak foreshadows his death in the final scene.
Not only does Lear attempt to control his own passions, he consistently attempts
to control the passions of others. When Cordelia and Lear are reunited, Cordelia begins
to weep after seeing her father weak and mad. He recognizes the tears, the physical
manifestation of sorrow, as her love. He asks, “Be your tears wet?” (21.67). He cannot
believe that the only daughter who has cause to hate him is the only one who truly loves
him. Only after he touches Cordelia’s tears is Lear able to recognize her previously
unknowable interiority. He is taken aback by her love. Yet, his next command is to ask
her to control her embodied passions: “Yes, faith. I pray, weep not” (21.68). Again,
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Lear expresses the desire to control his tears to Cordelia in Scene 24, as they are both
being led to prison. For a second time, he constructs tears, the physical manifestation
of melancholy, as a sign of weakness. He sees that Cordelia is beginning to cry and
demands that she “Wipe thine eyes./ The goodyear shall devour ‘em, flesh and fell,/ Ere
they shall make us weep. We’ll see ‘em starve first” (24.23-5). He
equates his desire to refuse defeat by his evil daughters with his desire to control his
bodily affects and encourages Cordelia to manage her tears for the same purpose.
Albany demonstrates a similar ability to maintain rational control over the
passions as they possess his changing humoral body. He explains that he feels that his
body is possessed by passions and that his body wants to tear his wife to pieces:
Were't my fitness
To let these hands obey my blood,
They are apt enough to dislocate and tear
Thy flesh and bones. (16.61-65) 13
However, he manages to remain temperate. He (the rational Albany), not his wrath, is
in control of his hands, and therefore, he resists physically harming Gonoril. Ironically,
Gonoril resents Albany’s insistence on battling his violent passions. Rather than
encouraging Albany to become more temperate and controlled, she urges him to
become more choleric. She hurls a description of his dis-impassioned humoral body as
a brutal insult:
Milk-livered man,
That bear’st a cheek for blows, a head for wrongs,
Who hast not in thy brows an eye for discerning
Thine honour from thy suffering; (16.49-52)
According to Paster, early modern physiology understood the liver to be the seat of
13
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sexual passion and anger, both of which Gonoril accuses Albany of lacking
(Humoring the Body 37). However, she does not accept his milky liver as an excuse for
his passive behavior any more than Lady Macbeth does when she insults Macbeth for
being afraid to act (Macbeth 1.5.15). 14
If Albany and Cordelia can master their passions while mad Poor Tom, Lear,
Kent, Cornwall’s loyal servant and the evil Cornwall claim they cannot, where does
Shakespeare stand on the issue of biological determinism? Does power do curtsy to
wrath? Can anger have privilege? How strong is the relation between the cause
(multiple, conflicting and powerful passions) and the effect (a character’s actions)? As
Bamborough argued in 1952, the inability to manage passion with reason is central to
King Lear. However, what is distinctly absent from the play is Bamborough’s “perfect
formula for tragedy.” Shakespeare does not offer a linear narrative in which the hero is
infected by passion, overthrown by it, commits a sinful action, and finally suffers as a
result of passion. Instead, he disrupts this conventional account by creating characters
who experience conflicted passions which affect them in ambiguous ways. Some
passions lead to sin (like Cornwall’s wrath) and others to heroism (like the Servant’s
wrath). Some reason enables characters to be temperate and exemplary (like Cordelia’s
reason) while other reason justifies unforgivable acts (like Cornwall’s reason).
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Lai Sai Acón Chan points out, “Afraid that her husband’s nature ‘is too full o’th’milk
of human kindness’ (1.5.15) Lady Macbeth summons the ‘spirits/ That tend on mortal
thoughts’ ‘to unsex [her]/ And fill [me] from the crown to the toe top-full/ Of direst
cruelty! make thick [her] blood;/ Stop up the access and passage to re- morse,/ That no
compunctious visitings of nature/ Shake [her] fell purpose, nor keep peace between/ The
effect and it! Come to [her] woman’s breasts,/ And take [her] milk for gall’ (1.5.38-47).
Likewise, Goneril censures the ‘milky gentle- ness’ (1.4.295) of Albany and, in the
process, she is cursed with sterility” (48).

146
Throughout the play, Shakespeare’s treatment of the internal warfare between the
passions and reason is radically inconsistent. The play deeply engages with the debate
about the power of embodied passions but offers no conclusion.
Shakespeare breaks down the belief inherent to both Galenic humoralism and
contemporary neuroscience: physical material can govern our bodies against our will.
For Shakespeare, the issue of agency is far more complicated and narratively
compelling. Rather than imply that reason and passion are categorically distinct and
that people are responsible for actions initiated by one but not the other, Shakespeare
puts the forces of embodied passions and human agency in conversation and conflict.
He stages the autonomous forces of reason and multiple, contrasting passions in an
ongoing battle which takes place inside of the changing, conflicted, unpredictable
human body, a body which is indistinct from the material of affect.

CHAPTER FIVE
LITERAL HEARTBREAK
In the previous chapters, I have discussed how the understanding of emotion as
bodily material (the Galenic humors, being moved by passions and animal spirits, or
brain neurons, transmitting and reabsorbing neurotransmitters) affects the extent to
which we believe we can govern our emotional responses. In this chapter I look at the
most extreme cases of staged emotional materiality: the moments that characters die of
heartbreak. I began this study of heartbreak expecting to see concrete examples of the
emotional made material; nothing destroys the distinction between mind and body like
being physically killed by intense emotion. Surely, in order for emotion to be fatal, it
must be consubstantial with the body. I assumed that a close reading of breaking hearts
would challenge the thesis that I have supported over the last four chapters about how
both early modern writers and my contemporaries weave together “dualistic habits of
thought” and the monistic, materialistic language of either Galenic humoralism or
neurobiology to make sense of their emotional experiences. I expected to find the
narrative of emotion break down at the moment when the material organ of the humorally
overrun heart stops beating. However, what I found when I looked closely at these
moments was not a silencing of the dualist narrative. Instead, the narrative becomes
increasingly important.
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In this chapter I will discuss the ways that characters take control over their own
breaking hearts by managing their self-narratives and argue that the stories the characters
tell about what the materials in their bodies are doing not only determines how they
define what their emotions are, but also changes what the material of those emotions are
is able to do to the body.
Early Modern Meaning of Heartbreak
Heartbreak is traditionally understood as inherently metaphorical. The OED
defines heartbreak in immaterial terms: “Overwhelming, unbearable, or intense sorrow
or emotional distress, esp. as a result of bereavement or the end of a romantic
relationship; the fact or experience of having a broken heart” (OED). Certainly,
Shakespeare uses the notion of heartbreak in this way. Hamlet, describing his mother’s
rushed marriage to his uncle, concludes “It is not, nor it cannot come to good./ But break
my heart, for I must hold my tongue” (Hamlet 1.2.157-158). Coriolanus explains that he
sends his dear friend Menenius, away with a “cracked heart” (Coriolanus 5.3.9). In King
Lear, when Edgar discovers his father’s blindness and Lear’s madness, he says, “my
heart breaks at it” (King Lear 4.6.137). Of course, Hamlet, Coriolanus, and Edgar do not
mean to say that the actual organs of their heart are materially fractured; instead, they use
the notion of heartbreak to communicate their overwhelmingly painful sadness.
However, when Edgar describes his father’s death explaining, “his flawed heart,/
Alack, too weak the conflict to support!/ 'Twixt two extremes of passion, joy and
grief,/Burst smilingly,” he is no longer speaking metaphorically (King Lear 24.192).
Metaphor cannot explain what happens to tortured, old Gloucester as he recognizes
Edgar’s voice nor Lear as he cradles Cordelia’s corpse. In an alarming moment in the
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Winter’s Tale, when Paulina announces Hermione’s death, she screams out “Woe the
while!/ O, cut my lace, lest my heart, cracking it/ Break too” (3.2.170-173). Paulina must
cut the fabric over her breasts to prevent her expanding, overrun heart from cracking
against her bodice. She is not referring to a figurative heart, but to a materially expanding
organ. Why does the healthy, young Enobarbus suddenly die alone outside of Caesar’s
camp after abandoning Antony in Antony and Cleopatra? What kills Mamillius, the
young son of Leontes and Hermione, in The Winter’s Tale, Catherine’s sister in Love’s
Labour’s Lost, Montague’s wife in Romeo and Juliet, Desdemona’s father in Othello, or
Posthumus’s father and the homicidal Queen in Cymbeline? For these characters, the
experience of heartbreak is not metaphorical but is experienced as a physical bursting of
the heart, a somatic death as a result of overwhelming, embodied, material emotion. In
order to understand heartbreak in these instances, the trope must be opened up and
viewed as a literal, rather than figurative, breaking. 1
As Katherine Maus explains, “Renaissance speech habits can make it difficult to
know when … a bodily analogy is really an analogy; when we are dealing with metaphor
and when with a bare statement of fact” (196). This particular bodily analogy is
complicated by the fact that both early modern medical texts and fictional dramatic works
simultaneously use the word “heart” to discuss the physical organ and a person's inmost
being. Rather than distinguishing between these two meanings, anatomy, in its early
forms, tends to make the connection between body and soul literal, rather than one of

1

This is not to say that there is not room for fruitful readings of the metaphorical meaning
of heartbreak in Shakespeare’s work. For example, In “The Emotional Landscape of
King Lear,” Arthur Kirsch successfully argues, “The dramatization of the metaphor of a
breaking heart and its association with the extremity of dying are central to King Lear”
(155).
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mere analogy (Sugg 89). The notion that the soul is in someway located in the organ
of the heart dates to Aristotle. 2 While, in the Platonic tradition (represented by the works
of Ficino) the human soul was considered to be the connection between the higher realm
of God and mind with the lower realm of quality and matter (the body), in the
Aristotelian tradition (endorsed by Galenic medical writers) the human was thought of as
a body-soul composite (Carrera 15). Galen, in his On the Usefulness of the Parts of the
Body, claims, “The heart is, as it were, the hearthstone and source of the innate heat by
which the animal is governed” (292). Early modern Galenists continue to subscribe to
this notion of the heart. For example, 16th century theologian Philipp Melanchthon
explains, “The heart signifies not only the sensitive appetite, as they call it, but it means
the seat of all affections—love, hate, blasphemy, and incredulity” (108). French royal
surgeon Ambroise Paré describes the heart as:
The chiefe mansion of the Soul, the organ of the vitall faculty, the
beginning of life, the fountaine of the vitall spirits, & so consequently the
continuall nourisher of the vitall heate, the first living and last dying which
because it must have a naturall motion of it self, was made of a dense
solide and more compact substance than any other part of the body. (N6v) The
heart is the physical grounding of identity. It draws in all passions and holds the body’s
humors. Although Pare discusses the toughness of the material of the heart, it was
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For a detailed account of many contradictory readings of Aristotle’s placement of the
soul “in” the heart, see J.P. Anton’s “Heart and Soul in Aristotle,” Essays in Ancient
Greek Philosophy (1971). While he concludes that Aristotle certainly does not simply
locate the soul inside of the heart, he still asserts, “the soul as originating change and
controlling the life function is present in the heart in a way in which it is not present in
other organs” (337).
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also considered by anatomists, philosophers, theologians, and medical doctors to be a
particularly vulnerable organ. 3
Many of the medical and philosophical writers who added to the passions
discourse discuss the possibility of dying of a broken heart. For example, in The Castle of
Health Thomas Elyot opens his chapter “Of Dolor or Heaviness of Mind” by claiming
“There is noothinge more ennemye to lyfe, than sorowe, called also heavinesse” (Dii).
The popular French physician Jacques Ferrand, whose treatise on love melancholy was
translated into English in 1640, describes how the organ of the heart is literally expanded
and contracted by emotion. He explains, “In fact, each one of us experiences daily how
the heart squeezes up when we are sad or afraid, and how, on the contrary, it opens up
and dilates when there is joy and hope” (256). The London Bills of Mortality, weekly
municipal death records collected from 1603 onwards, document this belief in the power
of sorrow to cause death. “Between 1629 and 1660, the Bills record more than 350 deaths
from grief in the city” (Sullivan, “Shakespeare and the History of Heartbreak” 933).
Like Melanchthon, Thomas Wright describes the heart as “the peculiar place
where that Passions allodge” and describes how passions change the body (D1r). He
asserts:
Yet the Passions which [constrict] the heart, as fear, sadness, and
despayre, as they bring payne to the minde, so they are more dangerous to
the body; and commonly, men proove less harme in [illness], than in
these: and many have lost their lives with sadness and fear, but few, with
love and hope, except they changed themselves into heaviness and
despayre. (E7r)

3

For more about how the links between emotions and the heart developed between the
seventeenth and early twentieth centuries, see chapter 1, “Humours to Hormones,” of Fay
Bound Alberti’s Matters of the Heart (2010).
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Wright leaves an essential question open: What makes the hope turn into heaviness
and love into despair? What does the changing?
English physician Edward Jorden offers an unexpected answer in his discussion of
a common illness that specifically affects young girls and widows in his 1603 tract, A
Briefe Discourse of a Disease called the Suffocation of the Mother. 4 Like Burton, who
calls for melancholics to change their diet and exercise to rid themselves of melancholy,
and Ferrand, who advises the lovesick to mix herbal remedies in order to excrete their
excess humors, Jordan argues that the “mother” disease has “natural cause” and can be
cured by fasting and avoiding “mental perturbation.” Jorden criticizes Catholic priests
who improperly treat the disease as a manifestation of demonic possession and
ridiculously wave daggers over the bodies of the suffering woman to exorcize evil spirits.
However, as Jean E. Howard points out, Jordan’s mockery of the ineffectiveness of the
priests is hypocritical. Jorden, recognizing that “affections and perturbations of the mind”
affect disease, encourages “confirming the fantasies” of those suffering from “The
Mother” (G4r). 5 Jorden notes,

4

For a nuanced discussion of how “The Mother” participates in a larger discourse about
female hysteria, see Kaara L. Peterson’s Popular Medicine, Hysterical Disease, and
Social Controversy in Shakespeare.
5

Howard explains how Jordan hypocritically positions the physician’s trickery as useful
but the Papists’ trickery as sinful:
What separates Jorden from the Papists is his desire to help, and their lust
for power yet Jordan’s whole tract is part of a larger movement to take
power over men and women’s bodies from the hands of cunning women
and mid-wives and village healers and to vest it in the hands of the men of
the College of Physicians to whom he dedicated his tract, just as it is part
of the larger movement to take control over men and women’s souls from
the godless Papists and to vest it in the hands of the godly Protestants. All
may have recourse at times to tricks, disguises, and theatrical deceits, but
only some can do so “legitimately,” i.e. without being branded as mere
powerhungry tricksters. (3)
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Galen boasteth that he did every yeare cure many diseases by this
stratagem of moderating the perturbations of the mind by the example of
Aesenlapins who devised many songs and ridiculous pastimes for that
purpose. To which end also other phisitions have used divers sorts of
fallacies to encounter the melancholike conceits of their patients. (G4r)
Like the dagger waving priests whom he ridicules, Jordan’s chief source and anatomical
idol, Galen, engaged in overdramatic performances to make his patients believe that they
were cured of their diseases.
Jordan goes on to describe tricks that successful physicians have played on their
patients in order to heal them. A woman who “imagined” that the devil was the cause of
her illness was suddenly cured when her son made her believe that he looked into her
mirror and saw a large devil drive three smaller devils out of her (G4r). Another woman
stopped suffering when a physician put nails, needles, feathers “and such like things”
inside her “close stoole” and made her believe that they came out of her body (G4v).
Finally he describes a traditional prodigal son story.
A young man falling out of favour with his father, fell therupon into the
fits of the falling sickness, and continued long and often molested there
with, untill a reconciliation was wrought with his father: who sending him
a kind letter to that effect, the young man was presently delivered from
that fearful disease. (H1r)
These are three very different case studies. One patient is told a fictional, superstitious
story about devils leaving her body, one is provided with falsified ocular proof of a
medical extraction of the cause of her ills, and one is physically cured by the real
acceptance of his father’s love. The one thing that all of these patients have in common
is that they are able to use their experience to change their personal narratives about their
bodies.
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According to Jorden, these diseases are not cured by the remedies but by the
ill person’s belief in them. Interestingly, Jordan draws no distinction between the belief
in possession (which entails a belief in losing body and soul to the devil), the belief that
one excretes nails and feathers, or the belief in a father’s love. Despite the radically
different pains that they suffered and the difference in the stories that they were told, they
all are able to change their narratives about their unified body/self; this change in
narrative enables their bodies to materially heal. Jordan concludes his tract by asserting:
And it is no marvel that the affections of the mind doe beare such rule in
this disease, seeing we doe observe that most commonly besides the
indisposition of the bodie: here is also some Melancholike or capricious
conceit joyned withall of love, feare, hatred, jealousie, discontentment,
witchcraft, poysoning, &c. which being policie or good instructions and
perswasions removed, the disease is easily overcome. (H1v)
According to Jordan, affections certainly have control over the body, but good
instructions and persuasions can also heal the body. Jordan is specifically interested in
how the mind can be changed by narrative. Since, for Jordan, emotional pain is physical
pain, he understands that when a person changes the story that they tell themselves about
who they are and what their bodies feel, they can either inflict disease upon themselves or
purge their bodies of that same disease.
Heartbreak in the 21st Century
In the early modern period, all disease involves both the body and mind. Now, as
neuroscientists take new approaches to studying psychosomatic disorders (diseases of the
body caused by the mind), the dualist distinction between the experiences of emotional
and physical pain is becoming blurred. Ethan Kross, lead researcher and an assistant
professor of psychology at the University of Michigan, takes on this question in his 2011
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study, “Social Rejection Shares Somatosensory Representations with Physical Pain.”
He describes two painful experiences. In one scenario, Kross spills hot coffee on his arm;
in another he views a photo of a beloved former romantic partner, which makes him feel
rejected. Both experiences are described with words like “hurt” or “pain” but are distinct
(Kross et al. 6271). To explore the connection between these different forms of pain, he
recruited 40 individuals who recently experienced an unwanted romantic relationship
break-up to perform tasks that stimulated both types of pain. The participants underwent
fMRI scans (which measure neural activity by tracking changes in blood flow) during
four tasks. He tested two types of physical pain: “Hot trials, in which participants
experienced noxious thermal stimulation on their left forearm, and Warm trials, in which
participants experienced non-noxious thermal stimulation in the same area” (Kross et al.
6271). To test the pain of emotional rejection, participants viewed a pair of headshots. In
the “Rejection trails” they were asked to think about a specific rejection experience while
looking at a picture of a former romantic partner. In the “Friend trials” participants
viewed a headshot of a friend who was the same sex as their ex-partner and thought about
a recent positive experience they shared with that person” (Kross et al. 6271). The fMRI
scans showed that during both the “Hot trial” and the “Rejection trial” there was an
identical change in brain activity. Both showed “increases in thalamus and right parietal
opercular/insular cortex” (6272). The brain was materially altered by both the physically
painful and emotionally painful experiences in the same way. Kross concluded,
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“Rejection and physical pain are similar not only in that they are both distressing-they share a common somatosensory representation as well” (6271). 6
In an interview about this influential study Kross claims, “Heartache and painful
breakups are more than just metaphors” (McMillen 1). This conclusion is increasingly
becoming a commonplace among researchers. In fact, according to Kyung Bong Koh, a
psychiatrist and researcher at Yonsei University College of Medicine, it is no longer
hyperbolic to discuss the literally broken heart. Psychosomatic illnesses can manifest
themselves in many ways and depression is an established risk factor for coronary heart
disease (Bong Koh 191). For example, Takotsubo cardiomyopathy, a sudden weakening
of the muscle of the heart, can be instigated by emotional stress. Since the people who
suffer from this disease are frequently mourning the death of a loved one, it is popularly
referred to as “the broken heart syndrome.”
As emerging studies like Kross’s demonstrate that the brain processes emotional
and physical pain in the same way, clinicians are becoming increasingly interested in how
patients can control self-narrative in order to manage pain. After all, Kross’s trial
participants experienced pain while looking at the picture of a former lover but did not
while looking at the picture of a friend. It is not the act of looking at headshots that is
painful; it is the fact that each image visually and instantaneously communicates a preexisting narrative. Each participant has already constructed a story about the person in
each headshot; it is this story that materially changes the brain. E.O Wilson, a Pulitzer
prize winning biologist, addresses the ways in which brain processes rely on narrative:

6

For more somatosensory representation see James R. Augustine’s Human
Neuroanatomy, section 8.2.5 (135-136).
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With new tools and models, neuroscientists have joined cognitive
psychologists in drawing closer to an understanding of the conscious mind
as a narrative generator. Working on the same questions from different
perspectives, neuroscientists, cognitive psychologists, and even
evolutionary biologists are converging on a common theory of the brain: It
develops stories to filter and make sense of the flood of information that
we are exposed to every day. (10)
Like the Galenists, who imagine the passions and imaginations as autonomous forces,
Wilson imagines the brain acting as an agent as it frantically creates these narratives.
According to Wilson, we cannot have conscious control over these stories. In her article,
“The Brain Basis of Emotion,” Harvard neurologist Kristen Lindquist similarly describes
the brain’s method of processing information:
Only some of the wavelengths of light striking our retinas are transformed
into seen objects, only some of the changes in air pressure registered in
our ears are heard as words or music, and only some bodily changes are
experienced as emotion. To categorize something is to render it
meaningful. It then becomes possible to make reasonable inferences about
that thing, to predict what to do with it, and to communicate our
experience of it to others. There are ongoing debates about how
categorization works, but the fact that it works is not in question.
(Lindquist 124)
If we do not even understand how the brain categorizes information into narrative, how
can we take control over that narrative in order to manage and control the ways we
experience emotion? Nataša Jokić-Begić, professor of Humanities and Social Sciences at
University of Zagreb, Croatia, offers a potential solution: cognitive-behavioral therapy.
“Cognitive-behavioral therapies combine two different theoretical and therapeutic
approaches resulting from two different, but complementary paradigms of human nature
and psychopathology” (Jokić-Begić 236). She cites research that supports her claim:
when cognitive-behavioral therapy encourages people to change the story that they tell
themselves about who they are, it also changes their neurobiology. She argues,
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Cognitive activity may be changed, as shown by therapeutic success
achieved by metacognitive and mindfulness techniques, which also have
their neurobiological correlates in the changes occurring in the cortical and
subcortical structures and endocrine and immune systems. The empirical
research also shows that neurobiological changes occur after CBT
[Cognitive-behavioral therapies] in patients with arachnophobia,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, social phobia, major
depressive disorder and chronic fatigue syndrome. (237)
Like Jordan, who alleviated the suffering of his patients by enabling them to tell new
stories about their bodies, Jokić-Begić argues that a change in narrative can become a
change in body.
Staging Heartbreak
This neurobiological explanation about material changes, which occur in a body
after a change in self-narrative, can open a new way of understanding how the original
early modern audience might have interpreted dramatic characters’ heartbreaks. For
example, it can open a new reading of Falstaff’s death in Henry V. According to the
Hostess, “The King has killed [Falstaff’s] heart” (2.1.79). Nim explains Falstaff’s malady
by suggesting, “The King hath run bad humors on the knight, that's the even of it”
(2.1.110). Pistol agrees, claiming, “His heart is fracted and corroborate” (2.1.110). Is the
dying Falstaff’s heart metaphorically or literally broken? The non-dualist approach to
social rejection, which both neuroscientists like Kross and Galenists like Jordan
understand as a material change in the body, allows for both readings to be
simultaneously true. The change in self-narrative, which Hal’s rejection has forced upon
Falstaff, materially alters his body and also alters the emotional core of his being.
Shakespeare does not stage Falstaff’s death, so the audience cannot know how the
heartbroken Falstaff makes sense of his own painful experience. All we know is that, on
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his deathbed, Falstaff calls for both God and sack, suggesting that he maintains his
belief in the spiritually curative powers of a good drink up until the very end.
In All is True aka Henry VIII, Queen Katherine, like Falstaff, dies offstage after
she is forced to change her self-narrative against her will. King Henry metaphorically
breaks Katherine’s heart when he divorces her. This divorce does not only change the
story she tells about her relationship, it changes the story she tells herself about who she
is and what she is capable of. Initially, she describes herself as an agent who is fully in
command over her emotional body. During her abortive trial she imagines taking control
over the material substance of her embodied emotion; she responds to the king’s rejection
by claiming, “my drops of tears I’ll turn to sparks of fire” (2.4.7). She asserts that she will
turn her melancholic grief into choleric rage. However, later, she expresses less lively
confidence as she describes how the weight and “the burden of my sorrows” have grown
(3.1.110). She despairingly tells the manipulative Wolsey and Campeius, that “Like the
lily, / That once was mistress of the field and flourished, / I’ll hang my head and perish”
(3.1.110, 150-152). Campeius and Wolsey, trying to convince Katherine to accept the
terms of the divorce, treat her despair as a weakness; they tell her that she ought to have
more control over her passions. Campeius condescendingly claims that her concerns
about what will happen to her are “weak women's fears” which she ought to be able to
ignore (3.2.167). Wolsey explains that he is confident she will be able to master her
“stubborn spirits” and tells her, “I know you have a gentle, noble temper,/ A soul as even
as a calm” (3.2.165-166). Campeius makes the same claim about her ability to manage
irrational passions: “A noble spirit,/ As yours was put into you, ever casts/ Such doubts,
as false coin, from it” (3.2.168-170). Like Jonson’s Doctor Clement, who scolds Lorenzo
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Senior for his melancholy, they tell Katherine to manage her suffering body by
controlling her self-narrative. However, while they frame her despondency as a lack of
self-control, Katherine frames it as a choice. When she explains that she will hang her
head and perish, she imagines her rational, conscious self as the agent of this perishing.
She willfully constructs the narrative that ultimately leads to her demise.
Soon after, Katherine’s servants, Patience and Griffith note how Katherine’s
emotional suffering changes her body:
Do you note
How much her grace is altered on the sudden? How
long her face is drawn? How pale she looks, And of
an earthy colour? Mark her eyes? (4.2.96-99)
The excess of humoral melancholy in her body causes the “earthy colour” to
come over her body. When Caputius brings a message from the king who “grieves
much for your weakness,” Katherine explains,
O my good lord, that comfort comes too late;
'Tis like a pardon after execution:
That gentle physic, given in time, had cured me;
But now I am past all comforts here, but prayers. (4.2.121-124)
Like Jordan’s patients who are cured simply by being able to believe stories, Katherine
equates the kind words (from the man she still recognizes as her husband) with medicine.
However, her body, which processes her grief and anger as it would a physical disease, is
already too damaged. Like Falstaff after Hal’s rejection, Katherine is unable to reconcile
her self-narrative with the circumstances of her divorce. Her heart, both her literal life
giving organ and symbolic emotional center of self, becomes weakened. After blessing
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her husband and explaining how she wishes to be posthumously respected, she is led
offstage to die. 7
John Ford’s The Broken Heart stands out as an examination of the narratives
surrounding both metaphoric and literal heartbreaks. Ford fills the play with many
discussions of figurative heartbreak. However, Ford complicates the heartbreak
metaphor in the final scene, which stages and describes in great detail the moment that
the heroine’s material heart-strings literally crack. The dark tone of the play is set in the
opening scene when Orgilus mournfully reveals that the woman he loves, Penthea, has
been forced to marry Bassanes, a wealthy man, by her brother, Ithocles. Orgilus
physically feels the weight of his sorrow and explains to his sister, “Souls sunk in
sorrows never are without 'em./ They change fresh airs, but bear their griefs about 'em”
(1.1.116-117). Soon after, he feels a fresh pain, when he overhears that same sister
exchanging love vows with Prophilus, who is close friends with Ithocles. He feels
betrayed and describes this emotional assault as a material torture of the organ of his
heart: “Passion, O, be contain'd! My very heart-strings/ Are on the tenters” (1.3.91-92).
For Orgilus, emotional pain is physical pain. Yet, although he claims that he would
welcome the relief of death, his wracked heart-strings do not actually break.
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Katherine’s heart does not break on the stage but Shakespeare strongly implies that her
sorrow will kill her. As Sullivan points out:
Although the idea of a broken heart may conjure up a sense of sudden
acute pain that places great stress on the organ and quickly damages it,
medical and literary writings emphasized that illness from sorrow often
took hold gradually, slowly drying the body of moisture and causing it to
wither away, which speeded up the natural process of aging…
Shakespeare’s plays echo this sentiment, suggesting that sorrow, like age,
saps the body of its moisture. (“A Disease Unto Death” 166-167)
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Penthea is also very vocal about her despair. After Ithocles forces her to
marry Bassanes and she is “Compell'd to yield her virgin freedom up/ To him who never
can usurp her heart,” she feels that she is no longer worthy of Orgilus’s love (1.1.51-52).
Her sadness is written on her face, and before she even speaks, everyone who sees her is
immediately able to recognize her internal suffering. Bassanes, her husband, tells her
“This sadness, sweetest,/ Becomes not youthful blood,” and begs her “For my sake put
on a more cheerful mirth;/ Thou 'lt mar thy cheeks, and make me old in griefs” (2.1.115118). 8 His request reveals that Bassanes, like Campeius and Wolsey, believes Penthea is
in control of her self-narrative and that she ought to be able to “put on” a less
despondent mood. However, Penthea, like Katherine, refuses to change her destructive
self-narrative. Her passions cause her pain and will not even pretend to be anything other
than despondent.
To what extent is Penthea actually in control of this sadness? The question of her
emotional agency is complicated. She explains, “I have not given admittance to one
thought/ Of female change since cruelty enforc’d/ Divorce betwixt my body and my
heart” (1.3.56-58). Here, she imagines her body dissected and depicts her heart, the seat
of her emotion, to be a separate entity from the rest of her material body; her body has
been touched and consumed by her husband (who she does not love), but Penthea
8

Sullivan notes that “The emphasis on the dryness of both sorrow and aging leads to a
strong correlation between the process of growing old and that of grieving in many of
Shakespeare’s works (“A Disease Unto Death” 167). She provides many examples of
Shakespeare equating sorrow and age: The Nurse, in Romeo and Juliet claims “These
griefs, these woes, these sorrows make me old” (3.2.89); In Richard III the Duchess of
York tells Richard, “Either thou wilt die by God’s just ordinance… Or I with grief and
extreme age shall perish” (4.4.184, 86); Egeon, in The Comedy of Errors, explains to his
son that he may not recognize him because “grief hath changed me since you saw me
last,/ And careful hours with time’s deformed hand/ Have written strange defeatures in
my face” (5.1.298-300).
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describes her heart as an immaterial part of herself that has not been soiled by marital
rape. Penthea use the word “heart” as a different metaphor when she explains to her
brother’s love interest, Calantha, “'Tis long agone since first I lost my heart./ Long I have
liv'd without it” (3.4.72-73). Of course, Penthea speaks figuratively; she has not lived
without her life-giving organ. When she describes her heart as lost, she refers to her lost
virginal identity, which was stripped from her the moment she was forced to enter into
the marriage contract. Yet, neither Penthea’s shame of her union with Bassanes,
unrequited love for Orgilus, or anger at Ithocles is strong enough a material force to kill
her. In fact, she is able to forgive her brother and claims that she will even help him
court his beloved Calantha on one condition: “If sorrows/ Have not too much dull’d my
infected brain/ I'll cheer invention for an active strain” (3.2.137). Clearly, her brain is not
“too much dull’d” by sorrows, because in the next scene she approaches Calantha on
Ithocles’s behalf with a set strategy. Penthea tells Calantha that if Calantha cannot love
Ithocles, he will die of a broken-heart. Cunningly, Penthea explains,
But if you please to kill him,
Lend him one angry look or one harsh word,
And you shall soon conclude how strong a power
Your absolute authority holds over
His life and end. (3.5.100-104)
At this point in the play, it is easy to make the case that Penthea uses hyperbole as a
manipulative ploy to encourage Calantha to consider Ithocles’s proposal. Ford seems to
be mocking the notion that Calantha could ever kill Itholces with a simple rejection. This
is reminiscent of the mock-courtship scene in Shakespeare’s As You Like It. Rosalind
ridicules the lovelorn Orlando when he exclaims that his lover’s frown might kill him.
Surely, like Rosalind’s frown, Calantha’s “will not kill a fly” (As You Like It 4.5.95). The
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absurdity of the notion that Ithocles could die as a result of lovesickness is
emphasized by the fact that Ithocles has already claimed to be broken hearted over
Penthea’s fate. He deeply regrets forcing her to marry against her will and takes full
responsibility for his sister’s broken heart. He describes how his lack of humoral
control led to his decision to force Penthea to marry. He confesses,
Sad Penthea,
Thou canst not be too cruel; my rash spleen
Hath with a violent hand pluck’d from thy bosom
A love-blest heart, to grind it into dust
For which mine’s now a-breaking. (3.2.42-46)
Yet, his breaking heart is still able to perform its function and continues to produce
overwhelming passions that consume his body in love for Calantha. Although he
physically feels the agony of his shame and “sweats in blood,” regretting his horrible
treatment of his sister, he is unable to actually die as a result of this emotion: “I consume/
In languishing affections for that trespass; Yet cannot die” (3.2.52-53). Furthermore,
Ithocles soon survives the news of his own sister’s death. Surely, if he can outlive that
emotional assault, he can survive an angry look from Calantha, a woman who he barely
knows.
Like her brother, Penthea cannot die of a broken heart. She calls for death after
fulfilling her last promise to her brother: “My reckonings are made even. Death or fate/
Can now not strike too soon, nor force too late” (3.5.111-112). Yet, her waning animal
spirit continues to animate her frail, shrinking body. Finally, she must take action. Much
to the dismay of the other characters, she refuses to eat and finally succeeds in starving
herself to death. Ford makes it clear that Penthea consciously chooses to starve herself
and that her free will, not her humors or passions, is the agent of her death. Upon
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learning of her death, Calantha speaks about Penthea’s death as a victory, claiming,
“She's happy; she hath finish’d/ A long and painful progress” (5.2.39).
By the end of the play, all of the metaphorically heartbroken characters (Penthea,
Orgilus, and Ithocles) die. But, as Shakespeare’s Rosalind would be quick to point out,
“there was not any man died in his own person,/ videlicit, in a love-cause” (4.5.92). Like
the famous heartbroken lover Troilus, who “had his brains dashed out with a Grecian
club,” and Leander, who Rosalind insists “would have lived many a fair year, though
Hero had turned nun” if it had not been for a fatal foot cramp, Ford’s characters do not
die of their broken hearts. Penthea dies, not of heart-burst, but of anorexia. 9 Ithocles
dies, not as a result of a harsh look from his lover or grief for his sister, but at the edge
of Orgilus’s sword. Orgilus’s heart does not spontaneously combust after he learns of
Penthea’s starvation. Instead, he willingly commits suicide; as he slits his wrist, he
explains to his friends and to the audience, “I show cunning/ In opening of a vein too
full, too lively” (5.2.122-123). The narrative producing, conscious, reasoning wills of
Penthea and Orgilus bring about these deaths, not the overwhelming power of a
material emotion. However, in the final scene Ford contrasts his figurative descriptions
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Nancy A. Gutierrez reads Penthea’s anorexia as both a social and political act. She
convincingly argues that starvation becomes a way for early modern women to command
control over their bodies and their social power in “‘Starved! starved!’: Anatomy and
Food Refusal in John Ford’s The Broken Heart,” in Shall She Famish Then?: Female
Food Refusal in Early Modern England.

of heartbreak with Calantha’s literal heartbreak.
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Of all the characters in The Broken Heart, Calantha seems the least likely to be
killed by overwhelming emotion. She is consistently portrayed as a model of
temperance. When Ford first introduces Calantha, her father praises her “moderation,/
Calmness of nature, measure, bounds, and limits/ Of thankfulness and joy” (2.35-36). In
fact, it is her excessive rationality, not her excessive passion that initially shocks the other
characters when she learns about the deaths of her loved ones. In act 5, Calantha dances,
preparing for her wedding feast. During her dance, characters enter, one by one,
revealing horrifying news. First, she learns of her father’s death, then of Penthea’s
starvation, and finally of the murder of her betrothed husband, Ithocles. Everyone
expects her to break down, but she amazes both the audience and the other characters
by continuing to dance. Armostes, her councilor, asks “Is’t possible?” Bassanes
exclaims, “Amazement dulls my senses,” and Orgilus, who hears Calantha call for more
music after he confesses to murdering her betrothed lover, stammers, “I am
thunderstruck” (5.2.12-22). Calantha’s only reference to her heart is to ask her musicians
to play a song with a faster temper to match her quickened heartbeat: “How dull this
music sounds! Strike up more sprightly; Our footings are not active like our heart, Which
treads the nimbler measure” (5.2.21-22). After concluding the dance, she pragmatically
discusses the implications of each death. She recognizes that her father’s death means
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Donald K. Anderson notes that Ford's use of the heart in The Broken Heart and ’Tis
Pity She’s a Whore reveals “imagery that not only is sustained but also progresses from
the figurative to the literal” (209). In ’Tis Pity, Annabella’s heart is literally torn out
because she defies society. However, Calantha, who yields to society, also has her heart
physically broken. According to Anderson, Ford’s message, in these two plays as well
as The Golden Meane and The Sun’s Darling is that “the pleasures of this life must be
neither shunned nor abused” (217).

167
that she is now queen, describes Penthea’s death as a victory, and calmly sentences
Orgilus to death for murdering Ithocles. Like Shakespeare’s Macbeth, who stoically
states, “She should have died hereafter” upon learning of his wife’s suicide, Calantha
appears callously indifferent (Macbeth 5.5.17). Before exiting, she coldly states, “Those
that are dead are dead. Had they not now died, of necessity they must have paid the debt
they ow’d to nature, one time or other” (5.2.90). Armostes comments, “Tis strange these
tragedies should never touch on her female pity” (5.2.95). Bassanes finds her unfeeling
response less strange than inspirational and commendable:
She has a masculine spirit;
And wherefore should I pule, and, like a girl, Put
finger in the eye? Let's be all toughness, Without
distinction betwixt sex and sex. (5.2.95)
Bassanes imagines her “masculine” response as superior to the “girlish” response that
he feels himself. Therefore, they are all further shocked in the next scene when
Calantha claims,
A woman has enough to govern wisely
Her own demeanors, passions, and divisions.
A nation warlike and inur’d to practice
Of policy and labour cannot brook
A feminate authority. (5.3.9-12)
Armostes refutes her, claim. After witnessing her govern her own “demeanors,
passions, and divisions” so stoically, he is confident that he can trust her leadership
abilities. He explains, “We have seen tokens/ Of constancy too lately to mistrust it”
(5.3.16-17). Her emotionless, “masculine” response to the overwhelming news of so
much death gives her authority over the men who might otherwise agree with her claim
that a nation cannot be governed by a female leader.
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After a long deliberation about inheritance and legal domains, Calantha undergoes
a sudden transformation. Placing her ring on the finger of Ithocles’s corpse, she reveals
what her intentions have been all along: “Thus I new-marry him whose wife I am; Death
shall not separate us” (5.3.66). She then tells the story that she has kept silent since the
deaths of her father, friend, and husband were first revealed:
O, my lords,
I but deceiv’d your eyes with antic gesture,
When one news straight came huddling on another
Of death! and death! and death! still I danced forward;
But it struck home, and here, and in an instant. (5.3.66-70)
Although she has maintained her composure for a full act, she reveals that it was a
facade, an icy mask hiding internal chaos. She describes the moment that the material
substance of humoral sorrow struck her directly “here” (pointing to her heart) “in an
instant.” Unlike Penthea, whose diminished, failing body makes her interiority visible
to the other characters, the internal workings of Calantha’s body remain not only
unpredictable, but wrongly predicted. The revelation that her heart has been broken all
this while is much more shocking than her composure in the earlier scene (which her
kinsmen initially misinterpreted as indifference). She becomes a bizarre and grotesque
paradox; she is at once the dancing body of the calm, “masculine” queen, and the fatally
wounded body containing an unsustainably shattered heart.
Calantha goes on to belittle women who do not hide their suffering: “Be such
mere women, who with shrieks and outcries/ Can vow a present end to all their sorrows,/
Yet live to court new pleasures, and outlive them” (5.3.71-73). This reminds the
audience of the many “shrieks and outcries” that we have heard earlier in the play. Of
course, many of these shriekers were not women. For example, Calantha’s beloved
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Ithocles certainly “outcried” about his sorrow and guilt after forcing his sister into a
fatally unhappy marriage. Yet, he lived to court the pleasure of Calantha’s love. By
distinguishing herself from the “mere women” who can purge their sorrows by
expressing them, Calantha suggests that communicating sorrow is a choice, and by
suffering silently, she suffers more.
She concludes by claiming, “They are the silent griefs which cut the heart-strings;
Let me die smiling” (5.3.74-75). This is a contradictory claim. On one hand, she is
asserting that her grief is fatal because it is silent. However, it is only after she
intentionally crafts and verbally expresses a narrative about the grief cutting her heartstrings that she actually dies. She gives Ithocles’s corpse “One kiss on these cold lips, my
last!” and then says her final words: “Crack, crack! —Argos now 's Sparta's king. —
Command the voices/ Which wait at th’ altar now to sing the song/ I fitted for my end”
(5.3.76-79). By calling for the song, she reveals that she has carefully orchestrated her
death. She must have known that she wanted to die in this place and at this moment for a
long enough time to choose the song that her servants would sing for her final moments.
With her words, “crack, crack,” she gives a narrative voice to those “silent griefs” and
makes audible the inaudible noise of heart-strings breaking. Even as the strings of her
heart literally crack, she never loses control over her self-narrative. It is as if Calantha,
the story telling agent, and Calantha’s humoral body conspire to cause her death. The
physical pain of the overwhelming sorrow in her heart is not enough. She has to make
sense of the bodily sensation; only through the process of telling the story of her heartstrings cracking and giving the silent bodily events a narrative does she die. Even in this
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moment of heartbreak, the quintessential example of the oneness of body and mind,
there emerges an autonomous self who maintains agency over the narrative.
Cynthia Marshall also closely reads Calantha’s death in order to explore what
early modern depictions of heartbreak can tell us about the emergence of a modern
autonomous self. However, while I argue that Calantha’s heartbreak reveals how the
developing idea of subjectivity interacts and coexists with the literally fluid self, derived
from humoralism, Marshall is interested in how a heartbreaking work about heartbreak,
like Ford’s, “shatters the repose of viewers or readers” (2). Building on Greenblatt’s
theory that early modern cultural forces promoted an ideology of autonomous
individuality, Marshall focuses on the conflict between the notion of the humoral self and
the autonomous subject. She claims that autonomy aroused anxiety and fear because
“there existed a well-established notion of individuality as both morally and ontologically
suspect” (2). Therefore, the “aesthetic of shattering or self-negation took hold” of the
early modern stage as a “counterforce to the nascent ethos of individualism” (Marshall 2).
I find her reading very compelling and agree with her central claim:
An emergent sense of the autonomous self, individually operative as never
before in the spheres of politics, religion, and commerce, existed in
tension with an established popular sense of the self as fluid, unstable, and
volatile. (4)
However, Marshall argues that violent Renaissance texts disperse— rather than affirm or
stabilize—a sense of selfhood. According to Marshall’s reading of The Broken Heart,
Ford’s intention is not to purge his viewers of passions. Instead, “the play encourages
temporary eradication ... of the bounds of the self” and thereby helps playgoers achieve
“a kind of mastery through submission to suffering” similar to that experienced by

171
characters in the play (Marshall 157). However, I argue that Calantha is not submitting to
suffering. Rather, she is using her agency to control and manage the material stuff of her
suffering body. Calantha’s autonomous heartbreak does not destroy the notion of an
abstracted selfhood as Marshall attests. For Calantha, fatal heartbreak is not sudden and
spontaneous. Instead, her death is a desired and carefully orchestrated event. Although
the play seems to indicate an irreducibly physical aspect to the “self,” it also affirms that
Calantha has an abstracted agency that is in control of her life narrative. Calantha is not
merely the balance of her humoral fluids nor is she an individual agent, free of the
bounds of her body and its passions; Calantha is the stories she tells about what her body
does.
Shakespearian Heartbreak
As I argue in chapter four, Shakespeare’s treatment of the internal warfare
between embodied passions and conscious agency is inconsistent. Frequently, the
stories that Shakespeare’s characters tell about their material emotions and the actions of
their bodies do not correspond; not everyone who wants to die of a broken heart actually
does. Many characters will their hearts to literally break to no avail. Near the end of King
Lear, when Edgar recounts the story of his father’s death via heartbreak, he futilely cries
out “O, that my heart would burst!” (5.3.181). In Romeo and Juliet, the passionate Juliet
commands her metaphorically broken heart to literally break after she learns the Romeo
has killed Tybalt: “O, break, my heart! poor bankrupt, break at once!” (3.2.57). In The
Tragedy of King Richard the Third, Queen Elizabeth attempts to take control over her
material heart by telling the story of her grief. As she mourns the death of the young
princes, Richard, speaking metaphorically, demands, “Harp not on that string, madam.
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That is past” (4.4.295). He wants her to change her narrative. Elizabeth refuses and
redefines his metaphor making the “string” not that of an instrument but that of her own
heart-string; she defiantly states “Harp on it still shall I till heart-strings break” (4.4.295).
This harping becomes more than a metaphor because, through the process of speaking,
she narrates her emotional pain as it is felt materially in her body. Both her embodied
humoral grief and the story she tells herself about her grief, are literally rubbing her
heart-strings raw. However, though she continues to speak, her worn, wracked heartstrings do not crack as Calantha’s do.
In Henry VI part 3, Queen Margaret is intensely aware of the power that she has
over the narrative of her own heartbreak. After she watches her enemies stab her son to
death, she begs them “O, kill me too!” and faints, materially overwhelmed by the horrific
emotion (5.5.42). When she awakes, being denied her request, she rails against her son’s
killers, failing to find words harsh enough for them. “What's worse than murderer, that I
may name it?” she asks (5.5.57). Then, in a moment of self-preservation, she pauses her
tirade, saying, “No, no, my heart will burst, and if I speak” (5.5.58). Immediately, she
changes her mind, defiantly stating, “And I will speak, that so my heart may burst”
(5.5.59). However, unlike Calantha’s, Margaret’s metaphorical heartbreak does not
become literal. Katharina of Shakespeare’s Taming of the Shrew takes a different
approach to narration and heartbreak. She isn’t concerned that her heart will break
because she shares her story. Instead, Like Calantha, who claims that it is the silent
sorrows that kill, she is concerned that being silenced by the husband who “means to
make a puppet” of her is not just frustrating; it is physically dangerous. She claims, “My

173
tongue will tell the anger of my heart,/ Or else my heart concealing it will break”
(4.3.76-77).
In her essay “A Disease Unto Death,” which illustrates “how strongly many
people living in and around the time of Shakespeare believed sadness to be a damaging,
debilitating, and even deadly force,” Sullivan argues that Shakespeare frequently
emphasizes “the importance of actively expressing sorrow, whether in the form of words,
actions, tears or all three” in order to mitigate or control their grief and preserve their
bodily health (181, 177). She points to Marcus’s response to finding Lavinia after her
brutal rape and mutilation in Titus Andronicus. When he asks her who has done this to
her, she is unable to respond; her tongue has been cut out of her mouth by her attackers.
He says,
O that I knew thy heart, and knew the beast,
That I might rail at him to ease my mind!
Sorrow concealed, like an oven stopped,
Doth burn the heart to cinders where it is. (2.4.34-37)
Sullivan correctly reads this passage as Marcus’s desire to use words to alleviate his
suffering. However, though Marcus does continue to conceal his sorrow, his heart does
not dry up with grief. I argue that using words to narrate the tangible pain of an emotional
experience is not necessarily a way of humorally purging. Both Marcus and the literally
silenced Lavinia, like the shrieking women who Calantha belittles, live (at least for a
time) to court new pleasures. The characters who actually die as a result of heartbreak on
Shakespeare’s stage are not those who remain silent; it is not the inability to emotionally
purge that breaks the heart. Instead, characters use the power of narrative not to cleanse
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themselves of passions but to make sense of their passions. Thereby, they use their
narrative agency to will their hearts to break.
In Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare stages the moment that Enobarbus dies as a
result of his overpowering emotion. After he deserts his friend Antony, Enobarbus is
overwhelmed with guilt. He claims, “I am alone the villain of the earth,/ And feel I am so
most” (4.8.30-31). This shame materially changes him: “This blows my heart./ If swift
thought break it not, a swifter mean/ Shall outstrike thought” (4.8.34-36). 11 His heart is
so swollen with the humoral stuff of passion that he expects to be able to break it with
just a thought. He is certainly willing to commit suicide, but unlike Ford’s metaphorically
heartbroken Orgilus who ends his life by slitting his wrists, Enobarbus knows that just
feeling his self-hatred will be enough to kill him; “Thought will do’t, I feel,” he claims
(4.8.36). He simultaneously gives both himself (the thinker) and the thought (an
embodied material force) agency over his life. With his “blown” heart still intact, he
wanders off stage, seeking out “some ditch wherein to die” (4.8.38).
Elyot describes the drying and cooling effect that “heaviness of the mind” has on
the body: “it exhausteth bothe naturall heate and moysture of the bodye, and dothe
extenuate or make the body leane, dulleth the wyt, and darkeneth the spirittes, letteth the

11

Shakespeare elsewhere supports Enobarbus’s notion that grief can be enough to break a
heart. In Much Ado About Nothing, Leonato bids his daughter, Hero, to die from her
shame when Claudio accuses her of adultery on her wedding day:
Do not live, Hero, do not ope thine eyes,
For did I think thou wouldst not quickly die,
Thought I thy spirits were stronger than thy shames,
Myself would on the rearward of reproaches
Strike at thy life. (4.1.122-26)
Leonato assumes that Hero will die without his intervention because he believes that her
shame is stronger than her life spirit. By telling her to die, he also suggests that she
should have the narrative control to manage her own death.
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use and judgement of reason, and oppresseth memory” (D2r). Wright similarly
describes how sadness impacts the organ of the heart and changes the temperature of
body:
The cause why sadnesse doth so moove the forces of the body, I take to
be, the gathering together of much melancholy blood about the heart,
which collection extinguisheth the good spirits, or at least dulleth them;
besides, the heart being possessed by such an humour, cannot digest well
the blood and spirites, but converteth them into melancholy, the which
humour being colde and drie, dryeth the whole body, and maketh it wither
away. (E6v-E7r)
Enobarbus’s body has already been transformed in the exact ways that both Galenists
predict. Melancholy, the cold, dry humor, has literally dried and cooled the organ of his
heart. He describes his heart as being so “dried with grief” that it “will break to powder”
(4.10.16). Despite this material transformation, like the dancing Calantha, Enobarbus
does not immediately die. Instead, stubborn life, which he describes as “a very rebel to
my will” hangs on him (4.10.11).
Two scenes after he originally declares his heart broken, a pair of Caesar’s soldiers
discovers him, still alive, in the no man’s land between Antony and Caesar’s camps. 12
They see him muttering to the moon and move closer to hear him. When he falls to the
ground, one soldier claims “But he sleeps” (4.10.23). The other soldier is less convinced
and claims, “Swoons rather; for so bad a prayer as his was never yet for sleep” (4.10.24).
When they try to wake him, both are surprised to find that “The hand of death hath raught
him” (4.10.28). Before his sudden, strange, unexpected death, they overhear Enobarbus
call upon the “sovereign mistress of true melancholy” (the moon) to wrap him in “the
poisonous damp of night” (4.10.12-13). Like Brutus, who materially prepares himself to
12

This location, physically situated between the two warring camps, is symbolic of
Enobarbus’s conflicted loyalties.
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kill Caesar by “stealing out of his wholesome bed,/ To dare the vile contagion of the
night/ And tempt the rheumy and unpurged air/ To add unto his sickness,” Enobarbus
relies on the ability of the night to humorally permeate him (Julius Caesar 2.1.263-266).
Enobarbus calls on the moon above him to,
Throw my heart
Against the flint and hardness of my fault:
Which, being dried with grief, will break to powder,
And finish all foul thoughts. (4.10.12-13).
He needs the moon, an outside agent, to interfere with his body, which stubbornly refuses
to die. By willing the moon to further cool his body until the dry, cold organ of his heart
turns to powder and breaks, Enobarbus, like Calantha, organizes and narrates his own
heartbreak. By praying to the moon, he exposes a suicidal intention, but his choice is not
a suicide in the traditional sense; he does not plunge a dagger into his heart or drink from
a poisoned cup. Instead, as Erin Sullivan points out, “he wills his heart to break, a process
that he narrates to his audience” (“Shakespeare and the History of Heartbreak” 934).
Other than Enobarbus’s, the only other literal heartbreak that Shakespeare chooses to
stage is the death of King Lear. 13 As I discussed in the previous chapter, any

13

According to Kenneth W Heaton, a medical doctor who systematically recorded every
mention of a physical symptom or sign occurring in a character who was clearly
experiencing strong emotion, Iras, Cleopatra’s servant, also dies of a broken heart on
stage (Antony and Cleopatra, 5.2.283). However, as A.M. Kinghorn points out, “Whether
Iras died of grief, of heart-seizure or a prior asp-bite is of little dramatic consequence”
(106). He explains that “Few critics make an issue of Iras’s sudden demise” (106 n.9).
Kenneth Muir notes, ‘Iras dies first, either from grief or more probably from the bite of
the asp. This could be made clear in production” (Antony and Cleopatra: Critical Studies,
114). Many editors, including Nicholas Rowe, have both handmaidens apply the asp.
Since we have no other examples of Shakespeare’s characters instantaneously dying of a
broken heart on stage without first narrating their despair, I find the popular reading of
Iras applying the asp more likely.
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reading of Lear’s death is complicated by the fact that one of the most notable
differences between Q and F is the death of Lear.
Q reads:
Lear:
And my poore foole is hanged, no, no life, why should a dog, a horse,
a rat have life, and thou no breath at all, O thou wilt come no more, never, never,
never, pray you, undo this button, thank you sir. O, O, O, O.
Edgar:

He faints my lord, my lord!

Lear:

Breake hart, I prethe break.

And F reads:
Lear:

And my poore Fool is hang’d: no, no, no life?
Why should a Dog, a Horse, a Rat have life,
And thou no breath at all? Thou’lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never.
Pray you, undo this button. Thank you, sir.
Do you see this? Looke on her? Looke her lips.
Looke there, looke there. He dies

Edgar:

He faints, my Lord, my Lord.

Kent:

Breake heart, I prythee breake. 14

In chapter four, I discussed how the two extra F lines change the way that Lear’s death
can be interpreted. In Q, Lear, who had for so much of the play intrepidly fought off
melancholy, is finally thoroughly overcome by it. In F, Lear dies in a moment of
emotional conflict. The other subtle, but crucial difference that this textual crux exposes
is the extent to which Lear is the agent of his death. In Q, Lear, realizing that his
daughter is dead, like Enobarbus and Calantha, intentionally wills his heart to break and
narrates the moment of his death. As he calls for his own heart to break, his self-narrative
14

The editors of the Norton Shakespeare insert the stage directions, [to Lear]. I want to
argue that this editorial intervention is not necessary because the Kent of F more likely
directs this command to his own material heart than to Lear’s corpse.
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and his embodied emotional material synchronously end his life. But in F, Lear, fleetingly
believing that Cordelia lives, dies in a moment when he most desires life. In both Q and
F, Lear certainly dies as a result of excessive emotion, which materially alters his body.
However, is Lear’s death in the F really a result of heartbreak? In Q, the story that Lear
tells about what the materials in his body are doing is clear; he didactically explains that
his grief breaks his heart. F is more ambiguous. What story does Lear tell himself in his
final moments? Lear’s ability to manage either his material emotion or his self-narrative
is doubtful.
In F, it is Kent, not Lear, who attempts to use narrative to control his humoral
body; he begs, “Breake heart, I prythee breake.” Kent’s command goes unheeded (at
least for the duration of the staged action) but contextualizes his denial of Albany’s
request to help rule the kingdom: “I have a journey Sir, shortly to go/ My master calls
me, I must not say no.” Kent, who always defines himself as Lear’s loyal servant, is
metaphorically heartbroken at the moment of his master’s death. After willing his heart
to break, Kent tells the story of what is happening to his emotional body. He
demonstrates the emotional management that the Lear of F lacks and uses narrative to
will his metaphorical heartbreak to become literal. Ultimately, Kent’s passions, swelling
through his organs, act on their own accord, but by managing his self-narrative, he will
perform his final act of servitude and willingly follow Lear to the grave.
Like Ford’s Calantha, Shakespeare’s Queen Katherine, Enobarbus, the Lear of Q,
and the Kent of F craft narratives about the material changes in their organs, and
thereby, will their hearts to literally break. Their heartbreaks are neither the result of a
lack of control over their bodies nor a silencing of a dualist narrative. Instead, they are
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moments of targeted agency. These deaths reveal the complexity of Shakespeare’s
portrayal of the mind/body relationship. Shakespeare slips between the dualist mentality
of a mindful agent controlling and managing a body in motion and a monist approach to
the body and mind as a unified, indistinguishable substance. Although, like his
contemporary Galenists, Shakespeare understands that emotional anguish is
consubstantial with bodily material, which can ultimately literally burst the material
organ of the heart, he also gives power to a narrative making self. Therefore, in
explaining the essence of emotion, Shakespeare uses the language of two contrasting
worldviews. He continually blurs the boundaries between the body and mind while
simultaneously recognizing their distinction.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
In many ways, this project has been inspired by my friendship with Dr. Stephanie
Golden. As I wrote this dissertation, she was completing her PhD in neuropsychology
and working with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) patients at the VA Medical Center.
Stephanie and I are close friends, but we are also very different in many ways. As
Stephanie (and anyone who has spent any extended time with me) knows, my standard
emotional state is usually a happy one and I consider my cheerfulness to be my defining
characteristic. Stephanie is also a deeply joyful person, but can become exasperated with
me because she more often experiences cheer as a hard-won victory rather than
normative state of being. She is forthcoming about the fact that her struggles with anxiety
and depression inspired her to dedicate her professional life to studying the ways that the
brain produces the chemicals that we experience as emotion. After being diagnosed with
clinical depression and beginning to manage her mental health through pharmaceuticals,
she came to a realization: her depression is not her fault; she is not her depression.
Stephanie is able to understand her experience of depression as a symptom of a physical
aliment. As a diabetic can take insulin to manage blood sugar levels, Stephanie can take
medications that change the way her neurotransmitters process chemicals like serotonin.
Neuroscience, and the psychopharmacology it made possible, not only gives her
access to medical treatment (which empowers her to manage her emotions), it also gives
180
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her a new emotional vocabulary that she can use to think about and express what she
is feeling. Now, when she can feel her depression getting out of control, she does not say
to herself, “There is something wrong with me. I am sad. I want to be happy.” Instead,
she can say to herself, “I am depressed. There is something wrong with the dynamic
connectivity among my neuroanatomical structures involved in regulation of my mood
and stress response. I want to either structurally, functionally or molecularly alter my
brain.” 1 Of course, when she speaks about being frustrated with work, happy to see a
loved one, or excited for a vacation, she says nothing about neurons, axons, and synapses.
However, when she is feeling overwhelmed, struggling to control an emotion, or
concerned about what her emotions mean and how she can change them, her vocabulary
(and therefore her mode of contemplating the emotional) becomes increasingly material.
In these situations, she describes mechanisms of the nervous system rather than using
subjective emotional language.
When I first began to research the history of early modern emotion and Galenic
humoralism for this project, we had a conversation that shaped my research questions.
What began as a frank discussion about her depression shifted tone when she teased me
about my perkiness. She told me, “You know, Dev, my serotonin levels are too low and
yours are too high. I could find you a drug that might fix you too.” I was taken aback by
how much her comment bothered me. Despite the many hours we had spent discussing
emotion in material terms, I had never considered the source of my optimism to be a
chemical imbalance. I had seen Stephanie transform from a person who was unable to
muster up enough enthusiasm to leave her home, into the strong, confident woman whom
1

Language from “Neurobiology of Depression: an Integrated View of Key Findings” by
V. Maletic, M. Robinson, et all.
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I admire. I had come to believe that her body had been chemically imbalanced and by
altering its hormonal makeup, she was able to be her “true self.” The phenomenological
shift, which comes from conceptualizing emotion as material, empowers Stephanie.
However, it frightens me. What if her comment about my being chemically imbalanced
(albeit in a way which I experience in the form of joy, not depression) is true? If my
personality can be defined by my brain’s chemical processes, then what will happen if I
do something that inadvertently alters my body? Who will I be? How will I know
myself? It is comforting to be able to claim, “I am not my depression,” but does that
also mean that I have to confess, “I am not my joy?”
I found that the question I began to ask about myself (what am I if not my unique
emotional engagement with the world?) is also of sincere concern to characters on the
early modern stage. This the question that Jonson’s Thorello, asks as he struggles to
understand and define his identity after his normally calm composure is materially
overcome by a new passion. He unsuccessfully attempts to establish a self that is other
than and autonomous from his humoral body. Shakespeare’s concerned Worchester asks
this question about his rash nephew: What is Hotspur if not his choler? Can Hotspur ever
be the rational leader that the Percy family needs? When an unnamed gentleman
describes watching Cordelia go to war with her own passions, he raises a similar
question: is the emotionally overrun Cordelia still the same woman who so calmly
claimed that she could say “nothing” when her father demanded a declaration of love?
Does Ford’s heartbroken Calantha still have an autonomous self as her body dies from
the impact of destructive material emotion? Jonson, Shakespeare and Ford certainly
raise questions about the conflict between forces of embodied passions and human
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agency; however, for the most part, these questions remain unanswered.
This project has shown that, in order to make sense of emotion both my
neurocentric contemporaries (like Stephanie) and early modern writers (like Jonson,
Ford, and Shakespeare) use two contradictory systems of language: the monist, which
assumes a that physical material (either neurochemicals or humors) can govern a body
without regard to one’s individual will, and the dualist, which assumes an autonomous
self who maintains free will. The ability to fluctuate between the vocabulary of
materiality and the vocabulary of subjective emotional language gives both the follower
of neuroscience and the Galenist flexibility in creating self-narratives. Therefore, when
Thorello “strives, even in despite of hell, myself to be,” he crafts his self-narrative
(Every Man in His Humour 1.4.207). His “self” becomes not just the motion of the
material substance in the body, nor just an intangible being which exists independent of
any physical forces; instead, he is both his material body and an autonomous agent. As
Hotspur charges Hal on the battlefield, he is at once “altogether governed by humours,”
(as his wife asserts) and the willful master of his own destiny (1 King Henry IV, 3.1.228).
When Cordelia’s rebel passions seek “to be king o’er her,” she begins to cry,
experiencing a material change in her body while simultaneously maintaining her
unique identity; therefore, she becomes “sunshine and rain at once” (The History of
King Lear 17.19). Even Calentha who literally dies of a broken heart, is never reduced
to mere material nor able to establish a “self” that is entirely sovereign over her failing
body. However, she maintains narrative agency and is at once, Calantha, the story telling
agent, and Calantha, the humoral body. Both her narrative and her humoral makeup
cause her death.
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Like the early moderns, I maintain two contradictory beliefs: for me, the first
is grounded in the neurocentric principal that “what there is and all there is, is physical”
(Flanagan 594); the second (dismissed by Mudrik and Maoz as the “Double-subject
Fallacy”) is that I am the owner of my body and that “I” can fight to maintain my “self”
even if my neurochemicals change. For now, I have decided to embrace the inconsistency
inherit in simultaneously holding these beliefs. Like the early modern stage characters, I
both recognize that my emotional self is my material body and assert that I am the
storyteller of my own self-narrative. My contradictory notion of self continues to be
defined by the stories that I tell about what my body does.
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